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Introduction
A majority of all workers in the world are informally employed. Approximately 2 billion
workers, or 60% of the world’s employed population, earn their livelihoods in the infor-
mal sector. Workers in the informal sector often face higher risk of poverty and lower
productivity compared to formal workers (International Labour Office, 2018). One
reason is that they often lack access to social protection, which makes them vulnerable
to adverse shocks such as sickness or income loss. Social protection refers to policies
and programs designed to reduce and prevent poverty and vulnerability throughout
the life cycle and often include a mix of social insurance and social assistance programs
(International Labour Office, 2017). In the absence of these safety nets, adverse shocks
risk pushing households deeper into poverty or maintain them in a poverty trap.
During the last decades, large efforts have been made in many developing countries
to expand social protection to the informal sector and achieve universal coverage of such
programs. Despite wide agreement regarding the importance of social protection as a
key factor for inclusive growth, this human right is still not fulfilled for most people in
the world. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes that everyone
has the right to social security (Article 22). Although social protection policies are
seen as key elements in national development strategies in most countries, it has been
estimated that approximately 4 billion people, almost 55% of the world’s population,
have access to no or inadequate social protection (International Labour Office, 2017).
A majority of this group is represented by households in the informal sector.
Households in the informal sector face substantial idiosyncratic and common risk,
resulting in high income variability (Townsend, 1994). For a large share of these house-
holds who live on a day to day basis, adverse shocks such as health and employment
shocks, could throw families into poverty and have long lasting effects for generations.
For example, in 2015 approximately 930 million people incurred catastrophic health
expenditures, defined as out-of-pocket health spending exceeding 10% of household
consumption, pushing 89.7 million people into extreme poverty (World Health Organi-
zation & World Bank, 2019). As a result, informal labor is increasingly recognized as
an obstacle to eradicate poverty in many developing countries and a major challenge
for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals.
In the absence of social protection, the burden to protect households from idiosyn-
cratic and common shocks is placed on the families and communities themselves. To
deal with the effects of adverse shocks, households rely on strategies such as informal
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borrowing, asset sale and decreased education expenditures (Leive & Xu, 2008; Mitra
et al., 2016; Heltberg & Lund, 2009; Islam & Maitra, 2012). Additionally, uninsured
risk compels households to diversify income and to engage in low-risk and low-return
production activities (Cole et al., 2017; Dercon & Christiaensen, 2011) in order to
smooth consumption. These activities hamper the ability of households to grow their
incomes and escape poverty (Binswanger & Rosenzweig, 1993). As a result, households
are kept in persistent poverty. Despite informal insurance arrangements and strate-
gies income fluctuations often remain high, suggesting that informal income-smoothing
mechanisms are inadequate and leave households with uninsured risk (Townsend, 1995;
P. Gertler & Gruber, 2002).
Social protection can reduce the cost of coping strategies and enhance the capacity
of families and communities to absorb the negative impacts of shocks. For example,
cash transfers have been shown to have positive and sustained effects on child education
and health (Aizer et al., 2016; Baird et al., 2019), household investment in durable
goods and savings (Haushofer & Shapiro, 2016), and productive investments (Handa et
al., 2018; Bastagli et al., 2016; P. J. Gertler et al., 2012). Furthermore, in the presence
of idiosyncratic shocks, households with health insurance were more likely to invest
in schooling for girls, livestock and durable goods compared to uninsured households
(Liu, 2016). There is an international consensus on the importance of social protection
as a key policy tool for implementing the U.N. Sustainable Development Goals and to
ensure inclusive development where no one is left behind. Social protection is essential
to achieving a number of the SGDs such as eradicating poverty for all everywhere
(SDG 1), ending hunger (SDG 2), and contributing to gender equity and women’s
empowerment (SDG 5). Furthermore, by increasing access to affordable healthcare,
social protection can contribute to achieving universal health care (Target 3.8) and
good health and well-being for all (SDG 3). As a result, Target 1.3 explicitly calls on
countries to implement nationally appropriate social protection systems to end poverty
by 2030 (United Nations, 2015).
Despite a global agreement on the importance of social protection, questions regard-
ing how to best implement and expand effective and sustainable universal programs are
still unanswered. Countries often combine contributory social insurance schemes with
non-contributory social assistance programs in order to achieve a universal coverage.
On the one hand, non-contributory programs include universal and means-tested social
assistance programs that are key to ensuring a basic level of social protection for all
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residents, i.e. a social protection floor (Behrendt & Nguyen, 2018). While universal
programs are effective in reaching the poorest and most vulnerable households, they
also cover many households that are not in need of social protection. In the face of lim-
ited fiscal capacities, programs targeted to the poor might offer a more cost-effective
option. However, means-tested programs rely on costly mechanisms to identify the
poorest households (Aryeetey et al., 2012) with low levels of accuracy. This often leads
to under-coverage and errors of exclusion (Brown et al., 2016), resulting in a trade-off
between coverage and effectiveness.
On the other hand, contributory social insurance schemes tend to provide more
insurance coverage and a higher level of protection than social assistance programs.
However, social insurance schemes might be inaccessible for the poorest households
that often lack contributory capacity (Behrendt & Nguyen, 2018). In order to make
enrollment equitable, governments can subsidize enrollment. However, subsidies have
the potential of being regressive if contributions remain too high for the most vulnerable
households, preventing them from enrollment despite government subsidies (Kalisa et
al., 2016). Additionally, take-up of the social protection programs might be hindered
by factors such as lack of information (Hossain, 2011), high transaction costs (Capuno
et al., 2016), and low quality of services. These barriers must be defined and targeted
by well designed policies and interventions.
Ultimately, the potential capacity of social protection programs to address risk and
vulnerability, by contributing to increased productivity and resilience among house-
holds in the informal sector, represents another important factor that is likely to predict
take-up of the program and willingness to contribute to enrollment. This is largely con-
textual. If benefits are not aligned with the need and priorities of households, they may
be reluctant to contribute. The design of efficient policies is likely to be particularly
challenging for the informal sector that represents a complex and all but homogeneous
sector of the labor force in most developing country contexts. Increased knowledge
regarding the impacts of social protection programs can improve the predictability and
the efficiency of public policy.
Summary Thesis
My dissertation consists of three independent empirical papers on public policy in the
informal sector context. The aim of the thesis is to contribute to increase knowledge
regarding the efficiency of common policy tools in contributing to universal coverage of
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social protection programs and to increase resilience among households in the informal
sector. To do this, I use quasi-experimental evaluation methods in combination with
detailed administrative data to investigate the impact of policies on the take-up and
quality of social insurance programs in the informal sector, as well as their impact
on the productivity of economic activities. The overall contribution of my thesis is
to provide evidence related to the interaction between public policy and household
decision making, focusing primarily on economic performance and health. On the one
hand, the design and implementation of policy interventions will determine the effects
of such policies on the lives and livelihoods of households in the informal sector. On
the other hand, household preferences and decision making will determine the success
of implementation and take-up of these policies. In the first chapter I evaluate the
importance of premium subsidies as a policy tool to achieve universal coverage of
community-based health insurance (CBHI) in Rwanda, while considering the financial
self-sustainability of the insurance scheme. In the second paper I explore the impact
of a national social protection program in Mexico that addresses the burden of unpaid
housework on women, when evaluating its impact on female entrepreneurship.Finally,
in the third paper I investigate disparities in the quality of health services provided
within the community-based health insurance scheme in Rwanda.
In chapter 1, ”The Price Sensitivity of Demand for Health Insurance: Evidence
from Community Based Health Insurance in Rwanda”, I use the introduction of a new
premium subsidy scheme to estimate the price sensitivity of the demand for community-
based health insurance in Rwanda. The results indicate that the demand for health
insurance is price sensitive but not elastic, suggesting that the demand for health insur-
ance varies little in relation to the variation in price. Furthermore, my findings suggest
that the price sensitivity varies among socioeconomic groups. I use the estimated
price sensitivity to predict insurance coverage and the financial self-sustainability in
relation to a number of plausible subsidy schemes. As a direct result of the inelastic
insurance demand, take-up does not vary much across premium schemes. However,
the heterogeneity in price sensitivity indicates that premium subsidies will affect the
composition of enrolled individuals. To estimate the financial self-sustainability of the
subsidy schemes, I match administrative data on the cost of providing the insurance
scheme to estimate how much of the total insurer costs are covered by premiums for
each alternative subsidy scheme. This allows me to control for the potential effects of
adverse selection on patient costs. I find a positive slope of the cost curve, which is
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consistent with adverse selection, although the estimations suggest that the financial
implications of this are limited. Overall, the results suggest that premium subsidies
might represent an expensive policy tool for reaching universal heath coverage, one of
the key targets in the Sustainable Development Goals.
In chapter 2, ”The Role of Childcare in Firm Performance: Evidence from Female
Entrepreneurship in Mexico”, I study the impact of a national daycare program on
the performance of female-run microenterprises. Estancias Infantiles para Apoyar a
Madres Trabajadoras offered subsidized childcare to children younger than four years
old, whose mother was working in the informal sector. I explore the variation in
availability of the program in a difference-in-difference design, and compare outcomes
for women with children just below and above the eligibility threshold for the program.
Furthermore, I explore the roll-out of the childcare program in a triple-difference design
with treatment intensity that varies across municipalities and over time. I find no
evidence that the program was associated with changes in female entrepreneurship
and business performance, proxied by number of workhours, physical capital, or the
likelihood of operating the business from home, having an employee, or applying for
a credit. This paper is one of the first papers to study the importance of childcare
obligations as a barrier for business performance among female-run microenterprises
by evaluating the impact of a nationwide social policy program on female business
performance.
The third chapter, ”Variation in the Quality of Primary Healthcare: Evidence from
Rural and Urban health services in Rwanda”, I document disparities in the quality of
healthcare between rural and urban primary health clinics in Rwanda, and to what ex-
tent structural and contextual factors can explain such disparities. I use administrative
data on 12 quality indicators from each health facility to measure the quality of health-
care. This data was collected through direct observations and chart examinations, as
performed by professional health staff during regular quality inspections at the health
clinics. I use the quality indicators to construct two quality scores for each health
facility—one general score that includes health services, administration and manage-
ment, as well as laboratory work, and a second patient centered score that focuses on
the quality of patient services. The findings show a significant difference in quality
between rural and urban health clinics, where rural clinics underperformed in relation
to urban clinics in all dimensions. Furthermore, the results indicate that differences in
such factors only explain a small part of the disparities in health quality. This paper
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contributes to the discussion on how to erase inequality in health services within de-
veloping countries by providing evidence suggesting that variation in structural inputs
is unlikely to erase such disparities.
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1 Introduction
In 2015 the UN General Assembly included universal health coverage as part of the
overall commitment to the Sustainable Development Goals (United Nations, 2015).
Community-based health insurance (CBHI) has been adopted by many developing
countries as a financing mechanism to reach this goal by pooling health risks and
resources at the community level.1 So far enrollment in CBHI has often been low,
particularly among poor households (Gnawali et al., 2009; Yilma et al., 2015; Parmar
et al., 2014). In order to increase enrollment levels, many countries have implemented
premium subsidies.2 However, premium subsidies are costly and contribute to a lack of
self-financing of the insurance schemes as premium revenues cover only a small share of
the patient costs. In addition to impacts on insurance enrollment, premium subsidies
might affect the type of individuals who enroll, resulting in an association between
premiums and the insurer costs. Previous research from developing country contexts
suggests that premium subsidies could exacerbate the effects of adverse selection (Par-
mar et al., 2012), which would negatively affect the financial sustainability of the CBHI
scheme.
The main contribution of this paper is to study the impact of premium subsidies on
policy relevant outcomes such as insurance coverage and the financial self-sustainability
of the CBHI scheme. I use the introduction of a new premium scheme as a quasi
experiment to estimate the price sensitivity of demand for health insurance. This is
done in the context of Rwanda, a low-middle income country in Africa. Next, I use
the estimated price sensitivity to predict enrollment levels, and subsequently premium
revenue, for a number of plausible premium subsidy schemes. In order to evaluate
the financial sustainability associated with the different subsidy schemes, I use unique
data on the total insurer costs related to the CBHI to consider the potential effects
of adverse selection on the cost of providing the health insurance. To the best of my
knowledge, this is the first attempt to estimate the consequences of premium subsidies
on the financial sustainability of health insurance in a developing country context,
considering the financial impact of adverse selection.
In 2011 the government of Rwanda replaced a uniform subsidy scheme, in which all
individuals paid the same premium, with a targeted premium subsidy that was directed
1India (Aggarwal, 2010), Uganda (Basaza et al., 2008), Burkina Faso (Fink et al., 2013)
2Mexico (Bosch et al., 2012), Vietnam (Wagstaff et al., 2016), and Ghana (Asuming et al., 2017),
Burkina Faso (Parmar et al., 2012) offers targeted premium subsidies to poor households.
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to households with low socioeconomic status. The aim of the targeted subsidy was to
increase access to healthcare among poor households and to improve the financial sus-
tainability of the CBHI scheme (Kalisa et al., 2016). The categorization of households
into subsidy groups was based on Ubudehe, a classification system developed by the
Rwandan government to categorize all households according to socioeconomic status.
This resulted in a stratified premium scheme in which households categorized as having
low socioeconomic status received fully subsidized premiums whereas relatively wealth-
ier households were subject to a price increase. Exploiting the variation in premium
costs created by the policy reform, I estimate the price elasticity of insurance demand
using a linear probability model with individual fixed effects. Knowledge of the price
sensitivity of demand can inform policy makers regarding the effciency of premium
subsidies as a policy tool to promote universal health insurance.
I use panel data from the Rwandan Integrated Household Living Conditions Survey
(EICV) in 2010/11 and 2014 to estimate the price sensitivity of the demand for health
insurance. The results indicate that the demand for insurance is sensitive to price
change but it is not price elastic.3 An increase of the premium costs by 1,000 Rwandan
franc (RwF, corresponding to approximately USD 1.1), is associated with a decrease
in the likelihood of enrolling by 10.9 percentage points (ppt) (15% at the mean). This
implies an average elasticity of –0.18, indicating that the change in demand is small in
relation to the price change. The estimated elasticity is considerably lower than both
the elasticity of the demand for the National Health Insurance Scheme in Ghana esti-
mated by Asuming et al. (2017) and the price elasticity of demand for preventive health
products such as bed nets and deworming medicine (Dupas, 2011; Kremer & Miguel,
2007; Cohen & Dupas, 2010). The effect of changes to premium costs is heterogeneous
between different subgroups of households. Individuals living in poor households or
households headed by women have a higher price elasticity than individuals in non-
poor or male-headed households. As a result of the heterogeneity in price sensitivity,
the composition of beneficiaries varies among different subsidy schemes.
The association between household socioeconomic status and insurance premiums,
caused by the introduction of the stratified premium scheme, suggests that endogeneity
may be a concern for the interpretation of my results. I demonstrate the robustness of
my results to omitted variable bias using the Oster (2019) test. Furthermore, I estimate
the price sensitivity using samples that are balanced on observable characteristics.
3The demand is considered inelastic if the price elasticity is < |1|; that is, a given percentage
change in the premium cost will cause a smaller percentage change in the demand for insurance.
2
Comparing individuals with increasingly similar characteristics decreases the concerns
that omitted time-varying factors are driving the price sensitivity estimates.
Overall, the results indicate that government subsidy strategies will have a limited
effect on insurance coverage. This is a direct effect of the inelastic demand. For
example, I find that a decrease in the overall premium costs from RwF 3,000 to RwF
1,000 (USD 3.4 to USD 1.1) would increase take-up from 66% to 77%. Additionally, a
subsidy scheme that offers completely subsidized premiums for young children under six
years old corresponds to a predicted take-up of 67%. Overall, the simulations indicate
that the average insurance coverage remains relatively constant for different subsidy
schemes.
Financial sustainability is calculated as the share of insurer cost that is covered by
household premiums. I simulate the financial coverage related to the different pricing
strategies by calculating the share of insurer costs covered by premium revenue. In ad-
dition to considering the potential effects on enrollment levels, this forces me to further
consider the association between premium levels and the cost of providing health in-
surance. In the presence of selection, changes to the insurance premiums will affect the
cost of providing the insurance as the composition of insurance beneficiaries changes in
response to the changes in premium costs. As the premium costs increase, so does the
cost of providing insurance. Following the analysis presented by Einav et al. (2010),
I use unique administrative data on the total costs of providing CBHI in Rwanda and
provide evidence of a positive association between insurer costs and premium costs by
estimating the average cost curve for administrative sections.4 A positive slope of the
average cost curve indicates that the average insurer cost among enrolled households
in a section increases as the average premium level increases, consistent with adverse
selection.
I use the association between patient costs and insurance premiums to calculate the
financial sustainability in relation to alternative premium schemes. The simulations
indicate that the financial coverage of alternative premium subsidies differs depending
on whether the insurance market is adversely selected. In the absence of selection, the
range of financial coverage levels is wider, between 0.28 and 0.85. In the absence of
adverse selection, insurer costs are constant among the different subsidy schemes and
variation in the financial coverage is driven by changes in enrollment. Considering the
adverse selection scenario, the financial coverage reaches levels between 0.35 and 0.80
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for the majority of subsidy schemes; that is, household premiums cover approximately
35%–80% of the insurer costs. Not surprisingly, the difference between the level of
financial coverage in the selection and the levels in no-selection scenarios increases as
the premium levels deviate from the mean cost. Differences between average insurer
costs in scenarios with and without adverse selection are indicative of the financial
implications of selection. This is important knowledge that can inform policymakers
on how adverse selection translates into future costs faced by the insurer.
This study makes two contributions to the literature. First, it adds to a relatively
small and recent body of literature that seeks to evaluate the role of premium subsidies
in the take-up of health insurance in a developing country context (Thornton et al.,
2010; Asuming et al., 2017; Capuno et al., 2016; Wagstaff et al., 2016).5 This literature
primarily relies on experimental variation in premium costs to identify the effects of
short-term premium subsidy interventions on insurance take-up. To date, the empirical
evidence is inconclusive. While some studies find no evidence that premium subsidies
represent an efficient policy tool to increase take-up (Capuno et al., 2016; Wagstaff et
al., 2016),6 others find positive impacts on enrollment (Thornton et al., 2010; Asuming
et al., 2017).7 My study contributes to this literature by providing evidence from a na-
tionwide policy intervention that resulted in a considerable and indefinite price change.
This is important since previous research argues that onetime external subsidies alone
are often insufficient to encourage the take-up of health products (Kremer & Miguel,
2007). Furthermore, this study evaluates the demand of a popular insurance scheme
with a high enrollment rate. During 2011, 67% of the target population were enrolled
in the insurance scheme. This is a high number compared with enrollment rates in
other countries such as Burkina Faso, at 6%; Ghana, at 38% (Chemouni, 2018); and
5Another type of insurance that has received much attention in the literature is index-based crop
insurance. Evidence from this literature indicates that demand for insurance is price sensitive, but
that the insurance has low take-up rates at actually fair prices (Cole et al., 2013; Karlan et al., 2014;
Mobarak & Rosenzweig, 2014).
6Capuno et al. (2016) find that a 50% premium subsidy in combination with increased access to
information regarding the insurance led to a 3% increase in demand among informal worker households
in the Philippines. A 25% premium subsidy contributed to an increase in enrollment by 3.5 ppt in
Vietnam (Wagstaff et al., 2016).
7Asuming et al. find that households that received a premium subsidy were 38 ppt more likely to
enroll in the national health insurance scheme when receiving a subsidy that covered 1/3 of the price.
Furthermore, when premiums were fully subsidized, enrollment increased from 27% to 75%, indicating
that the demand is price sensitive. Levine and colleagues (2016) find that a premium subsidy of 80%
contributes to an increase in enrollment in the SKY social health insurance in Cambodia. In contrast
to previous studies, these results indicate that the demand is price elastic (–1.1). The Cambodian
study deviates from the other papers by evaluating an insurance scheme that targets rural populations.
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Laos, at 2% (Alkenbrack et al., 2013). In the context of very low enrollment rates,
alternative factors such as low quality of care, limited access to care, or limited in-
formation about the insurance are alternative factors that might represent first-order
barriers to insurance enrollment.
Second, this paper adds to a an emerging literature on adverse selection in the
developing country context,8 by estimating how insurer costs vary as the insurance
premiums change. Using this method, the slope of the cost curve provides a test for
selection in the CBHI market (Einav et al., 2010). This method has been frequently
used in developed countries (Bundorf et al., 2012; Einav et al., 2010), but this paper
is one of the first to provide evidence from the developing country context. Fischer
and colleagues (2018) find strong evidence of adverse selection for individual insurance
policies by using experimental variation in insurance price to identify the cost curve for
hospitalization insurance in Pakistan. Hospitalization insurance is a specialized health
insurance that insures households against severe health shocks that require hospital
care. This study differs from that of Fischer and colleagues (2018) because it evaluates
an insurance scheme that covers services at all service levels in the Rwandan healthcare
system, including preventive healthcare. This is a first step in using administrative
cost data on insurer costs to estimate the financial implications of selection in health
markets in the developing country context.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a description of the study
context and the CBHI scheme in Rwanda. Section 3 describes the data. The empirical
strategy is presented in Section 4, followed by the results and a sensitivity analysis in
Section 5. Section 6 provides the results from the financial self-sustainability analysis,
and Section 7 concludes.
8Earlier literature from the developing country context has primarily used the correlation between
ex-ante individual health risk and the likelihood of enrollment (Wang et al., 2006; Zhang & Wang,
2008), as well as the positive correlation test measuring the correlation between insurance coverage and
individual risk (Chiappori & Salanie, 2000), to identify adverse selection. The results are mixed: while
some studies find evidence of adverse selection (Wang et al., 2006; Zhang & Wang, 2008; Lammers et
al., 2010), others do not (Nguyen & Knowles, 2010; Banerjee et al., 2014). Importantly, the literature
is often limited to evaluating the relationship between baseline health risk and insurance take-up, few
studies consider the financial implications of adverse selection due to a lack of data on the costs of
insurance schemes.
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2 Community-Based Health Insurance
Community-based health insurance (CBHI) was introduced by the Rwandan govern-
ment in 1999 as a result of limited utilization and ability to pay for healthcare services
among large segments of the population. The main objectives of the CBHI scheme are
to provide equal access to healthcare services and to prevent people from catastrophic
healthcare costs by pooling resources in district and national risk pools (Kalisa et al.,
2016).
CBHI was initially introduced as a pilot project in 3 of the countries 30 districts
—Kabgayi, Kabuyare and Byumba—covering 52 health centers and 3 hospitals. Dur-
ing the following years, similar insurance schemes were introduced in other districts
throughout the country. In 2006, a national policy was implemented that standardized
the different regional schemes and developed a national health insurance scheme. The
national scheme is centrally managed by the ministry of health, which is responsible
for the overall policy development of the CBHI. At the same time, the CBHI continues
to be a highly decentralized insurance scheme that is coordinated in 30 administra-
tive districts. Each CBHI district is a legal body with branches –CBHI sections–at all
health centers in its geographic area. Each CBHI section represents approximately the
catchment area of a health center (Kalisa et al., 2016).
Enrollment in CBHI has increased drastically during the last decade. Appendix
Figure A1 shows national CBHI enrollment levels during the period 2003–15. Insur-
ance coverage increased sharply and peaked around 2010 with enrollment levels around
90%. In the following years, and in conjunction with the introduction of the new pre-
mium scheme, enrollment levels have been volatile and decreasing. Despite the recent
development, insurance enrollment is high compared with that in other countries with
similar insurance schemes: the National Health Insurance Scheme in Ghana reached a
coverage level of 40% in 2014 (Wang et al., 2017); the CBHI in Ethiopia, 8%; a na-
tional health insurance scheme in Nigeria, 3% (Chemouni, 2018); and Vietnam Social
Security, 42% (Lagomarsino et al., 2012).
One reason for the relatively high enrollment levels in Rwanda could be explained by
a strong policy focus on improved accessibility and quality of healthcare implemented in
part by the introduction of a performance-based financing scheme (Ministry of Health,
2012). During the last decades, Rwanda has recorded an impressive improvement
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in public health outcomes (World Bank, 2020),9 which has been accompanied by a
large increase in resources through CBHI insurance schemes, resource mobilization,
and external funds. Between 1998 and 2010 health expenditure increased from USD
10 to USD 40 per capita (Ministry of Health, 2015).
Figure 1 shows the distribution of health centers covered by the insurance scheme.
The facilities are distributed all over the country, with a high concentration in the
capital of Kigali. Each health center has a CBHI health section, which results in 100%
geographic coverage. All public health facilities are covered by the CBHI (Kalisa et
al., 2016).
Figure 1: Distribution of CBHI health centers in Rwanda
From a financial point of view, the CBHI scheme can be described as a local in-
surance scheme that pools funds at the national and district levels.The CBHI scheme
is financed mainly through member premiums, which represent approximately 66% of
the total budget Kalisa et al. (2016). These monetary contributions are received at the
community level and used to reimburse health centers for services provided. Approxi-
9Between 1996 and 2018, life expectancy almost doubled, from 35 to 69 years, and the under-five
mortality rate dropped from 196 to 35 per 1,000 births, and between 2000 and 2018, the maternal
mortality rate dropped from 1,160 to 248 per 100,000 live births (World Bank, 2020).
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mately 55% of the premium revenues remain in the CBHI section, while the remaining
premium contributions are channeled to fund the district risk pools in order to cover
hospital claims. Approximately 10% of the funds directed to the district risk pools are
forwarded to a national risk fund that covers services at the referral hospitals. The
Rwandan government represents the second-largest source of funding (14%), primarily
covering the contributions of indigent members. The global fund covers approximately
10% of the total budget, and patient copayments and contributions from other health
insurance schemes in the country cover the remaining costs. Since 2008 the Rwandan
government has mandated that other insurance companies provide 1% of their income
to the CBHI (Kalisa et al., 2016).
In addition to the premium, members pay a flat copayment of RwF 200 each time
they visit a health center, as well as a copayment of 10% of the total hospital bill. The
new premium schedule was meant to increase the financial sustainability by increasing
premium revenues and reducing dependence on external subsidies (Kalisa et al., 2016).
CBHI beneficiaries are entitled to predefined packages of healthcare services known
as the minimum package of activities (MPA) and the complementary package of ctivi-
ties (CPA). The MPA covers preventive, promotional and curative health services pro-
vided at the health centers, whereas the CPA includes services provided at the national
hospitals. The service packages are defined by the Ministry of Health. Beneficiaries
can access healthcare at public health facilities at all levels of the public healthcare
delivery system: health centers, district hospitals and referral hospitals. However, the
insurance does not cover healthcare at private health facilities (Kalisa et al., 2016).
In conjunction with the standardization of the CBHI scheme in 2006, a uniform
premium system was developed and introduced. This system required members to pay
an individual annual premium of RwF 1,000 (USD 1.1). The premium level was set to
cover the cost of health services provided at the health centers, but did not cover costs
associated with secondary level care such as at district and national hospitals (de la
Sante, 2004). As a result, the premium costs paid by insurance beneficiaries were
significantly subsidized through a uniform premium subsidy scheme. Furthermore, the
Rwandan government offered full premium subsidies to indigent households. Despite
this targeted subsidy, the premium structure was considered strongly regressive and
exclusive of the poor (Kalisa et al., 2016).
To promote equal access to healthcare, in 2011, the flat-rate premium was replaced
by a stratified premium system based on targeted subsidies to households with low
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socioeconomic status. Besides increasing the equity of the insurance, the targeted
subsidies were part of an overall policy change that aimed to strengthen the adminis-
trative structure of the insurance scheme. Another aim was to increase the financial
self-sustainability of the insurance. The new subsidy scheme was based on Ubudehe
categories, a socioeconomic classification system developed by the Ministry of Local
Government.
The Ubudehe system was first introduced by the Rwandan government in 2001, well
before the introduction of the targeted premium subsidy. This is important because
it verifies that the classification of households into Ubudehe groups was not devel-
oped with the aim of determining the premium costs for the CBHI. Households using
a community-based targeting process, with each community divided into cells, small
groups of approximately 10 households each. Each cell has a supervisor who is respon-
sible for keeping track of and updating the categorization of the households in the cell.
To control the reporting of Ubudehe categorization, the complete list of households is
revised yearly by the whole village on one of the village work days (Umuganda) that
are mandatory for all residents. The categorization is revised yearly by the Ministry
of Health at the national level (Kayobotsi, 2019).
Under the Ubudehe system, the population was divided into six categories reflec-
tive of socioeconomic status. The system considers a wide range of socioeconomic
factors including household nutrition, financial and nonfinancial assets, access to prop-
erty, household livelihood and production capacity, with households in category 1
classified as living in abject poverty and those in category 6 classified as money rich
(MINECOFIN, 2002). (For further description of the Ubudehe classification, see ap-
pendix table A1) Importantly, although the Ubudehe classification system is correlated
with the national poverty measure, based on household consumption levels, this mea-
sure does not perfectly predict household Ubudehe classification. Appendix table A2
shows the relation between Ubudehe categorization and poverty classification accord-
ing to the national poverty line. The majority of both poor and nonpoor households
were categorized as Ubudehe group 3. However, a larger share of poor households were
placed in lower Ubudehe categories relative to the share of nonpoor households in the
higher categories. Importantly, both poor and nonpoor households are present in all
Ubudehe categories.
As shown in table 1, households in premium category—1 that is, the lowest two
Ubudehe groups, 1 and 2—were subject to an annual individual premium of RwF 2,000
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(USD 2.2) according to the new premium scheme implemented in 2011. However,
this premium is completely subsidized by the government. Ubudehe groups 3 and 4
fell into CBHI premium category 2, paying a premium of RwF 3,000 (USD 3.4) per
individual and year. Households in the two highest Ubudehe groups, 5 and 6, were
placed in premium category 3, with a premium of RwF 7,000 (USD 7.9) per year. All
members of a household were subject to the same premium level. On average, the
policy change resulted in an increase in premium costs among beneficiary households.
While the number of beneficiaries who received fully subsidized premiums increased,
households in the two highest premium categories faced a relatively sharp price increase
following the policy change. According to the summary statistics presented in appendix
table A3, the yearly consumption of a household was approximately RwF 218,426
(USD 221). The average household included 5 household members, so a household in
premium category 2 would pay RwF 15,000 to enroll all family members in the CBHI
scheme, and therefore the premium cost would represent approximately 7% of their
yearly consumption. Importantly, beneficiaries of the CBHI scheme are enrolled on an
individual basis, paying individual premiums to enroll.
Table 1: Ubudehe and Premium Categories
(1) (2) (3)
Ubudehe CBHI Premium Premium
premium before 2011 (RwF) after 2011 (RwF)
Ubudehe 1 (abject poverty) Category 1 0 or 1,000 0
Ubudehe 2 (very poor)
Ubudehe 3 (poor) Category 2 0 or 1,000 3,000
Ubudehe 4 (resourceful poor)
Ubudehe 5 (food rich) Category 3 1,000 7,000
Ubudehe 6 (money rich)
Notes: Column 1 shows the CBHI premium categories based on the Ubudehe groups in the leftmost
column. Column 2 presents the premium scheme before the policy change in 2011, and column 3
shows the premium scheme after the policy change. RwF 1,000 is equivalent to approximately USD
1.1, RwF 3,000 to USD 3.4, and RwF 7,000 to USD 7.9.
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3 Data
This analysis is based primarily on data from the Rwandan Integrated Household
Living Conditions Survey (EICV), a household survey representative at the national
level, using two survey rounds conducted in 2010–11 (EICV3) and 2014 (EICV4). A
subsample of the households surveyed in 2010–11 were tracked and interviewed again
in 2014, resulting in a panel with 2108 households.
Data for the EICV3 were collected during a one-year period between October 2010
through October 2011, both before and after July 1, 2011, when the new CBHI pre-
mium scheme was implemented. The baseline data have been adjusted to include only
those households interviewed before the policy change. Furthermore, for the purpose of
this analysis, 188 households that had at least one family member who reported being
enrolled in another health insurance scheme were dropped. I restrict the sample to in-
clude only households where age and sex are consistent for household members between
the rounds.10 The above data adjustments resulted in a final data set with 937 house-
holds and 3806 individuals. The data include household demographics, socioeconomic
characteristics, wealth, employment and health conditions.
Appendix table A3 presents summary statistics for all households in the sample.
The results suggest that approximately 40% of the sample had access to piped water
and 78% to improved sanitation such as toilet or latrines with slab. Almost half of the
individuals in the sample stated that they worked and 87% lived in a rural household.
Approximately half were younger than 20 years old, and around 13% were older than
50 years. Women made up 53% of the sample, and households had on average five
members. Nearly 42% of the sample lived in households that were categorized as poor
based on the national poverty line. A large majority of households, 90%, were classified
in Ubudehe groups 2 and 3. Additionally, approximately 9% of the sample belonged
to Ubudehe group 4 and 1% to group 1. Ubudehe group 5 represented less than 1% of
the sample, and no observations were categorized in group 6. Individuals in the two
highest Ubudehe categories were likely to be enrolled in private insurance schemes.
10I dropped 117 households due to error in coding. Given changes in individual characteristics,
such as sex and age, the data suggested that individual identifiers were used for different people and
household sin the follow-up data survey in 2014.
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3.1 Indigent households
The EICV data do not contain information regarding household insurance premiums.
To define the premium cost for each household after the introduction of the new pre-
mium scheme, I use information on household Ubudehe category. This allows me to
define the premium cost of enrolled households as well as the premiums that unenrolled
households would have been subject to if they enrolled in the CBHI.
Before the introduction of the stratified premium scheme, households paid a uni-
form premium to enroll in the CBHI scheme, independent of their Ubudehe category.
According to administrative documents, however, the premium for indigent households
was already completely subsidized before the policy change. I lack information that
allows me to identify the subsidized households. However, administrative documents
indicate that approximately 11%–16% of the poorest households were considered des-
titute (Kalisa et al., 2016; Lu et al., 2012; Kalk et al., 2010).
I use a number of alternative strategies to identify the indigent households base
on household Ubudehe category and a national poverty measure based on household
consumption. The definitions are presented in table 2. First, households that were
categorized in Ubudehe group 1 or 2 and simultaneously were defined as extremely poor
by the national poverty measure are defined as indigent. Second, I use a definition based
exclusively on household consumption level, defining households with a consumption
level below (i) the 10th percentile or (ii) the 16th percentile as indigent.
Importantly, information about household Ubudehe category is available only in
the post-treatment data (2014). I use two strategies to define household Ubudehe
category prior to the policy change. First, I make the assumption that the Ubudehe
category is constant during the study period (premium Ubudehe). Second, I use a
number of household characteristics to predict the likelihood of being categorized in
Ubudehe group 1 or 2 (predicted Ubudehe) in the post-treatment data. Appendix table
A4 presents the estimated correlation between these households characteristics and the
likelihood of being categorized in Ubudehe group 1 or 2 in 2014. Households with a
predicted likelihood that exceeds the 75th percentile are categorized in Ubudehe group
1 or 2.
By using a number of different definitions of the households that were exempted
from insurance premiums in 2010–11, I show that the estimated price elasticity is robust
to the definition of these households. The results are presented in the section 5.
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Table 2: Alternative definitions of completely subsidized, indigent households in
2010–11
Ubudehe Households categorized as Ubudehe 1 or 2 (in 2014) and defined
as extremely poor according to national poverty measure
Predicted Ubudehe Households predicted as Ubudehe category 1 or 2 and defined
as extremely poor according to national poverty measure
16th percentile 16 percent of households with the lowest consumption
10th percentile 10 percent of households with the lowest consumption
Note: Households categorized as indigent received subsidized insurance premiums before
the policy change in 2011.
4 Empirical Strategy
The introduction of the new premium scheme implied that households in different
Ubudehe categories were subject to different price changes as a result of the policy
change. I use the price variation to identify the price sensitivity of the demand for
CBHI in Rwanda. Table 3 provides a detailed description of the price variation caused
by the policy change as well as the corresponding variation in insurance enrollment.
The results are given separately for the alternative definitions of indigent households.
Table 3 presents the full range of price variation in the data. According to the
stratified premium scheme, households that paid a premium of RwF 1,000 in the base-
line were subject to (i) a full premium subsidy after the policy change (row 1), (ii) a
price increase by RwF 2,000 if they ended up in premium category 2 after the premium
change (row 3), or (iii) an increase by RwF 6,000 if they were classified as premium
category 3 (row 5). Households that were exempted from paying an insurance premium
before the policy change either ended up in premium category 1 after the policy change
and continued to get fully subsidized premiums (row 2) or were classified as category
2 and faced an increase in the premium cost by RwF 3,000 (row 4).
In addition to the different premium changes, table 3 shows related variations in
insurance enrollment as well as the number of individuals affected by each price change
(N). The results are included for each alternative definition of indigent households. As
expected, the results show that the number of households that were subject to each
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price change depends on the definition of the insurance premium prior to the policy
change. The majority of individuals, 73%–65%, endured a premium increase by RwF
2,000 as a result of the new policy scheme. Additionally, approximately 17%–22% were
subject to a price decrease by RwF 1,000, whereas 4%–10% of the sample received full
premium subsidies both before and after the premium change and were consequently
not affected by the new premium scheme. This group is smaller when indigent house-
holds are defined in relation to the 10th percentile of household consumption. Finally,
given the lack of coherence between the Ubudehe categorization and the poverty mea-
sure based on household consumption, households that were defined as destitute in
2010 could face premium costs of RwF 3,000 after the policy change.11 Less than 1%
of the sample endured a price increase of RwF 6,000.
Overall, the results indicate that the distribution of price variations caused by the
implementation of the new premium scheme is robust to different definitions of the pre-
mium scheme in the pre-treatment period. Additionally, table 3 describes changes in
insurance enrollment associated with each premium change. The association between
insurance premiums and enrollment is stable across the different definitions of indigent
households, but varies among premium groups. The results suggest that there is a
negative association between changes in insurance premiums and enrollment within
almost all premium groups. There is an increase in insurance enrollment within the
group of households that were not affected by the premium change (∆ premium = 0).
The positive variation in insurance enrollment within this premium group is explained
by variables other than the cost of insurance premium, such as for example information
campaigns or public efforts to decrease obstacles for enrollment among these house-
holds. This analysis focuses on the importance of variation in premium costs to explain
variation in insurance enrollment.
11This price variation is dropped as a result of the construction of the premium scheme in the pre-
treatment period when indigent households are defined based on the assumption of constant Ubudehe
categories (Ubudehe, columns 1 and 2).
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Table 3: Variation in premium costs and enrollment levels before and after
policy change for different definitions of indigent households
Ubudehe Pred. Ubudehe 16th pctl. 10th pctl.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
premium enrollm. N (%) enrollm. N (%) enrollm. N (%) enrollm. N (%)
1. -1000 0.175 659 (17) 0.169 738 (19) 0.149 731 (19) 0.174 837 (22)
2. 0 0.226 340 (9) 0.257 261 (10) 0.310 268 (7) 0.284 162 (4)
3. 2000 -0.120 2797 (73) -0.117 2617 (69) -0.105 2456 (65) -0.112 2576 (69)
4. 3000 — — -0.156 180 (5) -0.226 341 (9) -0.213 221 (6)
5. 6000 -0.20 10 (0) -0.20 10 (0) -0.20 10 (0) -0.20 10 (0)
Notes:The table describes the price variation used to identify the price elasticity in the analysis and
the corresponding variation in insurance enrollment. The results are presented separately for each
alternative definition of the premium scheme prior to the policy change (indigent households).
I plot the within-group variation in insurance premiums and enrollment in ap-
pendix figure A2 for each separate premium group, as described in table 3. Despite
low variation in premium costs, the figures suggest that the relationship between the
within-group variations in premium and enrollment is approximately linear and nega-
tive. Given the distribution of the observations in combination with the limited price
variation in the data, I estimate the price sensitivity using a linear estimation model.
Importantly, the different plots suggest that the distribution of observation is similar
for the alternative definitions of indigent households. The results indicate that the
estimated price elasticity is expected to be robust to the different definitions of indigent
households. In the following analysis, I use the definition of indigent households based
on constant Ubudehe categories as the preferred definition of indigent households, but
provide price sensitivity estimates for all alternative definitions in appendix table A5.
I use the variation in insurance premiums caused by the introduction of the new
premium scheme to identify the effect of a price change on insurance enrollment. My
baseline specification to estimate this effect is presented in equation (1). I estimate
equation (1) using a linear probability model (LPM) with individual fixed effects (FE):
Pr(CBHIijt = 1|Xijt, µi, pCBHIjt , γt) = β1pCBHIjt +Xijtβ2 + γt + µi + εit (1)
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where i indexes individual, j household, and t time periods. CBHIijkt indicates
individual i’s insurance status in time period t. The treatment variable, indicated
by pCBHIjt , measures the premium level of each household in time t. Xijt is a vector
of individual and household time-varying factors that are potentially correlated with
the outcome, such as age, labor and health status, household consumption, access to
water and sanitation services, and travel time to closest clinic. µi are individual fixed
effects, controlling for individual heterogeneity across individuals that are constant
over time. Importantly, individual fixed effects control for time constant differences in
individual health risk and underlying health status which are likely to be correlated
with insurance status, as well as premium costs. The fixed effects also control for time-
invariant differences among individuals belonging to different Ubudehe categories. Year
fixed effects, γt, captures aggregate changes in insurance enrollment over time.
In all specifications, standard errors are clustered at the household level. By doing
this, I allow for correlation in the error term for individuals within the same household.
I choose this level of clustering because individuals within a household are exposed to
a number of factors such as household composition and culture, as well as underlying
health conditions that are likely to affect the individual decision to enroll in health
insurance.
4.1 Threats to identification
The difficulty of evaluating the effect of insurance premiums on enrollment lies in
the fact that the changes in premium schemes are often endogenously determined,
that is, the premiums are often likely to be correlated with observable or unobservable
characteristics of the population. As described earlier, the introduction of the stratified
premium scheme for the CBHI in Rwanda was not random across individuals but
depended on household socioeconomic status. Given the structure of the new premium
scheme, households with a relatively higher socioeconomic status endured a larger
price increase than households with lower socioeconomic status. At the same time, the
detailed classification of household socioeconomic status makes it possible to identify
households that are relatively similar in terms of a measure of socioeconomic status that
is more complex than measures that are based on household income. In this context, the
Ubudehe system allows me to identify households, in consecutive Ubudehe categories,
that were potentially relatively similar in relation to a number of characteristics but
were subject to significantly different price changes.
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In order to produce unbiased estimates, the fixed effects estimator is based on the
assumption that all unobservable factors that might simultaneously affect insurance
enrollment and premium category are time-invariant. The individual fixed effects (µi)
reduce the concern that differences in individual characteristics among premium groups
drive the estimated price sensitivity by controlling for all variables that are consistent
over time, such as preferences, risk aversion, and underlying health characteristics.
However, time-varying unobservable characteristics remain a concern and a potential
source of endogeneity. In this section, I discuss potential channels through which these
variables potentially could confound the estimated price elasticity presented in next
section.
The relationship between socioeconomic status and health is well documented in
the economics literature, suggesting a positive association between health and socioeco-
nomic status (Cutler et al., 2008). The individual fixed effects control for all differences
in health status among premium categories that are constant over time. However, pre-
vious research also indicates that individuals with low socioeconomic status are more
likely to suffer from health shocks than those with relatively higher socioeconomic sta-
tus (Currie & Hyson, 1999; Currie & Stabile, 2002). As a result, systematic differences
in health status among Ubudehe categories could imply that the effects of an adverse
health shock, such as a malaria outbreak, disproportionately would affect individuals
in the low premium group (who were subject to a price decrease), increasing their will-
ingness to enroll in health insurance. If this shock coincided with the policy change,
this could create an association between premium change and the willingness to en-
roll in health insurance even on the absence of price sensitivity. This would result in
an upward bias of the estimated price sensitivity, leading to an upper bound of the
price sensitivity. To control for potential differences in health changes among premium
categories, I control for variation in health status before and after the policy change
by including an indicator for whether an individual was sick during the previous two
weeks as well as an indicator for disability.
Another potential concern related to differences in socioeconomic status among the
different premium groups are public health interventions that exclusively target poor
households in the low Ubudehe categories (groups 1 and 2). If the timing of such
policy intervention coincided with the price change of the CBHI, and if the interven-
tion resulted in improved health status among targeted households, this could result
in a downward bias of the price sensitivity estimates. Households that received fully
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variables potentially could confound the estimated price elasticity presented in next
section.
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the economics literature, suggesting a positive association between health and socioeco-
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in the low premium group (who were subject to a price decrease), increasing their will-
ingness to enroll in health insurance. If this shock coincided with the policy change,
this could create an association between premium change and the willingness to en-
roll in health insurance even on the absence of price sensitivity. This would result in
an upward bias of the estimated price sensitivity, leading to an upper bound of the
price sensitivity. To control for potential differences in health changes among premium
categories, I control for variation in health status before and after the policy change
by including an indicator for whether an individual was sick during the previous two
weeks as well as an indicator for disability.
Another potential concern related to differences in socioeconomic status among the
different premium groups are public health interventions that exclusively target poor
households in the low Ubudehe categories (groups 1 and 2). If the timing of such
policy intervention coincided with the price change of the CBHI, and if the interven-
tion resulted in improved health status among targeted households, this could result
in a downward bias of the price sensitivity estimates. Households that received fully
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subsidized premiums after the policy change would simultaneously decrease their will-
ingness to pay for insurance as a result of improved health status and lower expected
health costs. Using the reverse logic, any simultaneous government intervention that
contributed to improve incomes among households in the two lower Ubudehe categories
would result in an upward bias of the price elasticity estimates, as the willingness to
pay for insurance would increase as a result of improved incomes.
According to the Rwandan Health Sector Strategic Plan, one policy focus area has
been increased access to improved water and sanitation services among poor households
in the lower Ubudehe categories (Ministry of Health, 2012). I control for changes in
access to water and sanitation services by including indicators for household main water
supply and toilet facility in my specification. Importantly, these proxy variables adjust
for all potential changes in unobservable factors that are correlated with improved
water and sanitation services such as individual health status. I discuss the variation
in access to these services in the next section.
Reverse causality represents another possible source of endogeneity. Increased ac-
cess to health insurance is likely to affect individual health status and labor productiv-
ity positively, which in turn would affect household premium costs through improved
socioeconomic status and Ubudehe group. However, because of the complexity of the
Ubudehe categorization, household Ubudehe status is unlikely to change drastically
from one year to another. To change the classification, households would have to show
improvement across several wealth-related factors such as main livelihood, nutrition,
assets and children’s schooling. Despite the possibility that improved health and la-
bor productivity could affect some of the Ubudehe indicators in the short run, other
factors, such as access to land and housing, are likely to change only in the medium
to long run, that is, not within the time frame of this study period. As a result, it is
reasonable to think that the effects of reverse causality are likely to be larger in the
medium and long run. Consequently, I consider the risk of reverse causality limited.
Finally, the identification strategy relies on the assumption that the Ubudehe clas-
sification process did not allow for elite capture. Elite capture would bias the results
upward, leading to an upper bound of the true price sensitivity. As described earlier,
the classification of households into Ubudehe categories is the result of a highly partic-
ipatory process in which all households in a village have to agree unanimously on the
classification of each household. This process works as a control function to minimize
elite capture and maintain the accuracy of the Ubudehe categorization. The high level
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of transparency in the classification process contributes to decreasing the likelihood of
elite capture as a common phenomenon. Community-based targeting has often been
framed as a trade-off between the better information that communities have on the
wealth levels of their population and the risk of elite capture in the targeting process.
However, previous empirical research indicates that the community-based targeting is
not significantly different from other targeting strategies and that elite capture does
not affect the accuracy of beneficiary targeting (Alatas et al., 2012). Importantly, the
downward bias caused by elite capture would not undermine the results and conclusions
in the analysis.
In the next section, I address the plausible concerns related to omitted variable
bias using the Oster (2019) method. The Oster test suggests that the results are ro-
bust to omitted variable bias. In addition to the Oster analysis, I estimate the price
sensitivity using samples that are increasingly balanced on covariates. Balanced sam-
ples contribute to decreasing the correlation between the policy change and household
socioeconomic status.
4.2 Differences among groups
As discussed in the previous section, the validity of the fixed effects estimator relies on
the assumption that there are no confounding effects. This assumption requires that
changes in insurance enrollment were not associated with differential changes in time-
varying confounders among the different premium categories. One step in verifying the
identifying assumption would be to provide evidence of parallel trends in the outcome
variable prior to the treatment. However, lack of access to adequate pre-treatment data
does not allow for a parallel trends analysis in this study. Instead, in this section I
investigate changes in time-varying observables among premium groups, both pre- and
post-treatment. Information regarding the balance in observable covarates between
the premium groups, over time, could provide information regarding the importance
of confounding effects.
Table 4 provides summary statistics of household and individual characteristics
for premium categories 1 and 2. Columns 2 and 3 show the balancing tables for
households in each premium categories related to a number of time-varying observable
predictors. The results indicate that there are significant differences in characteristics
between the two premium categories. Overall, the descriptive statistics indicate that
individuals living in a households that are classified as premium category 1 (Ubudehe
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1 and 2) have lower socioeconomic status than households in category 2 (Ubudehe 3
and 4). These differences in descriptive statistics confirm the accuracy of the Ubudehe
classification system as a tool to categorize households according to their socioeconomic
status. Individuals in premium category 1 are less likely to have access to piped water
or have a flush toilet or latrine with solid slab, they have significantly lower household
consumption, and they are less likely to run a nonfarm enterprise, although individuals
in category 1 are more likely to be salary workers. There is no difference between the
two groups regarding the likelihood of working.
The descriptive statistics in columns 1 and 2 show that there is a significant dif-
ference between the groups in health-related factors; that is, households in the lower
premium category are more likely to report having experienced a health issue during
the last two weeks prior to the survey, or to have a disability. Additionally, households
in premium category 1 need to travel 0.38 hours longer on average to reach the nearest
hospital. However, there is no significant difference in travel time to the nearest clinic.
Importantly, the fixed effects estimation strategy allows for differences in character-
istics among individuals in different premium groups, as long as these differences are
constant across time and controlled for in the baseline specification.
The last three columns of table 4 display the estimated changes in the observable
characteristics over time. Columns 5 and 6 present changes in individual and household
characteristics between the periods before and after the introduction of the new policy
scheme. Column 7 shows the difference in these changes between the two premium
groups—that is, the difference-in-difference estimates. These estimates indicate that
the baseline differences between the two groups persist over time for the majority of
individual characteristics. Importantly, there is no significant change over time in the
variation of individual health measures and consumption levels, factors that have a
strong likelihood of simultaneously affecting Ubudehe category and the demand for
health insurance. The results provide tentative evidence that differential changes in
unmeasured variables between premium categories are not likely to drive the results
in the analysis. However, unobservable and time-varying characteristics could still
represent a threat to the identification.
I will discuss this further in the following section.
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Table 4: Summary statistics for premium categories 1 and 2, baseline 2010—11
Levels Change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables All Premium Premium Diff Premium Premium Diff-in-diff
category 1 category 2 category 1 category 2
Health issue 0.180 0.212 0.168 0.043*** 0.065 0.069 -0.004
Disability 0.050 0.074 0.041 0.033*** 0.008 -0.005 0.013
Piped water 0.321 0.290 0.332 -0.042** 0.120 0.158 0.038**
Sanitation 0.744 0.620 0.789 -0.169*** 0.066 0.077 -0.010
Own house 0.924 0.881 0.940 -0.059*** 0.021 0.013 0.008
Own land 0.974 0.961 0.978 -0.016*** -0.022 -0.015 -0.006
Work 0.468 0.454 0.472 -0.0178 0.102 0.067 0.035***
Salary worker 0.227 0.268 0.212 0.057*** 0.047 0.020 0.027*
Own nonfarm enterprise 0.116 0.092 0.124 -0.032*** 0.017 0.005 0.012
Poor 0.451 0.607 0.396 0.211*** -0.052 -0.055 0.002
Consumption HH 212,486 159,826 231,295 -71,468*** 7,273.92 13,467 -6,193
Rural 0860 0.882 0.852 0.030** 0.038 0.013 0.025**
Female 0.530 0.557 0.521 0.036* - - -
HH size 5.167 4.795 5.300 -0.504*** 0.928 0.872 0.056
Travel time clinic 0.808 0.842 0.796 0.045 -0.107 -0.004 -0.111
Travel time hospital 3.111 3.390 3.012 0.378*** 0.177 0.186 -0.009
Age 0–5 0.198 0.177 0.206 -0.028* - - -
Age 6–19 0.344 0.379 0.331 0.048*** - - -
Age 20–29 0.142 0.108 0.154 -0.046*** - - -
Age 30–39 0.117 0.104 0.121 -0.017 - - -
Age 40–49 0.078 0.071 0.080 -0.009 - - -
Age 50–65 0.087 0.101 0.081 0.020* - - -
Age > 65 0.038 0.064 0.028 0.036*** - - -
Observations 3 796 999 2 797
Notes: Column 1 shows baseline summary statistics for individuals in premium categories 1 and 2.
Columns 2 and 3 present summary statistics for both premium groups separately, whereas column 4
shows the differences between the two groups for each variable. Columns 5 and 6 present the changes
in individual and household characteristics between the pre- and post-policy time periods, for each
premium group, whereas column 7 presents the difference in changes in characteristics between CBHI
categories 1 and 2 —that is, the difference-in-difference estimate. Consumption in RwF 1,000 and
travel time in hours. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
5 Results
In this section, I estimate the price sensitivity of the demand for health insurance using
the linear probability model with individual fixed effects. I also provide evidence of the
robustness of the estimated price sensitivity to omitted variables bias by estimating the
Oster approach and providing price sensitivity estimates based on balanced samples.
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Finally, I use the estimated price sensitivity to predict insurance enrollment related to
a number of plausible premium subsidy schemes.
Table 5 presents the results of estimating equation (1) using the complete sam-
ple including the full set of price variation. Each column shows the price sensitivity
estimate, including different sets of covariates. Column 1 shows the unconditional
estimate of the price sensitivity, including only a time indicator that controls for un-
derlying time-varying factors that affect insurance enrollment and are common to all
premium groups, and column 2 adds individual fixed effects. The estimated price elas-
ticity more than doubles when I control for individual heterogeneity compared with the
unconditional estimate. The results suggest that the individual heterogeneity is posi-
tively correlated with the price change, creating an upward bias of the unconditional
estimate. This is likely to be explained by a higher underlying enrollment rate among
wealthier households, which face higher premium costs. The following columns show
that the estimated price sensitivity is robust to the inclusion of a number of covariates:
Column 3 controls for individual labor status and includes an indicator that equals one
if a household is situated in a rural household. In column 4, I additionally control for
changes in individual health status by including an indicator for whether an individual
has a disability or was sick during the two weeks prior to the interview. A control for
household consumption is added in column 5, and the last column includes controls
for any change in access to piped water and sanitation. The results suggest that the
estimated price sensitivity is robust to the inclusion of covariates.
The preferred specification in column 6 suggests that an RwF 1,000 increase in
the premium level is associated with a 10.9 ppt decrease in the likelihood of being
enrolled in the CBHI. This is equivalent to a 15.2% decrease at the mean (0.717). The
policy change resulted in an increase in premium levels by 83.7% on average, across
the entire sample, resulting in a price elasticity of the demand for health insurance of
–0.18. Taken together the results indicate that although health insurance coverage is
sensitive to price change, the overall demand is price inelastic; that is, the elasticity is
less than 1.
In appendix table A5, I test that the estimated price sensitivity is not driven by a
single premium group by stepwise excluding premium groups in the fixed effects anal-
ysis. The results indicate that no single group is driving my results and the estimated
price elasticity is relatively stable across the different samples (panel A). Furthermore,
panels B—D replicate the results in table 5 for alternative assumptions of the premium
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scheme prior to the policy change as discussed earlier (see table 2 for further details).
The results indicate that the estimated price sensitivity is robust to the different defi-
nitions of indigent households.
Importantly, although the fixed effects model controls for all time-invariant hetero-
geneity, there could still be time-varying heterogeneity that the model does not control
for. As discussed in previous sections, this could potentially cause biased estimates.
In the following section, I provide evidence of the robustness of the results to omitted
variables based on the Oster approach and by providing price sensitivity estimates that
use a number of balanced samples.
Table 5: Baseline results - price sensitivity of the demand of health insurance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables
Premium (RwF 1,000) -0.0339*** -0.107*** -0.108*** -0.108*** -0.109*** -0.109***
(0.0105) (0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0143)
Observations 7612 7612 7612 7612 7612 7612
R-squared 0.007 0.054 0.061 0.062 0.063 0.066
Number of PID 3806 3806 3806 3806 3806
FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Basic covariates No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Health status No No No Yes Yes Yes
HH wealth No No No No Yes Yes
Water & sanitation No No No No No Yes
Mean insurance enrollment 0.717 0.717 0.717 0.717 0.717 0.717
Notes: The results for the baseline linear probability regression with individual fixed effects corre-
sponding to estimating equation (1) for the complete sample. The dependent variable is a dummy
variable indicating enrollment in CBHI. Column 1 presents the unconditional price sensitivity; in col-
umn 2, individual fixed effects are added; and in columns 3—6, household and individual controls are
added. Controls include individual and household characteristics, such as labor status and rural loca-
tion, individual health status and household consumption, and access to water and sanitation services.
Column 6 presents the preferred estimation strategy. Standard errors are clustered at household level.
Standard errors clustered by household are shown in parentheses below the estimated coefficient. ***
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
5.1 Heterogeneity
This section investigates heterogeneity in the price sensitivity of the demand for health
insurance for individuals in different subsamples. Table 6 presents the price sensitivity
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estimated by age, gender, relation to household head and health risk.12 Overall, the
estimates are similar among groups. An increase in the premium level of RwF 1,000 is
associated with an 8.82 ppt decrease in the enrollment among spouses, compared with
10.9 ppt among household heads. This corresponds to approximately 12% and 15%,
respectively, at the mean (semi-elasticity).
Table 7 shows heterogeneity in price sensitivity among individuals living in house-
holds with different socioeconomic status and demographic composition. The results
indicate that price sensitivity varies among households with different socioeconomic
status, but that the demand for health insurance is inelastic in all groups.
An increase in premium levels by RwF 1,000 is associated with a decrease in the
likelihood of being enrolled in the insurance by 17 ppt among individuals living in
poor households, compared with a 9.13 ppt decrease among individuals in nonpoor
households. This corresponds to a decrease of 27.3% and 11.6%, respectively in the
likelihood of being enrolled at the mean, indicating that the price elasticity among
poor households was more than twice as large as among nonpoor households. The
results are in line with previous empirical research suggesting that the price elasticity
of demand for preventive healthcare varies with socioeconomic status, and is higher
among less wealthy and vulnerable households (Dupas, 2014). The estimated price
sensitivity does not differ significantly between rural and urban households or between
households headed by women and men. Individuals living in households headed by
women, however, had a relatively high price elasticity of -0.257, compared with -0.149
among individuals residing in households headed by men.
12I estimate the health risk using a linear probability mode: yi = β0 + Xiβ + εi, where yi is an
indicator that equals 1 if an individual visited the clinic during the two weeks prior to the survey,
and zero otherwise. Xi is a vector of explanatory variables including age, sex, income, disability, and
access to water and sanitation. Individuals with a predicted risk of having been sick that exceeds 0.25




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































estimated by age, gender, relation to household head and health risk.12 Overall, the
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Table 7: Heterogeneity in the price sensitivity—among households
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Insurance Poor Nonpoor Rural Urban Female HH Male HH
head head
Premium (RwF 1,000) -0.170*** -0.0913*** -0.115*** -0.132** -0.119*** -0.107***
(0.0335) (0.0175) (0.0156) (0.0512) (0.0233) (0.0198)
Observations 3224 4388 6622 990 1606 6006
R-squared 0.140 0.054 0.064 0.202 0.115 0.057
Number of PID 2,174 2,756 3,518 702 851 3,051
Mean 0.622 0.787 0.709 0.769 0.721 0.716
Semi-elasticity -0.273 -0.116 -0.162 -0.172 -0.165 -0.149
Elasticity -0.311 -0.140 -0.192 -0.177 -0.257 -0.164
Notes: The results for the baseline linear probability model with individual fixed effects regression,
corresponding to estimating equation (1) for different subsamples of individuals (column 1—6). All
results are estimated using the preferred specification (table 5, column 6), and control for individual
and household characteristics, such as labor status and rural location, individual health status and
household consumption, and access to water and sanitation services. Standard errors are clustered at
household level. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
5.2 Sensitivity analysis
In this section, I test the robustness of the price sensitivity estimates to omitted variable
bias. First, I use the Oster approach to evaluate robustness to selection on unobserved
factors. Second, I test the robustness of the estimated price sensitivity by providing
estimates using a number of samples that are relatively more balanced on observable
characteristics than the sample used for the principal estimations.
5.2.1 Bounds
The results presented in table 5, columns 2 and 3, show that the estimated price
sensitivity remains stable after controlling for set of covariates, suggesting that the
estimate is stable to the inclusion of observable characteristics. This has often been in-
terpreted as an indication that omitted variable bias is limited (Oster, 2019). However,
this interpretation builds on the assumption that the selection on observable factors is
informative about the selection on unobservable characteristics.
Building on the work by Altonji et al. (2005), Oster (2019) proposes a framework
that quantifies the robustness of an estimated coefficient to omitted variable bias. The
approach uses movements in an estimated coefficient and corresponding R2 values,
when controlling for a set of observable covariates, to identify bounds of the estimated
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treatment effect. Furthermore, the Oster test provides a measure of how large the
selection on unobservables has to be to erase the treatment effect.
The Oster test requires that I make assumptions about the relative degree of se-
lection on observed and unobserved variables, δ, and the R2max. The R
2
max represents
the maximum R2 value that the regression can attain, including all observable and
unobservable variables. Due to measurement errors and idiosyncratic variation, Oster
(2019) argues that the R2max in many empirical settings is likely to be lower than 1. I
follow Oster (2019) and set the R2max equal to 1.3*R
2. R2 is measured for the preferred
fixed effects regression that controls for all time-invariant individual and household
characteristics, as well as time-varying observables (table 5, column 6, R2 = 0.066).13
I also provide calculations based on more conservative values of R2max, assuming values
that are two and three times as large as the R2 of the baseline regression. Additionally, I
assume that the selection on observable and unobservable factors is proportional—that
is, δ = 1.
Conditional on the assumptions on δ and R2max, I compute bounds on the price-
sensitivity coefficient. The lower bound is represented by the fixed effects estimate
(table 5, column 2) that assumes no selection bias from unobservable variables, δ = 0,
whereas the upper bound is represented by the bias-adjusted coefficient, assuming
that the selection on unobserved time-varying variables is at most as large as the
selection on observed and unobserved time-invariant variables, δ = 1. I control for
individual fixed effects in all regressions including the baseline estimations, excluding
all time-invariant characteristics from the confounding category. I do this because I
consider it reasonable to assume that the selection on time-varying observables explains
a proportional part of the selection in relation to unobservables (δ = 1), excluding time-
invariant characteristics.
Table 8 shows the estimated coefficient bounds. Based on the most conservative
R2max value, the bounding set is estimated to [–0.136, –0.107]. The results suggest that
the inclusion of controls increases the negative price sensitivity, moving the coefficient
away from β=0. Oster (2019) proposes that the robustness of such coefficient can
be tested by evaluating whether the coefficient bounds fall within +/–2.8 standard
errors of the controlled coefficient estimate.14 The results in table 8 show that all
13Oster (2019) determined this value based on a sample of randomized papers: 1.3*R2 allowed for
90% of randomized results to survive.
14For bias-adjusted coefficients moving toward zero, β = 0, a coefficient bound that does not include
zero is considered robust.
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estimated bounds related to the different R2max assumptions fall within the defined
interval, indicating that the size of the price sensitivity estimated by the baseline fixed
effects regression is similar to the bias-adjusted estimate. Importantly, calculations of
the price elasticity based on the bias-adjusted price sensitivity, β = 0.136, show that
the estimated price elasticity is robust to potential omitted variable bias and remains
negative and inelastic—that is, adjusting the estimated price sensitivity for omitted
variable bias would not change the conclusions presented in the analysis.
The second test provided by the Oster approach measures how large the selection
on unobservables has to be, in relation to the selection on observable variables, to erase
the estimated treatment effect. The results suggest that the selection on unobservables
needs to be at least 7.4 times stronger than the selection on observable factors (δ =
–7.401) for the estimated price elasticity to switch sign (β = 0). δ < 0 suggests that
if the observable covariates in the baseline regression are positively correlated with
the price change, the omitted variables would have to be negatively correlated with
the price change in order for the price sensitivity to switch sign. The estimated price
sensitivity from table 5 shows that in the main sample, adding in controls actually
increased the negative price sensitivity, implying that observable household and indi-
vidual characteristics are positively correlated with the price of insurance enrollment.
As previously discussed, one of the main sources of bias could arise if the Rwandan
government were to introduce policy initiatives that aim to improve the health of in-
dividuals in the lower Ubudehe categories. This would create a negative correlation
between improved individual health status and price change. In this context, selection
on observables as well as unobservables result in an underestimated price sensitivity.
The degree of selection on unobservables relative to observables that would be neces-
sary to explain away the price sensitivity, indicates that the estimated price sensitivity
is robust to omitted variable bias (Oster, 2019).
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A. Bounds on the treatment effect [-0.1123, -0.107]
(δ=1,R2max=0.0.086)
δ for β=0 (R2max=0.086) -27.136
δ for β=-0.600 (R2max=0.086) 3.067
B. Bounds on the treatment effect [-0.122, -0.107]
(δ=1,R2max=0.132 )
δ for β=0 (R2max=0.132) -12.951
δ for β=-0.600 (R2max=0.132) 2.787
C. Bounds on the treatment effect [-0.136, -0.107]
(δ=1,R2max=0.198 )
δ for β=0 (R2max=0.198) -7.401
δ for β=-0.600 (R2max=0.198) 2.463
Notes: The outcome variable is a dummy variable taking the number
1 if an individual is enrolled in the CBHI scheme, and zero otherwise.
The uncontrolled estimation includes a time dummy, as well as individ-
ual fixed effects (table 5, column 2). The controlled treatment effect
is calculated from the fixed-effects regression as reported in table 5,
column 6. Calculations in panel A follow Oster (2017), using R2max=
1.3*R2; panel B assumes an R2max that is twice as large as the value
from the baseline fixed effects specification; and panel C assumes an
R2max=0.198, three times as large as the one related to the baseline
specification. Furthermore, the calculations are based on the assump-
tion that the selection on unobservables is proportional to the selection
on observables, δ=1. The last row in each panel present the δ value
associated with a price elasticity larger than -1. All calculations are
made using the psacalc Stata code by Oster (2016).
A potentially even more relevant measure is the robustness of the conclusions drawn
in the analysis. In the previous section, the baseline fixed-effects estimation strategy
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indicates that the price elasticity for the demand of CBHI in Rwanda is negative and
inelastic. As mentioned earlier, a price elasticity is considered inelastic if the elasticity
is less than |1|. Using the Oster approach, I test the robustness of the estimated price
elasticity to this conclusion by estimating how large the selection on unobservables
would need to be to result in an elastic price elasticity (β < −0.600). The results in
table 8 show that the selection on unobservables needs to be at least 2.5 times stronger
than the selection on observable, as well as all time-invariant, factors (δ=2.463) for the
demand of CBHI to become elastic in relation to the most conservative assumption on
R2max. The results indicate that the conclusion that the demand for CBHI in Rwanda is
price inelastic is robust to omitted variable bias (Oster, 2019). In summary, the results
suggest that the estimated price elasticity is not driven by omitted variable bias.
5.2.2 Balanced samples
In this section, I aim to limit the correlation between the policy change and household
socioeconomic status, and thereby obtain a treatment that is closer to being indepen-
dent of the background of covariates. I do this by increasing the balance of the sample.
This will reduce the potential for bias (Ho et al., 2007).
First, I limit the sample to include only individuals in Ubudehe groups 2 and 3.
These two groups received very different insurance premiums after the policy interven-
tion, but had similar socioeconomic status according to the Ubudehe categorization
system. Second, I use propensity scores to create a more balanced sample in relation
to individual and household characteristics. Based on the sample limited to households
in Ubudehe group 2 and 3, I use a logistic regression to predict the likelihood of an
individual being classified in Ubudehe group 3—that is, of having received an increased
insurance premium. Based on these predictions, I construct one sample including all
individuals in the common support. I limit this sample further by including only in-
dividuals with predicted likelihoods between the 10th and 90th percentiles, as well as
the 20th to 80th percentiles. The adjusted samples ensure that there is overlap in the
distribution of covariates for all observations in the sample; that is, the estimations
require no extrapolation to cells without common support (Angrist & Pischke, 2008).
By constructing the sample based on the likelihood of being in Ubudehe group 3, I
ensure that there will always be a few observations in Ubudehe group 2 that can be
used to estimate the counterfactual.
Appendix Figure A3 illustrates the distribution of the predicted likelihood of in-
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dividuals in Ubudehe groups 2 and 3 being categorized in Ubudehe group 3. The
distribution shows a significant overlap between the treatment and control groups,
resulting in a wide region of common support. The distributions lack common sup-
port only at the low extreme of the distribution, showing that some individuals in
the control group are substantially different from individuals in the treatment group
and consequently have a significantly lower likelihood of being categorized in Ubudehe
group 3. Appendix figure A4 suggests a need for further adjustment in order to obtain
a balanced sample with similar baseline characteristics.
Appendix table A6 reports the estimates from the logistic regressions. In addition to
the household and individual characteristics included in the baseline estimations, these
predictions include a number of observable factors, defined by the Rwandan govern-
ment, that are used to classify households into specific Ubudehe categories: ownership
of the house and livestock, and household consumption (appendix table A1). Addi-
tionally, the estimations include an indicator for whether the house has improved floor
materials, such as wood or concrete. This variable is a proxy for quality of housing,
one of the specific factors in the Ubudehe classification process. The results show that
the number of household and individual characteristics that are significantly correlated
with the Ubudehe classification decrease as the sample gets more restricted. The re-
sults suggest that the significant differences between individuals in Ubudehe groups 2
and 3 decrease, indicating that the balance in covariates between the groups improves
between the different samples. Furthermore, the predictions confirm that a number
of assessment factors of the classification process have been important in defining the
likelihood of being defined as Ubudehe group 3. The results also suggest that relatively
old and very young individuals (those over 65 years old and younger than 5), as well as
salary workers, were less likely to be categorized in Ubudehe group 3 across all specifi-
cations. Access to sanitation services and household size are positively associated with
the likelihood of being categorized in the higher Ubudehe category.
The results of the estimations using the balanced samples are presented in appendix
table A7. The estimates in column 1 are based on a sample restricted to include
individuals in Ubudehe groups 2 and 3, excluding the households that received full
subsidies prior to the policy change, as explained earlier. Column 2 restricts the sample
to include only individuals with a predicted likelihood of being treated within the
common support, whereas columns 3 and 4 restrict the sample even further by including
those with a propensity score within the common support between the 10th and 90th
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percenties (column 3) (Crump et al., 2006) and the 20th and 80th percentiles (column
4). The results indicate that the estimated price sensitivity is stable between the
different samples, suggesting that the main estimates of price sensitivity are not likely
to suffer greatly from bias caused by different distributions in covariates between the
different premium categories.
5.3 Predicted take-up levels
In this section, I use the price sensitivity estimates to predict insurance take-up re-
lated to a number of counterfactual premium subsidies. I make a linear prediction of
estimated take-up levels, taking into account the individual-specific fixed effects. The
predictions are calculated based on the coefficients estimated by equation (1) using
data from 2014. Table 9 shows the overall predicted take-up level for different pre-
mium structures, referring to both uniform premium subsidies and premiums targeted
to specific subgroups. Overall, the results indicate that the variation in predicted in-
surance coverage among different premium subsidy schemes is limited. This is a direct
effect of the low price sensitivity.
Column 1 in table 9 presents the predicted average take-up level based on the
estimated price sensitivity from the preferred specification, presented in column 6 in
table 5. The first row in table 9 shows the predicted insurance coverage in 2014 for the
current subsidy scheme. The total take-up level is predicted to approximately 70%,
which corresponds to the take-up level found in the EICV data. The succeeding rows
present the average enrollment levels for alternative subsidy structures. The results
suggest that the overall enrollment rate would reach approximately 82% in a scenario
in which all individuals receive fully subsidized premiums. This is consistent with
previous literature that indicates that full premium subsidies are not sufficient on their
own to induce universal insurance coverage (Finkelstein et al., 2019; Wagstaff et al.,
2016; Thornton et al., 2010). A uniform premium cost of RwF 3,000 results in a
predicted take-up of 66%.
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Table 9: Predicted insurance coverage, 2014
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Premium structure All poor Nonpoor Children age Senior age Low High
< 6 yrs. > 50 yrs. risk risk
Actual premium 0.698 0.588 0.775 0.672 0.738 0.695 0.717
0 0.819 0.694 0.857 0.803 0.821 0.822 0.809
1000 0.765 0.635 0.824 0.746 0.779 0.766 0.764
2000 0.710 0.576 0.792 0.689 0.737 0.710 0.718
3000 0.656 0.517 0.760 0.632 0.694 0.655 0.672
Avg. cost (3543) 0.626 0.485 0.742 0.601 0.671 0.625 0.647
Children <6 yrs free) 0.671 0.533 0.769 0.803 0.694 0.675 0.672
Minors (<19 yrs free) 0.732 0.616 0.800 0.803 0.694 0.759 0.673
Poor households free 0.721 0.694 0.760 0.707 0.732 0.723 0.723
Note: The predictions are based on the coefficients resulting from estimating equation (1), pre-
sented in table 5, column 6, across different population samples presented in tables 6 and 7. I
use data from EICV4 (2014) to predict take-up levels.
The final bottom three rows in table 9 predict take-up levels of targeted subsidies
offering full premium subsidies to poor households (based on household consumption
level) and to households with children under 19 and 6 years. In all three targeted
subsidy strategies, households that are not subsidized face an individual premium of
RwF 3,000. Overall, the simulations suggest that changes to the premium subsidy
scheme do not show a large impact on coverage levels. This is consistent with the
overall low price sensitivity. Furthermore, one plausible subsidy scenario is represented
by an actuarial premium scheme in which the insurance premium is set to average
insurer costs—that is, RwF 3543 in this context. The premium cost resulting from
pricing at average cost is high compared with the other subsidy schemes, resulting in
relatively low insurance take-up.
Besides an overall increase in access to healthcare, equal access to healthcare repre-
sents another policy priority for governments in relation to universal health coverage.
In this context, it is important to consider the impact of premium subsidy schemes on
insurance enrollment in specific subgroups. Columns 2—7 in table 9 present the effects
of alternative premium subsidies on take-up for a number of subgroups. Considering
the heterogeneity in price sensitivity among households with different socioeconomic
status presented in tables 6 and 7, it is expected that the predicted take-up of insur-
ance for alternative premium subsidy schemes will vary among different socioeconomic
groups. A premium scheme that targets consumption-poor households (poor in this
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percenties (column 3) (Crump et al., 2006) and the 20th and 80th percentiles (column
4). The results indicate that the estimated price sensitivity is stable between the
different samples, suggesting that the main estimates of price sensitivity are not likely
to suffer greatly from bias caused by different distributions in covariates between the
different premium categories.
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Column 1 in table 9 presents the predicted average take-up level based on the
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in which all individuals receive fully subsidized premiums. This is consistent with
previous literature that indicates that full premium subsidies are not sufficient on their
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2016; Thornton et al., 2010). A uniform premium cost of RwF 3,000 results in a
predicted take-up of 66%.
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by an actuarial premium scheme in which the insurance premium is set to average
insurer costs—that is, RwF 3543 in this context. The premium cost resulting from
pricing at average cost is high compared with the other subsidy schemes, resulting in
relatively low insurance take-up.
Besides an overall increase in access to healthcare, equal access to healthcare repre-
sents another policy priority for governments in relation to universal health coverage.
In this context, it is important to consider the impact of premium subsidy schemes on
insurance enrollment in specific subgroups. Columns 2—7 in table 9 present the effects
of alternative premium subsidies on take-up for a number of subgroups. Considering
the heterogeneity in price sensitivity among households with different socioeconomic
status presented in tables 6 and 7, it is expected that the predicted take-up of insur-
ance for alternative premium subsidy schemes will vary among different socioeconomic
groups. A premium scheme that targets consumption-poor households (poor in this
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case refers to the national poverty line based on household consumption, not to the
Ubudehe category) predicts higher insurance take-up among individuals in this group
in comparison with the current premium scheme that targets households with low so-
cioeconomic status. As previously mentioned, the simulations predict that the overall
take-up level related to the actual premium subsidy is approximately 70%, whereas
take-up among individuals living in consumption-poor households reaches only 59%
under the same subsidy scheme (column 2, row 1). Furthermore, the results indicate
that a premium subsidy based on a monetary measure of poverty could increase overall
coverage levels and, more importantly increase access to health insurance among the
consumption-poor. At the same time, the simulations indicate that the coverage level
among children will decrease with this subsidy scheme compared with the schemes that
specifically target children.
Young children represent another potential group of interest for policymakers. The
simulations indicate that targeted subsidies based on age will bring take-up levels to
around 80% among young children. Note that take-up levels among poor individuals
are low in relation to the age-based subsidy schemes. A premium structure that tar-
gets children 5 years and younger is predicted to contribute to low take-up levels of
approximately 53% among individuals living in financially poor households. On the
other hand, enrollment rates among the youngest remain relatively high when subsidies
target the consumption-poor.
There is not much difference in take-up levels between individuals with predicted
high health risk and those with low risk. This is important knowledge when considering
the governmental goal of universal healthcare coverage. The similarities in take-up
levels between high- and low-risk individuals indicate that individual health status is
not likely to affect the decision to enroll in the insurance at a given premium cost and
that the health status of enrolled individuals is stable across premium subsidy schemes;
that is, changes to the premium costs do not cause selection into the insurance scheme
based on health status. This reasoning is further supported by the fact that the price
sensitivity of the demand for health insurance is similar between the two groups (see
table 6, columns 8 and 9). I further evaluate the potential effects of adverse selection
in the following section.
Put together, heterogeneity in price sensitivity among different subgroups will con-
tribute to a variation in the composition of enrolled individuals. This is important
because it provides the government with some potential to target its efforts and in-
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crease take-up within different vulnerable subgroups. This is in line with the current
subsidy scheme that targets households with low socioeconomic status.
6 Financial Self-Sustainability
In this section, I will consider the importance of premium subsidies to the financial self-
sustainability of the CBHI scheme. Premium subsidies represent an increasingly com-
mon policy tool to promote take-up of health insurance. However, heavily subsidized
insurance premiums limit the financial self-sustainability of the insurance scheme as
premiums cover only a share of total patient costs. Furthermore, the results presented
in this analysis suggest that the overall effect of premium subsidies on insurance cov-
erage might be limited. At the same time, heterogeneity in the price elasticity among
different subgroups suggests that changes to the premium scheme might affect the com-
position of beneficiaries, which could result in changes in the demand for healthcare
within the insurance scheme. The selection of individuals into the insurance at differ-
ent premium costs could create an association between insurance premium and patient
costs. In a market with adverse selection, changes to insurance premium costs will
affect the cost of providing the insurance, as individuals select into the insurance based
on their expected demand for healthcare (Einav et al., 2010). As a result, in order to
evaluate the importance of premium subsidies on the financial self-sustainability of the
CBHI scheme, it is necessary to consider this potential association between insurance
premiums and patient costs.
6.1 Insurer costs and selection
To evaluate the importance of a change in insurance premiums to the financial self-
sustainability of the CBHI scheme, I consider the potential impacts of adverse selection
on the cost of insurance. To do this, I follow an empirical model proposed by Einav and
colleagues (2010). This strategy uses the insurer cost curve to identify and quantify
adverse selection. In the presence of adverse selection, individuals with the highest
expected patient costs are those who have the highest willingness to pay for the insur-
ance, resulting in a marginal cost curve that is increasing in price. As the premium cost
increases, relatively healthier individuals leave the insurance, driving up the average
insurer cost among beneficiaries.
35
case refers to the national poverty line based on household consumption, not to the
Ubudehe category) predicts higher insurance take-up among individuals in this group
in comparison with the current premium scheme that targets households with low so-
cioeconomic status. As previously mentioned, the simulations predict that the overall
take-up level related to the actual premium subsidy is approximately 70%, whereas
take-up among individuals living in consumption-poor households reaches only 59%
under the same subsidy scheme (column 2, row 1). Furthermore, the results indicate
that a premium subsidy based on a monetary measure of poverty could increase overall
coverage levels and, more importantly increase access to health insurance among the
consumption-poor. At the same time, the simulations indicate that the coverage level
among children will decrease with this subsidy scheme compared with the schemes that
specifically target children.
Young children represent another potential group of interest for policymakers. The
simulations indicate that targeted subsidies based on age will bring take-up levels to
around 80% among young children. Note that take-up levels among poor individuals
are low in relation to the age-based subsidy schemes. A premium structure that tar-
gets children 5 years and younger is predicted to contribute to low take-up levels of
approximately 53% among individuals living in financially poor households. On the
other hand, enrollment rates among the youngest remain relatively high when subsidies
target the consumption-poor.
There is not much difference in take-up levels between individuals with predicted
high health risk and those with low risk. This is important knowledge when considering
the governmental goal of universal healthcare coverage. The similarities in take-up
levels between high- and low-risk individuals indicate that individual health status is
not likely to affect the decision to enroll in the insurance at a given premium cost and
that the health status of enrolled individuals is stable across premium subsidy schemes;
that is, changes to the premium costs do not cause selection into the insurance scheme
based on health status. This reasoning is further supported by the fact that the price
sensitivity of the demand for health insurance is similar between the two groups (see
table 6, columns 8 and 9). I further evaluate the potential effects of adverse selection
in the following section.
Put together, heterogeneity in price sensitivity among different subgroups will con-
tribute to a variation in the composition of enrolled individuals. This is important
because it provides the government with some potential to target its efforts and in-
34
crease take-up within different vulnerable subgroups. This is in line with the current
subsidy scheme that targets households with low socioeconomic status.
6 Financial Self-Sustainability
In this section, I will consider the importance of premium subsidies to the financial self-
sustainability of the CBHI scheme. Premium subsidies represent an increasingly com-
mon policy tool to promote take-up of health insurance. However, heavily subsidized
insurance premiums limit the financial self-sustainability of the insurance scheme as
premiums cover only a share of total patient costs. Furthermore, the results presented
in this analysis suggest that the overall effect of premium subsidies on insurance cov-
erage might be limited. At the same time, heterogeneity in the price elasticity among
different subgroups suggests that changes to the premium scheme might affect the com-
position of beneficiaries, which could result in changes in the demand for healthcare
within the insurance scheme. The selection of individuals into the insurance at differ-
ent premium costs could create an association between insurance premium and patient
costs. In a market with adverse selection, changes to insurance premium costs will
affect the cost of providing the insurance, as individuals select into the insurance based
on their expected demand for healthcare (Einav et al., 2010). As a result, in order to
evaluate the importance of premium subsidies on the financial self-sustainability of the
CBHI scheme, it is necessary to consider this potential association between insurance
premiums and patient costs.
6.1 Insurer costs and selection
To evaluate the importance of a change in insurance premiums to the financial self-
sustainability of the CBHI scheme, I consider the potential impacts of adverse selection
on the cost of insurance. To do this, I follow an empirical model proposed by Einav and
colleagues (2010). This strategy uses the insurer cost curve to identify and quantify
adverse selection. In the presence of adverse selection, individuals with the highest
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insurer cost among beneficiaries.
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In this context, rejecting the null hypothesis of a flat marginal cost curve is evi-
dence for selection. Furthermore, the slope of the marginal cost curve of the insurance
provides a test for the direction of the selection: a positive slope of the cost curve is
evidence of adverse selection (Einav et al., 2010). This empirical strategy has been
widely used in the context of high income countries (Einav et al., 2010) and makes it
possible to measure the financial implications of adverse selection in health insurance
markets.
I estimate the association between insurer costs and insurance premiums using a
unique data set provided by the Ministry of Health in Rwanda. The data provides
a register of operational costs, as well as the cost of providing medical coverage for
all individuals enrolled in the CBHI scheme. The cost data are provided at the sec-
tor level, describing the total insurer cost for each sector in the country. A section
is an administrative entity that approximates the catchment area of a health clinic.
There are 416 sectors in Rwanda distributed in 30 districts (Ministry of Health, 2012).
After being adjusted for missing information regarding all or some expenditures, the
cost data represent a sample of 295 sectors, representing approximately 71% of the
total population of administrative sectors. Appendix table A8 shows that there is no
significant difference between missing sectors and the those included in the sample in
relation to a number of sector characteristics, indicating that my sample constitutes a
representative sample of sectors and the missing information is not likely to affect the
validity of the results.
The total insurer costs include a number of expenditures: cost of health consulta-
tions and hospitalization, operational costs, and reimbursement to health clinics and to
the district and national risk pools in order to cover hospital claims. Table 10 describes
the average cost per beneficiary related to a number of expenditures. Reimbursements
to health clinics for their services represent the largest expenditures within the CBHI,
followed by payments to the district risk pool and operational costs. On average, an
individual enrolled in the CBHI scheme generates a cost of RwF 3543 during one year
(approximately USD 4). This cost is almost equivalent to the premium cost of RwF
3,000 paid by individuals in premium category 2. The average cost gives an indication
of the level of subsidy provided to households in premium category 1, whose premiums
are completely subsidized.
36
Table 10: Insurer costs, avg. 2013–14
Expenditure N Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Health consultations 295 884.60 354.41 180.08 2315.54
Hospitalization 295 98.11 86.23 1.14 579.49
Reimbursements 295 1321.11 464.967 393.63 3951.68
District risk pool 295 1103.78 398.81 418.61 2846.68
Operational costs 295 134.86 85.06 24.19 621.87
Total costs 295 3542.45 815.18 1943.59 6839.57
Notes: The total insurer costs includes reimbursement to health centers for
health consultations and hospitalizations, as well as other costs related to the
care provided at health centers, contributions to the district risk pool, and
overall operational costs.
6.2 Estimating the cost curve
To estimate the association between insurer costs and insurance premiums, I use the
measure of average total patient costs described in table 10 and a measure of the average
insurance premium in each sector. I use the composition of beneficiary households
across premium categories in each sector to construct the average premium. Given this
construction, the premium is calculated as the average premium cost paid by enrolled
individuals in one section. As a result, sections with a higher share of completely
subsidized households (Ubudehe groupd 1 and 2) will have a lower average premium in
relation to sections with a relatively larger share of households in premium categories
2 and 3.
Figure 2 illustrates how average insurer cost among enrolled individuals covaries
with the average premium cost in each section. The figure shows average patient costs
by bins of 5% of the average premium cost per section. The positive slope of the curve
is consistent with adverse selection (Einav et al., 2010): as premium costs increase,
relatively healthier individuals drop out of the insurance, driving up the average insurer
cost.
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Figure 2: Insurer costs and enrollment
Notes: Average total patient costs for individuals enrolled in the CBHI
scheme during 2013–2014, showing the rough correlation between the
average insurer costs and the average premium cost in each administra-
tive section. The average costs are calculated as an average of the total
costs or medical consultations, hospitalizations, and reimbursement for
services at health clinic and district hospitals , as well as administrative
costs (presented in table 10). The average premium cost represents the
average insurance premium paid by enrolled individuals in each section.
The dots represent the average insurer cost per enrolled individual by
bins of 5% of the average premium cost per section.
Using the variation in average insurance premium and patient costs across sectors,
I estimate the cost curve presented in equation (2). Given the seemingly linear associa-
tion between insurance premiums and costs shown in figure 2, I estimate a linear model
assuming that insurer costs are linear in price. Importantly, the cost equation is esti-
mated based on patient costs among insured individuals. As a result, the insurer costs
are affected only by insured individuals who already selected into the insurance scheme.
Furthermore, changes in patient costs among sections will therefore not emerge as a
result of differences in insurance coverage, since all individuals face the same insurance
contract.
For the linear cost curve, the marginal cost curve can be derived by MC'=2*AC'.
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ck = δ0 + δ1p
CBHI
jk +Xjkδ3 + γk + σijk (2)
where ck is the average total cost of providing the insurance per sector k, including
medical consultations, hospitalizations, medicine and ambulance use, as well as admin-
istrative costs. The average cost is calculated per sector. δ1 measures the association
between insurance premium and average insurer costs, and Xk is a vector of sector
characteristics. According to Einav et al. (2010), the sign of δ1 is informative about
the presence and nature of selection in the health insurance market. A positive rela-
tionship between individual insurer cost and the premium indicates adverse selection as
individuals enter and exit the market endogenously as a result of the price change. In
this context, individuals with relatively better health status exit the insurance scheme
as premium levels increase and exceed their expected healthcare expenditure (Einav
et al., 2010). γk represents district fixed effects, controlling for systematic differences
among administrative districts.
Table 11, shows the results from estimating equation (2) using the cost data de-
scribed in table 10. Column 1 presents the unconditional estimate of the association
between premium and patient costs. In column 2, I add district fixed effect to make
sure that the price effect does not pick up only underlying differences among districts.
All health sections pool resources in a district risk pool to cover the costs of district
hospitals. Consequently, it is likely that the financial setup in different districts could
influence the cost structures of the sectors in each district. There are 28 administrative
districts in the data with an average of 6 health sectors per unit.
Column 3 adds a number of sector-specific covariates that can explain variation in
insurer costs such as the level of access to water and sanitation services, urbanization,
age composition, and average household consumption. The results suggest that an
increase in premium costs has a positive impact on average insurer costs. An increase
of RwF 1,000 in the average premium level is associated with an increase in average
insurer costs by RwF 674, approximately 20% at mean. The positive slope of the cost
curve is consistent with individuals adversely selecting into the insurance scheme since
the average cost increase among beneficiaries as the premium increases. The results are
stable to the inclusion of district covariates, whereas district fixed effects show some
effect on the estimates.
39
Figure 2: Insurer costs and enrollment
Notes: Average total patient costs for individuals enrolled in the CBHI
scheme during 2013–2014, showing the rough correlation between the
average insurer costs and the average premium cost in each administra-
tive section. The average costs are calculated as an average of the total
costs or medical consultations, hospitalizations, and reimbursement for
services at health clinic and district hospitals , as well as administrative
costs (presented in table 10). The average premium cost represents the
average insurance premium paid by enrolled individuals in each section.
The dots represent the average insurer cost per enrolled individual by
bins of 5% of the average premium cost per section.
Using the variation in average insurance premium and patient costs across sectors,
I estimate the cost curve presented in equation (2). Given the seemingly linear associa-
tion between insurance premiums and costs shown in figure 2, I estimate a linear model
assuming that insurer costs are linear in price. Importantly, the cost equation is esti-
mated based on patient costs among insured individuals. As a result, the insurer costs
are affected only by insured individuals who already selected into the insurance scheme.
Furthermore, changes in patient costs among sections will therefore not emerge as a
result of differences in insurance coverage, since all individuals face the same insurance
contract.
For the linear cost curve, the marginal cost curve can be derived by MC'=2*AC'.
38
ck = δ0 + δ1p
CBHI
jk +Xjkδ3 + γk + σijk (2)
where ck is the average total cost of providing the insurance per sector k, including
medical consultations, hospitalizations, medicine and ambulance use, as well as admin-
istrative costs. The average cost is calculated per sector. δ1 measures the association
between insurance premium and average insurer costs, and Xk is a vector of sector
characteristics. According to Einav et al. (2010), the sign of δ1 is informative about
the presence and nature of selection in the health insurance market. A positive rela-
tionship between individual insurer cost and the premium indicates adverse selection as
individuals enter and exit the market endogenously as a result of the price change. In
this context, individuals with relatively better health status exit the insurance scheme
as premium levels increase and exceed their expected healthcare expenditure (Einav
et al., 2010). γk represents district fixed effects, controlling for systematic differences
among administrative districts.
Table 11, shows the results from estimating equation (2) using the cost data de-
scribed in table 10. Column 1 presents the unconditional estimate of the association
between premium and patient costs. In column 2, I add district fixed effect to make
sure that the price effect does not pick up only underlying differences among districts.
All health sections pool resources in a district risk pool to cover the costs of district
hospitals. Consequently, it is likely that the financial setup in different districts could
influence the cost structures of the sectors in each district. There are 28 administrative
districts in the data with an average of 6 health sectors per unit.
Column 3 adds a number of sector-specific covariates that can explain variation in
insurer costs such as the level of access to water and sanitation services, urbanization,
age composition, and average household consumption. The results suggest that an
increase in premium costs has a positive impact on average insurer costs. An increase
of RwF 1,000 in the average premium level is associated with an increase in average
insurer costs by RwF 674, approximately 20% at mean. The positive slope of the cost
curve is consistent with individuals adversely selecting into the insurance scheme since
the average cost increase among beneficiaries as the premium increases. The results are
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Table 11: Average insurer costs
(1) (2) (3)
Average insurer costs
Avg. premium (RwF1,000) 0.720*** 0.563*** 0.572***
(0.126) (0.151) (0.153)
Observations 295 295 295
R-squared 0.148 0.452 0.460
District FE No Yes Yes
Notes: the table shows the results from estimating equation (2) using
the cost data described in table 10. Column 1 provides the uncon-
ditional association between average premium and patient costs across
sectors, whereas column 2 include district fixed-effects and column 3 ad-
ditionally controls for sector characteristics. When included, the con-
trols contain share of section households with piped water, access to
sanitation, share of households in urban areas, share of children below
5 years old and individuals older than 65, total population size and av-
erage household consumption. The estimated correlation between the
average premium and the average insurer cost is the slope of the cost
curve. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
According to the framework, the identification of adverse selection requires that
the variation in premium costs be unrelated to the underlying health status and ex-
penditure of the population in different sectors. However, due to the construction of
the average premium cost, there is a possibility that the positive correlation between
premium costs and insurer costs mirrors underlying differences in the distribution of
households across categories of socioeconomic status. The results show that the average
patient cost is higher in sections with a larger share of households with relatively higher
socioeconomic status than in to sectors with a larger share of enrolled households that
are worse off. This positive slope would appear if individuals, on average, in households
with higher socioeconomic status had a greater ability than others to negotiate and
demand an increasing number of expensive healthcare treatments, even in the absence
of adverse selection. Following the same reasoning, underlying cultural differences in
the use of healthcare services between households with high and low socioeconomic
status could cause a similar outcome. Both scenarios would result in an upward bias
in the association between insurance premiums and insurer costs presented in table 11.
Given this reasoning, the effect of changes in insurance premiums is likely to have a
40
more limited effect on patient costs than what is proposed in this analysis. I adjust for
this bias in the following analysis of the financial sustainability of the insurance scheme
by providing results that assume no presence of adverse selection. The overall results
are not undermined by the potential upward-biased estimation of adverse selection.
Differences in operational costs among geographic regions represent another po-
tential cause of bias if individuals in different Ubudehe categories were unevenly dis-
tributed between rural and urban areas. Sectors with a higher share of urban residents
and clinics could face higher operational costs than rural regions due to relatively higher
salaries, rent and materials in urban areas. If high-paying insurance beneficiaries are
concentrated in urban sectors, this variation in operational costs could result in an up-
ward bias of the association between insurer costs and premiums. Conversely, health
facilities in larger urban areas could face cost advantages as a result of increases in
their scale of production. In this context, the economies of scale would bias the cost
curve downwards.
I control for potential variation in operational costs between rural and urban areas
by controlling for the share of individuals living in urban areas in each CBHI sec-
tion. Additionally, to further rule out that variation in operational costs is driving
the variation in average patient cost, I provide estimates of the cost curve excluding
the operational costs of the insurer. The results are presented in appendix table A9
and indicate that the positive association between average premium costs and average
insurer costs hold when operational costs are excluded from the analysis and is robust
to the alternative definition of the total cost.
In general, any factor that simultaneously predicts patient costs and socioeconomic
status, and consequently premium cost, could bias the cost curve. As discussed earlier,
the relation between health and socioeconomic status has been well documented in
previous literature (Cutler et al., 2008). In this context, sections with a higher share
of completely subsidized beneficiaries could have higher average insurer costs primarily
due to low health status and not as a result of adverse selection. Importantly, the results
in figure 2 suggest that this mechanism is not driving the association between insurance
premium and insurer costs. However, I cannot rule out that the association between
premiums and health status could lead to an underestimation of the association between
premium costs and insurance costs, leading to a lower bound of adverse selection. I
control for differences in average health status by including covariates that control for
the share of population with access to piped water and sanitation in each sector, as
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Table 11: Average insurer costs
(1) (2) (3)
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sanitation, share of households in urban areas, share of children below
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average premium and the average insurer cost is the slope of the cost
curve. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
According to the framework, the identification of adverse selection requires that
the variation in premium costs be unrelated to the underlying health status and ex-
penditure of the population in different sectors. However, due to the construction of
the average premium cost, there is a possibility that the positive correlation between
premium costs and insurer costs mirrors underlying differences in the distribution of
households across categories of socioeconomic status. The results show that the average
patient cost is higher in sections with a larger share of households with relatively higher
socioeconomic status than in to sectors with a larger share of enrolled households that
are worse off. This positive slope would appear if individuals, on average, in households
with higher socioeconomic status had a greater ability than others to negotiate and
demand an increasing number of expensive healthcare treatments, even in the absence
of adverse selection. Following the same reasoning, underlying cultural differences in
the use of healthcare services between households with high and low socioeconomic
status could cause a similar outcome. Both scenarios would result in an upward bias
in the association between insurance premiums and insurer costs presented in table 11.
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well as the share of elderly (table 11).
In conclusion, the administrative cost data in this analysis do not allow me to further
investigate and rule out potential drivers of the correlation between patient and pre-
mium costs. Importantly, the underlying reasons for changes in the insurer cost are not
crucial for estimations of the financial sustainability of the insurance scheme. The esti-
mated association between insurance premiums and patient costs implies that changes
in premium costs are associated with modest increases in patient costs. Whether the
positive association between cost and premium is caused by adverse selection or other
factors does not change the conclusions regarding the potential role of a correlation be-
tween premium subsidies and patient costs in relation to financial sustainability. This
should be considered when reasoning about the financial sustainability of the CBHI
scheme as well as premium subsidies in general.
6.3 Simulations
In this section, I estimate the financial self-sustainability of the CBHI scheme in relation
to the different premium subsidy schemes previously described. Self-sustainability
is defined as the share of insurer costs covered by member premiums. I first use
the predicted insurance coverage levels presented in table 9 to estimate the premium
revenues corresponding to the different subsidy schemes. I then consider the effect of
the premium schemes on insurer costs. I use the estimated cost sensitivity in table 11,
column 3, to predict the average insurer cost corresponding to each subsidy scheme. By
combining the predicted revenue and insurer cost, I estimate the level of self-financing
that corresponds to each subsidy scenario.
Table 12 presents the simulated financial self-sustainability of the CBHI in Rwanda
related to the different subsidy strategies discussed in the previous section. Column
1 presents the average predicted enrollment for all subsidy schemes presented in table
9, column 1. Column 2 shows the premium revenues that correspond to each subsidy
scheme. The premium revenues follow directly from the take-up level and the level
of premium subsidies - as premium costs increase, enrollment levels decrease. Con-
sequently, the effect of subsidies on insurer revenue is an empirical question that will
depend on the price elasticity of demand for health insurance.
The second part of the table focuses on the implications of changes in premium
costs on insurer costs and the financial self-sufficiency of the insurance scheme. Fi-
nancial self-sustainability is estimated as the share of the total costs covered by the
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premium incomes. By definition, this measure of financial sustainability directly hinges
on the premium income and the average individual insurer cost predicted by the dif-
ferent subsidy schemes. The results are presented for two scenarios. In one scenario, I
assume that there is no adverse selection in the CBHI market and estimate the finan-
cial coverage level using a constant average patient cost, independent of the premium
level.15 The second scenario predicts the average patient cost related to each subsidy
scheme, using the association between patient costs and insurance premiums estimated
by equation (2). The estimates are presented in table 11, column 3. I use the estimated
price sensitivity to predict the relationship between average premium costs and average
patient costs at the health section level. The positive slope of the average cost curve is
reflected in the levels of average patient cost related to each premium scheme: as the
average premium cost increases, the average insurer cost increases.
The simulations indicate that the financial sustainability of alternative premium
subsidies differs depending on whether there is adverse selection. This is expected. In
a setting with adverse selection, the financial coverage reaches levels between 0.35–0.80
for the majority of subsidy schemes, meaning that household premiums cover approxi-
mately 35%—80% of the insurer costs. However, in the absence of selection, the range
of coverage levels for the corresponding subsidy schemes are wider, suggesting that the
coverage levels range between 0.28 and 0.85. The wedge between the level of financial
coverage in the selection and no-selection scenarios increases as the premium levels
deviate from the mean cost.
Overall, the results suggest that the effects of selection are limited but may be
important from the insurers’ point of view. The results are in line with previous
results from developed countries that indicate that the cost of adverse selection (mainly
in terms of social welfare) might be relatively negligible (Finkelstein et al., 2019).
Previous studies on adverse selection (Parmar et al., 2012) indicate that targeted
subsidy schemes are associated with increased adverse selection. Unfortunately, I lack
access to the cost data necessary to perform this analysis. The cost calculations related
to the targeted premiums are calculated based on the average cost among all individuals
at each premium level. The calculations provide an indication of the patient costs based
on sample average but do not consider variation in patient costs among individuals with
different socioeconomic and demographic characteristic.
15The average cost is calculated as a raw average of the administrative cost data provided by the
Rwandan government.
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premium incomes. By definition, this measure of financial sustainability directly hinges
on the premium income and the average individual insurer cost predicted by the dif-
ferent subsidy schemes. The results are presented for two scenarios. In one scenario, I
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cial coverage level using a constant average patient cost, independent of the premium
level.15 The second scenario predicts the average patient cost related to each subsidy
scheme, using the association between patient costs and insurance premiums estimated
by equation (2). The estimates are presented in table 11, column 3. I use the estimated
price sensitivity to predict the relationship between average premium costs and average
patient costs at the health section level. The positive slope of the average cost curve is
reflected in the levels of average patient cost related to each premium scheme: as the
average premium cost increases, the average insurer cost increases.
The simulations indicate that the financial sustainability of alternative premium
subsidies differs depending on whether there is adverse selection. This is expected. In
a setting with adverse selection, the financial coverage reaches levels between 0.35–0.80
for the majority of subsidy schemes, meaning that household premiums cover approxi-
mately 35%—80% of the insurer costs. However, in the absence of selection, the range
of coverage levels for the corresponding subsidy schemes are wider, suggesting that the
coverage levels range between 0.28 and 0.85. The wedge between the level of financial
coverage in the selection and no-selection scenarios increases as the premium levels
deviate from the mean cost.
Overall, the results suggest that the effects of selection are limited but may be
important from the insurers’ point of view. The results are in line with previous
results from developed countries that indicate that the cost of adverse selection (mainly
in terms of social welfare) might be relatively negligible (Finkelstein et al., 2019).
Previous studies on adverse selection (Parmar et al., 2012) indicate that targeted
subsidy schemes are associated with increased adverse selection. Unfortunately, I lack
access to the cost data necessary to perform this analysis. The cost calculations related
to the targeted premiums are calculated based on the average cost among all individuals
at each premium level. The calculations provide an indication of the patient costs based
on sample average but do not consider variation in patient costs among individuals with
different socioeconomic and demographic characteristic.
15The average cost is calculated as a raw average of the administrative cost data provided by the
Rwandan government.
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Table 12: Financial sustainability and insurance coverage: alternative subsidy
schemes
No selection Selection
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Premium subsidy Predicted Premium Avg.cost Financial Avg.cost Financial
scheme coverage payments Coverage Coverage
Actual premium (RwF 2223) 0.698 1.37e10 3543 0.593 3585 0.586
0 0.819 0.00 3543 0.000 2421 0.000
1000 0.765 6.98e09 3543 0.282 2993 0.347
2000 0.710 1.30e10 3543 0.564 3565 0.562
3000 0.656 1.79e10 3543 0.847 4137 0.725
Avg. cost = 3543 0.627 2.02e10 3543 1.000 4434 0.799
Children (0–5 yrs free) 0.671 1.61e10 3543 0.737 3849 0.679
Minors (<19 yrs free) 0.732 9.14e09 3543 0.403 3238 0.447
Poor households free 0.721 1.22e10 3543 0.533 3896 0.485
Notes: The leftmost column listss the different premium subsidy schemes that are used in the es-
timations of sustainable financing. Columns 1 and 2 show the predicted coverage levels and the
corresponding premium income generated by each subsidy scheme (see table 9 for further information
on the predicted take-up levels). Columns 3–6 present the estimated average patient cost and the re-
sulting financial coverage level related to each scheme. The estimations are provided for context with
and without selection. The average patient costs have been predicted using the cost curve estimations
given in table 11, column 3.
7 Conclusions
Over the last two decades, governments in many developing countries have taken im-
portant measures to achieve universal health coverage. In this study, I examine the
potential of premium subsidies as a policy instrument to reach this goal, considering
the financial sustainability of insurance schemes. The effect of premium subsidies is
directly dependent on the price sensitivity of the demand for health insurance. I study
the effects of premium subsidies on the take-up of the CBHI scheme in Rwanda, using
a policy change in the insurance premium to identify the effect of a price change on the
demand for health insurance. The results suggest that the demand for CBHI is price
inelastic. I find that an increase in premium costs by RwF 1,000 (USD 1.1) contributes
to an overall decrease in the likelihood of being enrolled by 10.9 ppt (15.2% at the
mean). This translates into a price sensitivity of –0.18.
Furthermore, the effect of changes to the premium costs is heterogeneous among
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different subgroups of households. Individuals living in poor households or households
headed by women have a higher price elasticity than individuals in nonpoor or male-
headed households. The results suggest that premium subsidies affect the composition
of individuals who decide to enroll.
I use the estimated price sensitivity to simulate the take-up level, insurer costs, and
financial sustainability of alternative subsidy schemes. Overall, the results indicate
that government subsidy strategies will have a limited effect on insurance coverage.
This is a direct effect of the inelastic demand. The results suggest that the current
premium scheme achieves a relatively high coverage level compared with the other
counterfactual subsidy strategies. However, when analyzing the predicted coverage by
subgroups, I find that the evidence indicates that there is great variation in enrollment.
Although one of the primary aims of the new premium policy in Rwanda was to
increase equity in access to healthcare (Kalisa et al., 2016), the results suggest that in
comparison with alternative premium structures, the current premium scheme does not
achieve high enrollment levels among poor households. According to the simulations,
the implementation of a subsidy scheme that targets monetary poor households not
only would contribute to an increase in overall insurance coverage but also would
increase insurance take-up among vulnerable individuals living in poor households and
among the youngest children. As a result, a premium scheme that targets monetary
poor households is likely to increase equality in the access to healthcare. A poverty
definition that is based on monetary measures differs from the unbudehe classification
system that is based on a more integral measure of household socioeconomic status.
However, it is important to note that the CBHI scheme primarily targets households
in the informal sector. In this context, classification of households according to income
could be problematic, implying that the implementation of this premium subsidy policy
might not be feasible from a practical point of view, resulting in an inefficient targeting
instrument. It is not obvious which method provides a better and more efficient poverty
measure.
Another important aim of the Rwandan policy reform was to increase financial
sustainability of the insurance scheme by increasing revenue from household premium
payments (Kalisa et al., 2016). I simulate the financial coverage related to the dif-
ferent pricing strategies by calculating the share of insurer costs covered by premium
revenue. Importantly, in the presence of selection, changes to the insurance premi-
ums will affect the cost of providing the insurance, as the composition of insurance
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beneficiaries changes in response to the change in premium costs. I use variation in
aggregate premium costs among administrative sectors to identify the average insurer
cost curve. The results show a strong correlation between premium costs and insurer
costs, consistent with adverse selection. The presence of adverse selection is important
for financial sustainability of the insurance scheme. As the premium costs increase, so
does the cost of providing insurance.
I predict the financial coverage, or financial self-sustainability, levels of subsidy
schemes in both a setting that allows for adverse selection and one that assumes no
selection. The results indicate that the financial effects of adverse selection are limited
in relation to many subsidy schemes. At the same time, selection is likely to contribute
to unsustainable insurance schemes: as premium costs increase, so does the cost of
providing insurance coverage among beneficiaries. Furthermore, in regard to the aim
of reaching universal healthcare coverage, the take-up levels related to relatively high
premium costs are far from universal. In the end, a health insurance scheme financed
by household premiums is not likely to represent a financially sustainable strategy to
reach universal health coverage. From another perspective, it is important to emphasize
that as enrollment levels start to increase in markets with adverse selection, the cost of
enrolling another individual is smaller relative to the cost of individuals already enrolled
in the insurance. This represents an important consideration when governments make
decisions on introducing premium subsidies.
The results in this study indicate that insurance premiums are not likely to pro-
mote universal insurance coverage without the support of external funds. Dependence
on external donors represents a threat to the overall sustainability of the insurance
schemes, as external funding might fluctuate as a result of cuts in aid budgets, so in
the long run, governments should find other potential sources of funding. However,
because of the small tax base in countries with extended informal sections, the limi-
tations of tax-based financing are obvious in the short run. Nevertheless, a number of
countries have decided to put legal tax commitments towards financing the expansion
of national social health insurance schemes. Premium subsidies can represent a good
alternative to expand CBHI in the short run.
The question of how to finance the expansion of health insurance is important for
the long-run sustainability of health financing in developing countries. The financial
implications of selection in the health market should also be evaluated in the context of
public health and welfare. From a government point of view, the expansion of health
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insurance coverage is likely to improve the health and well-being of the population,
factors that should be considered by policymakers when conducting a complete assess-
ment of the value of premium subsidies. From this point of view, increased patient
costs could for example imply that poor and vulnerable households with high needs
for medical care were able to enroll in the insurance scheme and access healthcare ser-
vices. Ultimately, it is important to recognize that this study is limited to evaluating
the impact of premium subsidies for health insurance on insurance take-up and from
a financial perspective.
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Fischer, T., Frölich, M., & Landmann, A. (2018). Adverse selection in low-income
health insurance markets: Evidence from a RCT in Pakistan (IZA Discussion Paper
No. 11751). Bonn, Germany: IZA Institute of Labor Economics.
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Appendix
Figure A1: National enrollment levels in CBHI, 2003–15
Sources: Kalisa et al. (2016); Ministry of Health of Rwanda (2013).
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Table A1: Ubudehe classification
Group Characteristics
Category 1 (abject poverty) Households in this category of the population own no property,
live by begging, and are wholly dependent on others. Children are
malnourished, and households have no access to medical care.
Category 2 (very poor) Households in this category have poor housing, live on a poor diet,
are able to work a little, but do not own land or livestock.
Category 3 (poor) Households in this category own a small portion of land and hous-
ing, live on their own labor, but have low production capacity and
no savings. Their food is not very nutritious, and they often have
no access to healthcare.
Category 4 (resourceful poor) Households in this group share many of the characteristics of the
poor. In addition they have small ruminants and children go to
primary school. They own some land, cattle, and a bicycle, and
have average production capacity.
Category 5 (food rich) Households in this group own large areas of land, can afford a
balanced diet, and live in decent homes. They employ others, own
cattle, and can afford university education for their children.
Category 6 (money rich) Households in this category have money in banks and can receive
bank loans; own an above-average house, a car, livestock, and
fertile lands; have access to sufficient food; and have permanent
employment
Source: Adapted from MINECOFIN (2002)




Ubudehe group 1 0.96% 1.75%
Ubudehe group 2 17.82% 33.63%
Ubudehe group 3 68.71% 59.43%
Ubudehe group 4 12.04% 5.20%
Ubudehe group 5 0.48% 0.00%
Ubudehe group 6 – –
Note: The poverty measure is defined by the Rwan-
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Table A1: Ubudehe classification
Group Characteristics
Category 1 (abject poverty) Households in this category of the population own no property,
live by begging, and are wholly dependent on others. Children are
malnourished, and households have no access to medical care.
Category 2 (very poor) Households in this category have poor housing, live on a poor diet,
are able to work a little, but do not own land or livestock.
Category 3 (poor) Households in this category own a small portion of land and hous-
ing, live on their own labor, but have low production capacity and
no savings. Their food is not very nutritious, and they often have
no access to healthcare.
Category 4 (resourceful poor) Households in this group share many of the characteristics of the
poor. In addition they have small ruminants and children go to
primary school. They own some land, cattle, and a bicycle, and
have average production capacity.
Category 5 (food rich) Households in this group own large areas of land, can afford a
balanced diet, and live in decent homes. They employ others, own
cattle, and can afford university education for their children.
Category 6 (money rich) Households in this category have money in banks and can receive
bank loans; own an above-average house, a car, livestock, and
fertile lands; have access to sufficient food; and have permanent
employment
Source: Adapted from MINECOFIN (2002)




Ubudehe group 1 0.96% 1.75%
Ubudehe group 2 17.82% 33.63%
Ubudehe group 3 68.71% 59.43%
Ubudehe group 4 12.04% 5.20%
Ubudehe group 5 0.48% 0.00%
Ubudehe group 6 – –
Note: The poverty measure is defined by the Rwan-
dan government and is based on household con-
sumption level.
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Table A3: Summary statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables N Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Health issue 7 612 0.213 0.409 0 1
Disability 7 612 0.049 0.216 0 1
Piped water 7 612 0.396 0.489 0 1
Sanitation 7 612 0.781 0.413 0 1
Work 7 612 0.505 0.500 0 1
Salary worker 7 612 0.239 0.427 0 1
Own nonfarm enterprise 7 612 0.120 0.325 0 1
Poor 7 612 0.423 0.494 0 1
Consumption HH 7 612 218 426 183 718 10 951 3 301 187
Own house 7 612 0.931 0.252 0 1
Own land 7 612 0.965 0.183 0 1
Rural 7 612 0.869 0.336 0 1
Age 0–5 7 612 0.144 0.351 0 1
Age 6–19 7 612 0.371 0.483 0 1
Age 20–29 7 612 0.143 0.350 0 1
Age 30–39 7 612 0.127 0.333 0 1
Age 40–49 7 612 0.080 0.272 0 1
Age 50–65 7 612 0.093 0.291 0 1
Age > 65 7 612 0.041 0.199 0 1
Female 7 612 0.529 0.499 0 1
HH size 7 612 5.613 2.279 1 12
Travel time clinic (hours) 7 612 0.792 1.504 0 30
Travel time hospital (hours) 7 612 3.125 2.05 0 12
Ubudehe 1 7 612 0.013 0.489 0 1
Ubudehe 2 7 612 0.249 0.432 0 1
Ubudehe 3 7 612 0.645 0.478 0 1
Ubudehe 4 7 612 0.089 0.285 0 1
Ubudehe 5 7 612 0.003 0.051 0 1
Ubudehe 6 . . . . .
Note: The results present sample means, standard deviation, and maximum
and minimum values for each variable.
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Table A4: Estimated correlation between household characteristics and
Ubudehe groups 1 and 2, 2014



















The table describes the estimated association be-
tween household characteristics and the likelihood
of being classified as Ubudehe 1 or 2. Estimations
are based on data from 2014, post-treatment, and
describe marginal effects at means.
57
Table A3: Summary statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables N Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Health issue 7 612 0.213 0.409 0 1
Disability 7 612 0.049 0.216 0 1
Piped water 7 612 0.396 0.489 0 1
Sanitation 7 612 0.781 0.413 0 1
Work 7 612 0.505 0.500 0 1
Salary worker 7 612 0.239 0.427 0 1
Own nonfarm enterprise 7 612 0.120 0.325 0 1
Poor 7 612 0.423 0.494 0 1
Consumption HH 7 612 218 426 183 718 10 951 3 301 187
Own house 7 612 0.931 0.252 0 1
Own land 7 612 0.965 0.183 0 1
Rural 7 612 0.869 0.336 0 1
Age 0–5 7 612 0.144 0.351 0 1
Age 6–19 7 612 0.371 0.483 0 1
Age 20–29 7 612 0.143 0.350 0 1
Age 30–39 7 612 0.127 0.333 0 1
Age 40–49 7 612 0.080 0.272 0 1
Age 50–65 7 612 0.093 0.291 0 1
Age > 65 7 612 0.041 0.199 0 1
Female 7 612 0.529 0.499 0 1
HH size 7 612 5.613 2.279 1 12
Travel time clinic (hours) 7 612 0.792 1.504 0 30
Travel time hospital (hours) 7 612 3.125 2.05 0 12
Ubudehe 1 7 612 0.013 0.489 0 1
Ubudehe 2 7 612 0.249 0.432 0 1
Ubudehe 3 7 612 0.645 0.478 0 1
Ubudehe 4 7 612 0.089 0.285 0 1
Ubudehe 5 7 612 0.003 0.051 0 1
Ubudehe 6 . . . . .
Note: The results present sample means, standard deviation, and maximum
and minimum values for each variable.
56
Table A4: Estimated correlation between household characteristics and
Ubudehe groups 1 and 2, 2014



















The table describes the estimated association be-
tween household characteristics and the likelihood
of being classified as Ubudehe 1 or 2. Estimations
are based on data from 2014, post-treatment, and
describe marginal effects at means.
57
Figure A2: Within-group variation in insurance premium and enrollment within
each premium group, before and after the implementation of the new premium
scheme
(a) Ubudehe (b) Ubudehe (predicted)
(c) Consumption 16th percentile (d) Consumption 10th percentile
Notes:Differences in insurance premiums and enrollment levels before and after the policy
change within each separate premium group, as presented in table 3. The observations
show the relation between changes in premium costs and insurance enrollment within each
premium group. The graphs plot the distribution of observations for each alternative defini-
tion of the premium scheme prior to the policy change (see tables 2 and 3 for more detailed
information).
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Table A5: Price sensitivity of the demand of health insurance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables All Drop δ Drop δ Drop δ
premium = 0 premium = (–1) premium = 3
Panel A: Ubudehe
Premium (RwF 1,000) -0.109*** -0.0971*** -0.156***
(0.0143) (0.0140) (0.0398)
Observations 7,612 6,932 6,294
R-squared 0.066 0.062 0.063
Number of PID 3,806 3,466 3,147
Panel B: Predicted ubudehe
Premium (RwF 1,000) -0.103*** -0.0929*** -0.146*** -0.104***
(0.0137) (0.0135) (0.0399) (0.0142)
Observations 7,612 7,090 6,136 7,252
R-squared 0.065 0.062 0.063 0.064
Number of PID 3,806 3,545 3,068 3,626
Panel C: 16th percentile
Premium (RwF 1,000) -0.101*** -0.0870*** -0.168*** -0.0983***
(0.0136) (0.0134) (0.0361) (0.0144)
Observations 7,612 7,076 6,150 6,930
R-squared 0.066 0.061 0.074 0.058
Number of PID 3,806 3,538 3,075 3,465
Panel D: 10th percentile
Premium (RwF 1,000) -0.101*** -0.0944*** -0.150*** -0.101***
(0.0136) (0.0135) (0.0470) (0.0141)
Observations 7,612 7,288 5,938 7,170
R-squared 0.068 0.065 0.062 0.063
Number of PID 3,806 3,644 2,969 3,585
FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The results from estimating equation (1) using the complete sample (column 1)
and restricted samples that stepwise exclude one premium group at a time (columns
2–4). The dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating enrollment in CBHI.
Column 1 presents the preferred estimation strategy shown in table 5, and columns
2–4 estimate the same specification based on the restricted samples. All estimations
include individual fixed effects and a full set of individual and household controls, such
as labor status and rural location, individual health status and household consumption,
and access to water and sanitation services. All estimations are presented separately
for the alternative definitions of the premium scheme prior to the policy change (panels
A–D). For further details see table 2. Standard errors are clustered at household level.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Figure A2: Within-group variation in insurance premium and enrollment within
each premium group, before and after the implementation of the new premium
scheme
(a) Ubudehe (b) Ubudehe (predicted)
(c) Consumption 16th percentile (d) Consumption 10th percentile
Notes:Differences in insurance premiums and enrollment levels before and after the policy
change within each separate premium group, as presented in table 3. The observations
show the relation between changes in premium costs and insurance enrollment within each
premium group. The graphs plot the distribution of observations for each alternative defini-
tion of the premium scheme prior to the policy change (see tables 2 and 3 for more detailed
information).
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Table A5: Price sensitivity of the demand of health insurance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables All Drop δ Drop δ Drop δ
premium = 0 premium = (–1) premium = 3
Panel A: Ubudehe
Premium (RwF 1,000) -0.109*** -0.0971*** -0.156***
(0.0143) (0.0140) (0.0398)
Observations 7,612 6,932 6,294
R-squared 0.066 0.062 0.063
Number of PID 3,806 3,466 3,147
Panel B: Predicted ubudehe
Premium (RwF 1,000) -0.103*** -0.0929*** -0.146*** -0.104***
(0.0137) (0.0135) (0.0399) (0.0142)
Observations 7,612 7,090 6,136 7,252
R-squared 0.065 0.062 0.063 0.064
Number of PID 3,806 3,545 3,068 3,626
Panel C: 16th percentile
Premium (RwF 1,000) -0.101*** -0.0870*** -0.168*** -0.0983***
(0.0136) (0.0134) (0.0361) (0.0144)
Observations 7,612 7,076 6,150 6,930
R-squared 0.066 0.061 0.074 0.058
Number of PID 3,806 3,538 3,075 3,465
Panel D: 10th percentile
Premium (RwF 1,000) -0.101*** -0.0944*** -0.150*** -0.101***
(0.0136) (0.0135) (0.0470) (0.0141)
Observations 7,612 7,288 5,938 7,170
R-squared 0.068 0.065 0.062 0.063
Number of PID 3,806 3,644 2,969 3,585
FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The results from estimating equation (1) using the complete sample (column 1)
and restricted samples that stepwise exclude one premium group at a time (columns
2–4). The dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating enrollment in CBHI.
Column 1 presents the preferred estimation strategy shown in table 5, and columns
2–4 estimate the same specification based on the restricted samples. All estimations
include individual fixed effects and a full set of individual and household controls, such
as labor status and rural location, individual health status and household consumption,
and access to water and sanitation services. All estimations are presented separately
for the alternative definitions of the premium scheme prior to the policy change (panels
A–D). For further details see table 2. Standard errors are clustered at household level.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Figure A3: Predicted likelihood of being categorized in Ubudehe group 3,—by
Ubudehe group, before matching
Figure A4: Predicted likelihood of being categorizedin Ubudehe group 3, —by
Ubudehe group, common support
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Table A6: Likelihood of being categorized in Ubudehe group 3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Ubudehe 2 & 3 Common support 10th–90th 20th–80th
percentile percentile
Health status -0.186 -0.0277 -0.0301 -0.0351
(0.119) (0.0178) (0.0203) (0.0305)
Disability -0.265 -0.0351 -0.0465 -0.0287
(0.208) (0.0312) (0.0352) (0.0492)
Work 0.298 0.0419 0.0454 0.0622
(0.201) (0.0300) (0.0350) (0.0549)
Salary worker -0.248* -0.0368* -0.0509** -0.0274
(0.146) (0.0218) (0.0255) (0.0431)
Own nonfarm 0.0749 0.0148 0.00968 0.0317
(0.170) (0.0254) (0.0298) (0.0497)
HH size 0.175*** 0.0261*** 0.0286*** 0.0556***
(0.0274) (0.00404) (0.00499) (0.0102)
Own house 0.909*** 0.134*** 0.146*** 0.207***
(0.163) (0.0245) (0.0280) (0.0395)
Own land 0.694** 0.0950** 0.0987** 0.108
(0.287) (0.0437) (0.0498) (0.0675)
HH consumption (RwF1,000) 0.000366 6.66e-05 0.000112 0.000126
(0.000359) (5.48e-05) (6.98e-05) (0.000121)
Rural -0.0176 -0.000388 0.0157 0.0176
(0.147) (0.0220) (0.0256) (0.0384)
Age6–19 -0.340** -0.0501** -0.0608*** -0.136***
(0.135) (0.0201) (0.0233) (0.0398)
Age20–29 0.168 0.0244 0.0288 -0.0446
(0.233) (0.0349) (0.0405) (0.0679)
Age30–39 -0.0132 0.00106 0.00973 -0.0907
(0.254) (0.0381) (0.0444) (0.0740)
Age40–49 -0.0988 -0.0174 -0.00161 -0.0814
(0.269) (0.0401) (0.0472) (0.0770)
Age50–65 -0.349 -0.0501 -0.0517 -0.115*
(0.245) (0.0367) (0.0421) (0.0633)
Age > 65 -0.895*** -0.128*** -0.142*** -0.222***
(0.269) (0.0406) (0.0462) (0.0656)
Female -0.127 -0.0184 -0.0199 -0.0331
(0.0955) (0.0142) (0.0165) (0.0263)
Piped water 0.0498 0.00750 0.000141 -0.00975
(0.108) (0.0161) (0.0187) (0.0285)
Toilet 0.483*** 0.0709*** 0.0663*** 0.126***
(0.103) (0.0154) (0.0177) (0.0281)
Constant -1.331*** -1.289*** 0.310 -1.030
(0.362) (0.372) (0.707) (1.076)
Observations 3,072 3,031 2,591 1,290
Notes: Predictions of Ibudehe categorization based on household characteristics. Column 1
presents the predicted likelihood of being categorized in Ubudehe group 3 using a sample
that includes only households from Ubudehe groups 2 and 3, estimated using a logistic
regression model. Column 2 further restricts the sample by including only households in
Ubudehe group 2 or 3 that are in the range of common support, whereas columns 3 and 4
are restricted to include only households within the 10th–90th and 20th–80th percentile of
common support. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table A7: Sensitivity analysis - price sensitivity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Ubudehe 2 & 3 Common 10th–90th 20th–80th
support percentiles percentiles
Premium (RwF 1,000) -0.106*** -0.0951*** -0.101*** -0.106***
(0.0173) (0.0142) (0.0150) (0.0173)
Observations 2,580 6,062 5,182 2,580
R-squared 0.089 0.076 0.076 0.089
Number of PID 1,290 3,031 2,591 1,290
Notes: Table shows the results for the baseline linear probability regression with indi-
vidual fixed effects corresponding to estimating equation (1) for the restricted samples
constructed in appendix table A6. Controls include individual and household charac-
teristics, such as labor status and rural location, individual health status and household
consumption, access to water and sanitation services, and distance to nearest clinic.
Standard errors clustered by household are shown in parentheses below the estimated
coefficient. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A8: Missing values: descriptive statistics on sectors included in and
excluded from in the sample due to missing cost information
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sector characteristics All Sample Missing Diff
Share access piped water 0.479 0.484 0.469 -0.014
Share access sanitation 0.840 0.839 0.842 0.002
Share urbanization 0.159 0.165 0.145 -0.020
Share individuals > 50 yrs. 0.117 0.116 0.121 0.005
Share children < 5 yrs. 0.163 0.162 0.165 0.003
Tot. population of sector 21 872 21 673 22 471 798
Avg. HH consumption 241 475 234 692 257 537 22844
Observations 416 295 121
Notes: Columns 1–3 provide descriptive statistics for all sectors, those included
in the study sample and those excluded from the sample due to missing cost
information. Column 4 presents differences between the sample and the missing
sectors, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A9: Cost curve: average insurer costs excluding operational costs
(1) (2) (3)
Average insurer costs
Avg. premium (RwF 1,000) 0.711*** 0.559*** 0.567***
(0.126) (0.151) (0.154)
Observations 295 295 295
R-squared 0.148 0.439 0.448
District FE No Yes Yes
Sector characteristics No No Yes
Notes: the table shows the results from estimating equation (2) using
the cost data that excludes operational costs. Column 1 provides the
unconditional association between average premium and patient costs
(excluding operational costs) across sectors, column 2 includes district
fixed-effects, and column 3 additionally controls for sector characteris-
tics. When included, the controls contain share of section households
with piped water, access to sanitation, share of households in urban
areas, share of children below 5 years old and individuals older than
65, total population size and average household consumption. The esti-
mated correlation between the average premium and the average insurer
cost is the slope of the cost curve. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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the importance of childcare obligations as a barrier for female entrepreneurship.
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ico. The program provided childcare services for children under 4 years old whose
mothers worked in the informal sector, and varied across time and space. I find
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mance measured by the likelihood of running a home-based business or having
an employee, the number of hours worked, physical capital or the likelihood of
applying for a credit. The results are consistent, irrespective of the choice of
estimation strategy.
Keywords: female self-employment, childcare, microenterprises, daycare pro-
gram
JEL classification: H55, J13, J22, J46, J48
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1 Introduction
Microenterprises account for an important share of employment in many developing
countries and women run the majority of the firms (Klapper & Parker, 2011). A
wide body of literature has shown that businesses run by women are smaller and
less profitable than those run by men (World Bank, 2012; Rijkers & Costa, 2012;
Hardy & Kagy, 2018; Bruhn, 2009). Several factors that could restrict female business
activities have been studied in literature, but the reasons why female-run firms under-
perform businesses run by men remains enigmatic. One potential explanation is that
women face additional barriers that prevent them from taking advantage of economic
opportunities in the market (World Bank, 2012). This paper studies the importance of
childcare obligations as a constraint for female entrepreneurship by placing restrictions
on female mobility, time use and market opportunities. Although unpaid housework
and childcare have often been mentioned as a limiting factor for female entrepreneurship
(Duflo, 2012; Jayachandran, 2020; Hardy & Kagy, 2018; Bruhn, 2009; Fitzpatrick &
Delecourt, forthcoming.), to my knowledge the current study is one of the first to
investigate the importance of childcare obligations as a bottleneck for firm performance
among female-run microenterprises in the developing country context.
I use the introduction of a subsidized childcare program in Mexico as a quasi-
experiment to estimate the impact of increased access to affordable childcare on firm
performance among female-run microenterprises (defined as small businesses with less
than six employees). Estancias Infantiles para Apoyar a Madres Trabajadoras was
introduced in 2007 and offered subsidized childcare to low-income mothers working
in the informal sector. According to the program rules, Estancias Infantiles was in-
tended exclusively for children younger than 4 years old (Secretaŕıa de Gobernación,
2007). This created an eligibility cutoff, where mothers with children who were just
under 4 years old were eligible for the program, but those with children who had just
turned 4 were not. I use this discontinuity in eligibility to estimate the effect of the
program on female-owned microenterprises using a difference-in-difference (DD) esti-
mation strategy. Additionally, I take advantage of the sequential rollout of the program
across Mexican municipalities, which created a geographic variation in program inten-
sity within and across municipalities over time, in a triple-difference design (DDD).
Firm performance is proxied by the likelihood of having an employee, hours worked,
capital stock, business location, and demand for credit.
Women typically spend disproportionately more time than men on unpaid house-
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work and childcare (Samman et al., 2016; Potter et al., 2013).1 Deep-rooted social
norms regarding responsibility for housework and childcare limit female entrepreneur-
ship by placing a constraint on time use and subsequently labor market opportuni-
ties (Samman et al., 2016; Bruhn, 2009; Jayachandran, 2020; Duflo, 2012; Razavi,
2012). Demand and responsibilities related to childcare and housework require female
entrepreneurs to balance business and family obligations, limiting their capacity to
separate the two spheres. This interconnection between family and business likely rep-
resents an important factor for understanding female entrepreneurship (Jayachandran,
2020; Friedson-Ridenour & Pierotti, 2019).
By limiting female market labor supply, childcare obligations could affect the op-
timal size of capital and investment among female-run firms. According to standard
economic theory, an entrepreneur will invest resources into a business until the interest
rate equals the rate of return on the investment. In this context, childcare obligations
are likely to further constrain the marginal return to investment by limiting both mo-
bilization and productivity among female entrepreneurs. Previous studies suggest that
female-headed firms are more likely to operate from home than male-headed enterprises
(Razavi, 2012; Bruhn, 2009). Furthermore, approximately 4 out of 10 female business
owners stated that they had to bring their children to work, which resulted in lower
profits compared to other female-run businesses with no children present (Fitzpatrick
& Delecourt, forthcoming.). By alleviating the interrelation between family obligations
and business activities, Estancias Infantiles could lead to increased marginal return to
investment by improving entrepreneur mobilization and productivity among female
entrepreneurs and, hence returns to investment.
In this study I combine data from the Mexican National Survey of Occupation
and Employment (ENOE) and the National Survey of Micro-enterprises (ENAMIN)
with administrative data on the rollout of Estancias Infantiles, to study the effect
of the program on the performance of female microenterprises in Mexico. ENOE is
a national household survey that provides information on self-employed women and
their businesses, as well as individual and household characteristics. This makes it
possible to match information on business performance with the number and ages of
each entrepreneur’s children. ENAMIN complements the ENOE survey by providing
1There are substantial differences in how men and women spend time on unpaid housework in
Mexico. On average, women dedicate 2.5 times more time than men per day to care for household
members. Men spend 131 minutes per day on average per day on unpaid housework and childcare,
and 478 minutes on paid work. For women, the situation is close to the reverse: they dedicate 331
minutes per day to unpaid work and 236 minutes to market work (OECD, 2014)
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information from in-depth interviews with a subsample of all individuals from the
ENOE sample who stated that they were self-employed. Finally, I merge the data on
self-employed women and their businesses with administrative data on the number of
children enrolled in the program per month in each municipality. The data on program
enrollment are used to construct a variable of treatment intensity that measures the
availability of Estancias Infantiles in each municipality.
Overall, I find no evidence that Estancias Infantiles was associated with business
performance, suggesting that mothers do not adjust their entrepreneurship as a con-
sequence of increased access to subsidized daycare services. The results indicate that
the estimated treatment effects were statistically insignificant for the majority of firm
performance measures, such as the location of firm operations, physical capital and
the likelihood of having applied for a loan or paid staff. I find some evidence that
the program was associated with an increase in the number of hours worked per week
among urban firms. Furthermore, I rule out that in- and outflows of entrepreneurs
from the self-employed sector explain the results by showing that Estancias Infantiles
was not associated with the decision to become self-employed.
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These studies have found some effects of savings on business practices but have failed
to find evidence that such improvements have translated into increased profits, sales,
and investment (Bastian et al., 2018). Another strand of literature has examined the
relevance of business training on firm performance. Few studies find significant ef-
fects of managerial training on female business performance and survival (Fiala, 2018;
McKenzie & Woodruff, 2013; Bruhn & Zia, 2013; Karlan & Valdivia, 2011; Drexler
et al., 2014). Overall, while policy interventions that aim to grow microenterprises,
such as increased access to financial capital and business skills training, often had no
effect on female entrepreneurship, such policies have frequently been effective among
male-run businesses (Fiala, 2018; Bastian et al., 2018; McKenzie & Woodruff, 2013).
Second, this study relates to the literature on the effect of subsidized childcare on
female labor force participation, the findings of which are inconclusive. Although some
studies found no evidence that formal childcare or preschool programs affected female
labor force participation (Manley & Vásquez Lav́ın, 2013; Medrano, 2009; Havnes &
Mogstad, 2011; Fitzpatrick, 2010), numerous papers have found a positive effect in both
developed and developing countries (Ángeles et al., 2011; Baker et al., 2008; Lefebvre
& Merrigan, 2008; Hallman et al., 2005; Attanasio & Vera-Hernández, 2004; Halim et
al., 2019; Berlinski & Galiani, 2007; Mart́ınez & Perticará, 2017). Also the effects of
Estancias Infantiles have been studied before. Calderon (2014) showed that a 10% rise
in childcare availability increased the probability of working among eligible women by
1.5 percentage points on average.
The identification strategy in my study is closely related to the empirical strat-
egy employed by Calderon (2014), although the current paper primarily relies on the
variation in eligibility resulting from the age cutoff create by the program rules. Im-
portantly, my study differs from that of Calderon by studying a different aspect of
Estancias Infantiles, focusing on different outcomes. While Calderon investigated the
effects of the program on female and male labor force participation, the purpose of
this paper is to evaluate the effects of the introduction of Estancias Infantiles on the
performance of female-run microenterprises. To my knowledge, this is the first paper
to use the introduction of a nation wide daycare program as a quasi-experiment to
study the importance of childcare obligations as an obstacle for female entrepreneur-
ship, using observational data. The analysis in this paper was made possible by the
unique possibility of combining survey data on firm operations with data on family
demographics.
4
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes Estancias Infantiles and other
formal childcare services in Mexico. Section 3 provides the data and summary statistics.
Section 4 outlines the empirical framework and discusses threats to identifications and
provides 5 presents the results and robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
2 Childcare in Mexico
Estancias Infantiles para Apoyar a Madres Trabajadoras is a federal daycare program
introduced in Mexico in 2007, with the aim of expanding public daycare to workers
in the informal sector. Estancias Infantiles offered subsidized childcare to low income
mothers that were working, studying, or looking for a job. Estancias Infantiles was
part of the government’s strategy to eradicate poverty by diminishing the vulnerability
of low-income and single parent households. The program targeted working mothers
with children 1 to 3 years old (under 4 years old) who did not have access to social
security daycare servicesand lived in households with an income less than six times the
minimum wage (Ángeles et al., 2011).
Public daycare has been offered in Mexico since the 1970s, when the Mexican In-
stitute for Social Security (IMSS) introduced daycare for mothers covered by social
security who were working in the formal sector. Despite efforts to expand the coverage
of the daycare program, IMSS far from satisfied the childcare demand among workers
in the formal sector (Staab & Gerhard, 2011). In 2005, the program enrolled approxi-
mately 200,000 children, representing 20% of the eligible group. In 2008, the program
had become the most important childcare provider for children under 4 years old, rep-
resenting 84% of all childcare centers and covering 56% of all enrolled children (Staab
& Gerhard, 2010). Importantly, IMSS services left out half of the labor force by not
targeting informal workers. In addition to IMSS, the Institute for Social Security and
Services for Public Employees (ISSSTE) offered daycare services to public employees
(Staab & Gerhard, 2011).
Figure 1 shows the development of childcare services in Mexico from 2000 to 2015.
Estancias Infantiles saw a dramatic expansion during the first years of operation. In
2014, the program offered childcare services to 300,000 children. During this time, the
supply of daycare centers from the formal sector was stable.
5
These studies have found some effects of savings on business practices but have failed
to find evidence that such improvements have translated into increased profits, sales,
and investment (Bastian et al., 2018). Another strand of literature has examined the
relevance of business training on firm performance. Few studies find significant ef-
fects of managerial training on female business performance and survival (Fiala, 2018;
McKenzie & Woodruff, 2013; Bruhn & Zia, 2013; Karlan & Valdivia, 2011; Drexler
et al., 2014). Overall, while policy interventions that aim to grow microenterprises,
such as increased access to financial capital and business skills training, often had no
effect on female entrepreneurship, such policies have frequently been effective among
male-run businesses (Fiala, 2018; Bastian et al., 2018; McKenzie & Woodruff, 2013).
Second, this study relates to the literature on the effect of subsidized childcare on
female labor force participation, the findings of which are inconclusive. Although some
studies found no evidence that formal childcare or preschool programs affected female
labor force participation (Manley & Vásquez Lav́ın, 2013; Medrano, 2009; Havnes &
Mogstad, 2011; Fitzpatrick, 2010), numerous papers have found a positive effect in both
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Figure 1: Childcare service in Mexico
Notes: The number of children ages 1—3 years old enrolled in a daycare in Mexico across
time. Prior to the implementation of Estancias Infantiles (EI), the Mexican Institute for
Social Security (IMSS) and the Institute for Social Security and Services for Public Em-
ployeed (ISSSTE) provided childcare services for parents who were working in the formal
sector.
Estancias Infantiles provided subsidized daycare services that covered up to 90% of
the cost of childcare with a maximum amount of 700 Mexican pesos a month per child.
Beneficiaries had to pay the remaining part of the childcare cost, resulting in a daycare
fee of about 200 pesos per month on average for enrolling a child in Estancias Infantiles
(Secretaŕıa de Gobernación, 2007). This fee was low compare with the cost of already
existing daycare alternatives. Households in the informal sector did not have access
to other public daycare centers operated by the national social security. However,
a study of private daycare centers in Mexico City indicated that there was a large
variation in costs and services among centers. The monthly cost for children under 1
year ranged from approximately 500 to 5,350 pesos for full-time service, whereas the
tuition for children between 2 to 6 years old ranged from 650 to 3,780 pesos per month
(PROFECO, 2014).
According to the program rules, any existing childcare center that satisfied the
6
rules of affiliation was eligible to join the Estancias Infantiles daycare network. At
the same time, any individual or organization who wanted to establish and operate a
childcare center could apply to enter the program. The applications were verified by the
responsible government institution and an evaluation was made of the suitability of the
applicant and the property intended for the daycare center (Secretaŕıa de Gobernación,
2007). Furthermore, the program offered a governmental grant to those willing to open
a childcare center so that the could upgrade their facilities in accordance with the
program guidelines. The maximum amount was 61,000 Mexican pesos (approximately
USD 2,900). The rules of operation allowed the use of 20% of the funds to be used
to cover operational costs during the first two months of operation. The strategy was
intended to help the program quickly expand (Secretaŕıa de Gobernación, 2007).
The introduction of Estancias Infantiles increased the total supply of daycare ser-
vices by adding to the existing childcare centers. Approximately 87% of the childcare
centers within the program were newly founded, while the other 13% were existing
centers that converted to Estancias Infantil (Ángeles et al., 2011). As a result of the
implementation strategy the geographic location of the centers was defined by the sup-
ply and demand in the market, without any government intervention. I discuss the
implications of the rollout process in the following section.
3 Data
The analysis in this paper is based on data from the Mexican National Survey of
Occupation and Employment (ENOE). ENOE is a quarterly survey with a rotating
panel design that is representative at the national level. I use one survey round per
year between 2005 and 2014 to construct a repeated cross sectional data set.2 Besides
detailed information about the labor conditions for all working-age individuals in a
household, the ENOE survey also contains sociodemographic characteristics for all
household members. This makes it possible to link information about self-employed
women and their businesses with the ages and number of children they had. I refer to
the ENOE sample as the national sample.
2Data are collected through an extended and a shorter versions of the survey. The extended version
is rolled out once every year, in different trimesters, whereas a shorter version is used for the remaining
survey rounds. In the baseline sample, I use only data from the extended survey since this version
contains better and more specific information on the microenterprises and entrepreneurs included in
this analysis.
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Every second year, the National Survey on Micro-enterprises (ENAMIN) is con-
ducted. A a random subsample of all self-employed individuals is drawn from the
ENOE data and asked to participate in in-depth interviews regarding their businesses
and entrepreneurial activities. The survey provides comprehensive information on mi-
croenterprises with less than 6 employees (15 for manufacturing firms), such as access
to financial credit, physical capital, and sales and profits. Given this sampling strategy,
the ENAMIN includes formally registered businesses as well as small and unregistered
firms that would have been excluded from business surveys based on administrative
records on registered businesses. This is important for this analysis because Estancias
Infantiles was directed primarily towards working parents in the informal sector.
I include data from the 2002, 2008, 2010 and 2012 ENAMIN survey rounds. The
current version of the survey dates back to 2008. Before that, the survey in 2002 was
conducted using a sub-sample of the National Urban Employment Survey (ENEU) and
covered only urban areas.3 To make the surveys comparable over time, I restrict the
ENAMIN analysis to urban areas with more than 100,000 inhabitants. Additionally, I
limit the analysis to include only survey questions that are comparable over the years.4
As a result, the pre-treatment analysis is limited to urban areas. I refer to the ENAMIN
data as the urban sample.
The ENOE survey stretches back several decades, but was also reconstructed in
2005. The reconstruction of the survey does not affect the main analysis since Estancias
Infanties was first introduced in 2007. However, to construct pre-treatment trends I
use data from an earlier version of ENOE, the National Employment Survey (ENE),
for the period 1995—2004. Similarly, I rely on the ENEU survey from 2000 to 2004 to
construct pre-treatment trends, for urban areas.
To identify entrepreneurs living in municipalities that were treated by the program, I
link administrative records on program enrollment with the data on firm and household
characteristics. The administrative data were provided by the Secretary of Social
Development (Sedesol) in Mexico City and contains information regarding the number
of enrolled children per month in each municipality and the date when each center
began to operate. I construct a measure of program intensity by dividing the number
of children enrolled in the program by the total number of children between 1 to 3
years old in each municipality. Data on the number of children are provided by the
2010 Mexican Census (Censo de Población y Vivienda 2010). Importantly, these data
3The survey was not conducted between 2002 and 2008.
4This has previously been done by BenYishay & Pearlman (2014)
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includes all children in the target age group in each municipality, including children
whose parents were eligible for childcare services offered by the formal social security
system. The share of enrollment in Estancias Infantiles serves as a proxy for availability
of the program in each municipality in a specific year.5
The analysis in this paper is restricted to self-employed women. For the purpose
of this stud, a woman is considered self-employed if she stated that she had worked at
least one hour during the past week and did not have a boss. Furthermore, I restrict
the sample to include only household heads and spouses of household heads that are
between 15 and 65 years old, who stated that they were not covered by social security.
I do not restrict the sample according to income level. As previously mentioned,
Estancias Infantiles was offered to households with an income below a threshold of
six times the minimum wage. In practice the program relied on self-reported income
and employment records (Calderon, 2014), which likely made the program available
to most self-employed households in the informal sector. According to the descriptive
statistics in appendix table A1, the average income level among entrepreneurs in the
national sample was approximately 2,900 pesos (USD 146). This is well below the
program income threshold of a monthly income of 8,500 Mexican pesos (USD 420),
which is the equivalent of six times the minimum wage in the country in 2007.6 The
results indicate that most households in the study sample were not likely to have been
affected by the income threshold.
3.1 Eligibility
According to the program rules, entrepreneurs with children 1 to 3 years old were el-
igible for Estancias Infantiles. I use the program regulation to define treatment. An
entrepreneurs was eligible if her youngest child was 1 to 3 years old and she lived in
a municipality that had introduced the program. Furthermore, I limit the sample to
include only women whose youngest child was under 6 years old, which results in a
control group that consists of women whose youngest child was between 4 and 6 years
old. (I present results with alternative control groups in the robustness section.) I
chose this sample in order to obtain a control group of women with childcare obliga-
tions as similar as possible to those of the women in the treatment group. Children
5This strategy has previously been used by (Calderon, 2014).
6In 2007, the minimum wage was 50.57 pesos per day (INEGI, 2019). During a month with 28
working days, this would result in a minimum income of 1,416 pesos, corresponding to approximately
8,500 pesos.
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chose this sample in order to obtain a control group of women with childcare obliga-
tions as similar as possible to those of the women in the treatment group. Children
5This strategy has previously been used by (Calderon, 2014).
6In 2007, the minimum wage was 50.57 pesos per day (INEGI, 2019). During a month with 28
working days, this would result in a minimum income of 1,416 pesos, corresponding to approximately
8,500 pesos.
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between 4 and 6 years old were not eligible for Estancias Infantiles, but were not yet
attending primary school. They were, however, most likely enrolled in mandatory pub-
lic preschool, which was held only four hours daily and consequently did not fulfill the
daycare needs of a full-time working mother. As a result, working women with children
4 to 6 years old continued to be in need of childcare services.
Given the definition of eligibility, it is possible that women in the treatment group
also had older children aged 4—6 years. This would lead to an underestimation of the
treatment effect since these women most likely continued to face barriers to economic
activities due to childcare obligations for the older siblings, even in the presence of Es-
tancias Infantiles. I do not exclude this group of women from the treatment group since
I consider this part of the treatment effect when studying the effect of any childcare
program directed towards young children under 4 years old. I do, however, provide
estimations based on a sample that excludes women in the treatment group who also
have children aged 4—6 years in the section for robustness tests.
Descriptive statistics for women in the treatment and control groups defined by the
age-cutoff are presented in appendix tables A2 and A3. The results suggest that there
are significant differences between the control and treatment groups. Eligible women
were significantly younger and more likely to have at least a secondary education com-
pared with women in the control group, in both the national and the urban samples.
Furthermore, the family composition differed between both groups: compared with
the control group, entrepreneurs in the treatment group were significantly more likely
be married and to live in households with fewer adult household members, but with
a larger number of children. This difference is statistically insignificant among urban
entrepreneurs. Importantly, there is no significant differences in income between house-
holds in the treatment and control groups in the national sample. Furthermore, eligible
and ineligible households are as likely to live in rural areas in the national sample.
The significant differences between entrepreneurs in the treatment and control
groups could lead to biased estimates if characteristics associated with program eli-
gibility were simultaneously associated with business performance. I further discuss
the potential effects of such confounders in the following section.
3.2 Rollout of the program
Appendix figure A1 shows the cumulative number of total childcare centers from the
introduction of Estancias Infantiles in 2007 until 2014. The program expanded rapidly
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during the first years of implementation and subsequently leveled off. During the first
year of the program, 6315 centers were opened in 935 municipalities. In December
2014, 1146 municipalities had at least one childcare center operating. This represents
approximately half of Mexico’s 2456 municipalities.
The availability of Estancias Infantiles varied among and within municipalities, over
time. Table 1 shows the rollout of the program across the municipalities in the ENOE
data. Row 1 in Panel A presents the total number of municipalities included in the
ENOE survey per year, after adjusting the sample to include only female entrepreneurs
with children between 1 to 6 years old (the target group for this study). The number of
municipalities varies from year to year as a result of the ENOE sampling frame; that is,
all municipalities were not surveyed every year.The ENOE survey is constructed to be
representative at the level of federal entities, as well as communities of four population
sizes.
The baseline sample used in the current study includes only municipalities that
introduced Estancias Infantiles directly in 2007. Given this strategy, I exclude munic-
ipalities that introduced the program after 2007 or not at all. These municipalities
represent the difference between row 1 and row 2 in Panel A.7 The numbers of munic-
ipalities included in the main national sample each year are presented in row 2 (panel
A). The results suggest that Estancias Infantiles quickly expanded across municipal-
ities, and that the program was implemented directly in 2007 in 379 of the sample
municipalities.
7I also estimated the effect of Estancias Infantiles using the full ENOE sample, including all
municipalities in the ENOE sample. I found that the results are consistent irrespective of the choice
of sample. Results are available upon request. Additionally, the multiple-period DD estimations using
all municipalities are presented in the robustness section.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics: intensity and rollout of the Estancias Infantiles
program
VARIABLES 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Panel A.
Municipalities
All municipalities 455 451 462 468 422 446 422 441 401 379
Baseline sample 369 368 379 384 347 358 337 356 328 311
(treated in 2007)
Panel B. Intensity
Mean 0 0 0.039 0.055 0.065 0.068 0.071 0.076 0.077 0.078
Min 0 0 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002
Max 0 0 0.147 0.198 0.212 0.232 0.225 0.333 0.299 0.253
Notes: Panel A presents the number of treated municipalities included in the analysis sample each
year. The first row shows the total number of municipalities in ENOE per year, and the second row
displays the number of municipalities where Estancias Infantiles was introduced in 2007–the baseline
national sample used in this analysis. Panel B displays the average intensity of the program per year
among municipalities in the baseline national sample, as well as maximum and minimum program
intensity levels.
Although Estancias Infantiles soon became the most important provider of formal
childcare in Mexico (Staab & Gerhard, 2010), exposure to the program was limited
within municipalities. Panel B of table 1 displays the intensity of the program in each
municipality in the baseline sample, measured by the number of enrolled children as
a share of the total number of children between 1 to 3 years old in each municipality.
Given the rollout process describe earlier, some municipalities expanded the program
faster than others, resulting in variation in treatment intensity both across and within
municipalities over time. The variation in average program intensity among sample
municipalities ranged between approximately 3.9% and 7.8% during the period, in-
creasing with time. At the same time, variation across municipalities at a given point
in time ranged between 0.01% and 33.3% in some municipalities. Importantly, all
municipalities in the urban sample introduced Estancias Infantiles directly in 2007.
Appendix figure A2 illustrates the geographic variation in treatment exposure across
municipalities at two points in time, 2008 and 2012. Estancias Infantiles appears to be
relatively evenly distributed across the country, with high concentrations of daycare
centers in urban areas.
According to the program rules, anyone who fulfilled the stated requirements was
able to start a daycare center. This rollout strategy is likely to have caused a correla-
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tion between business performance and exposure to Estancias Infantiles as a result of
a higher demand for childcare services in municipalities with high business growth. In
appendix table A7, I further examine the rollout of the program across municipalities.
Column 1 shows the association between a number of municipality characteristics and
the likelihood of being treated by the Estancias Infantiles program, whereas column
2 presents the relation between municipality characteristics and the timing of the in-
troduction of Estancias Infantiles in a specific municipality, conditional on treatment.8
The results in column 1 suggest that Estancias Infantiles was not randomly introduced
across municipalities. The likelihood that the program was introduced in a municipality
was negatively correlated with the share of self-employment, but positively correlated
with the share of the population with a low income (one minimum wage or lower). This
is likely to be a direct effect of the fact that Estancias Infantiles targeted low-income
women working in the informal sector. Municipalities with a higher average level of
education were more likely to offer Estancias Infantiles, although education level was
not associated with the timing of the rollout. Furthermore, the results in column 2
indicates that, controlling for the level of urbanization in a municipality, an increased
share of the population working in the tertiary sector was associated with an earlier
roll-out of the program. Also, the share of self-employed individuals in a municipality
was associated with a later introduction of the program. This was also true for urban
municipalities.
Overall, the results suggest that Estancias infantiles was more likely to have been
introduced in more dynamic areas with a potentially relatively high demand for daycare
services. The potential effects of the rollout of the program on the estimated treatment
effects are discussed further in the next section. Importantly, the main estimation
strategy relies primarily on the age of the youngest child to identify treatment.
3.3 Microenterprises
The female-run microenterprises are described in appendix tables A5 and A6. The
results indicate that women operated primarily their businesses from home or in a spe-
cific installation, and were mostly active in the sales or service sector. Appendix table
A5 describes enterprises in the national sample. Approximately one out of every four
8I measure the timing of the introduction of Estancias Infantiles in a specific municipality, using an
index that takes the value 1 January of 2007, 2 in February 2007, and so on. Given the construction
of the index, a municipality with a high index number introduced the program at a later stage than
did a municipality with a relatively lower number.
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enterprises had at least one employee and about 9% of the entrepreneurs employed a
paid worker. Among those who did not operate from specific establishment, approx-
imately 31% ran their businesses from home and 13% were walking vendors. About
57% of all microenterprises operated in the sales sector, whereas almost 20% and 19%
were active in the service and manufacturing sectors, respectively. Nearly half of the
entrepreneurs in the sales sector operate in specific installations, 37% were walking
salesmen of miscellaneous items, and 10% sold food by a public road. Approximately
17% of the entrepreneurs in the service sector prepared and served foods in specific
plants, and 9% were garment makers. Nearly one out of five were hairdressers. Female
entrepreneurs worked 30.5 hours per week, on average.
Appendix table A6 shows that, similarly to the national sample, about half of the
urban firms operated in the sales sector, but urban firms were more likely to operate in
the service sector, and less likely to operate in the manufacturing sector, than firms in
the national sample. The vast majority of the urban firms were individual businesses
started by the owner. Approximately 86% of the firm owners used start-up capital
when setting up their businesses. The average firm had a physical capital representing
a value of 9,700 pesos (approximately USD 490), but half of the entrepreneurs evaluated
the physical capital in their firms to be less than 1,000 pesos (USD 50). One out of
four urban businesses operated from a plant, and one out of three operated from home.
This structure is similar to the results from the national sample. About 17% of the
urban firm owners applied for a credit during the last year prior to the survey, and
97% of these also received it. The average loan was 2,100 pesos (USD 100).
The descriptive statistics indicate that the primary reason (52%) for starting a busi-
ness was to be able to supplement household income. Around 5% of the entrepreneurs
stated that theyad started their businesses as a response to good business opportunities,
whereas 10% considered that they would receive a higher income being self-employed
than from wage employment. Time flexibility has often been identified as one of the
main reasons that women become self-employed, so that they can balance housework
and market work (Samman et al., 2016). However, only 6% of the entrepreneurs stated
that they had started their business in order to receive more flexible working hours.
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4 Empirical Strategy
The empirical analysis in this paper builds on the variation in access to Estancias
Infantiles caused by program eligibility and rollout. According to the program rules,
entrepreneurs with at least one child 1 to 3 years old (under 4 years old) were eligible,
whereas families whose youngest child was just over 4 years old were not. The eligibility
rules created a variation in access to Estancias Infantiles across entrepreneurs living in
the same geographic area. I use this variation to identify the effect of the program on
female entrepreneurship and business performance.
My baseline specification to estimate the effect of Estancias Infantiles on female
entrepreneurship and business performance is presented in equation (1):
Yimt = β0 + β1Ai + β2postt + β3(A · post)it +Xiγ + δt + αm + εimt (1)
where i indicates an individual observation; m, municipality; and t, years. Yimt mea-
sures a number of different outcomes that proxy firm performance: hours worked during
one week, physical capital, and indicators that take the value 1 if (i) the business is
located in the entrepreneur’s home, (ii) the business has a payed employee, or (iii) the
entrepreneur has applied for a financial credit during the last year, and zero otherwise.
The likelihood of operating the business from home is a proxy for female mobility,
whereas the indicators for having a paid employee and applying for credit, as well as
having physical capital, are different measures of firm size. Ai is a dummy variable
indicating that the entrepreneur has at least one child 1 to 3 years old, controlling
for time-invariant differences in firm performance between the treatment and control
groups. The specification also includes year fixed effects, δt, which controls for ag-
gregate changes in female entrepreneurship over time, and municipality fixed effects,
αm, which control for time-invariant municipality characteristics that may influence
both entrepreneurship and treatment. Xi is a vector of household and individual char-
acteristics covariates, including age, education, marital status, number of adults and
children in the household, and household income. post is a treatment indicator that
takes the value 1 in all time periods after the introduction of Estancias Infantiles in
2007. εimt is the error term. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.
The coefficient of interest, β3, is the DD estimate of the treatment effect. I estimate
equation (1) as a linear probability model.
The DD design compares changes in business performance between eligible and
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ineligible entrepreneurs, before and after the program. An entrepreneur is defined as
treated in the DD estimation strategy if she had at least one child 1 to 3 years old and
lived in a municipality with at least one daycare center enrolled in Estancias Infantiles.
As a result, the DD design estimates treats all women in treated municipalities as
eligible if their youngest child is 1 to 3 years old, regardless of whether they received
the childcare services; this is the intention-to-treat (ITT) effect.
In addition to the variation in eligibility of Estancias Infantiles caused by the age
cutoff, the sequential rollout of the program caused another source of variation in
program availability. As described in table 1, the program was gradually rolled-out
across municipalities. Some municipalities expanded the program faster than others,
creating a variation in treatment exposure over time and among municipalities. As
a result, some municipalities had a higher share of eligible children enrolled in the
program at a given point in time, than others.
I expand the DD design by incorporating the geographic variation as a second
source of variation in treatment exposure. I use the variation in program availabil-
ity to estimate the difference in business performance between eligible and ineligible
entrepreneurs, before and after the introduction of the program (the DD estimate),
in municipalities with different levels of program intensity. The DD estimations from
high- and low-intensity municipalities can be combined in a tripe-difference model.
I estimate the following DDD specifications:
Yimt = β0+β1Ai+β2EImt+β3post+β4(Ai·postt)+β5(Ai·αm)+β6(EImt·Ai)+Xiγ+δt+αm+εimt
(2)
where again i indicates an individual observation; m, municipality; and t, years.
Similar to equatinon (1), equation (2) also includes a variable EImt that measures
program intensity in municipality m and time t. I use both a binary and a continuous
measure of treatment intensity. The continuous measure takes a value between zero
and 1 that was constructed by dividing the number of children enrolled in the program
by the total number of eligible children in each municipality. The binary treatment
indicator takes the value 1 if the municipality reached a treatment intensity above the
sample mean at ant time during the study period. EImt is a continuous variable that
takes a value between zero and 1, or a treatment indicator that equals 1 if program
intensity exceeds the median treatment intensity at any time during the study period.
Zero otherwise. The median maximum treatment intensity was 5.5% and 6.7% in the
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national and urban samples, respectively. β4, is the DD estimate, whereas β6 is the
DDD estimate that measures the effect of Estancias Infantiles on business performance.
Again, I estimate equation (2) using a linear probability model with municipality fixed
effects.
4.1 Threats to identification
According to the program rules, Estancias Infantiles targeted children 1 to 3 years
old, whose mothers were working in jobs that were not covered by the national social
security system, were actively looking for a job, or studying. For entrepreneurs whose
youngest child was born just before or after the age cutoff, the eligibility rules were likely
to have resulted in a treatment assignment that was as good as random. As discussed
earlier, baseline summary statistics reveal that eligible and ineligible entrepreneurs
differ significantly in relation to a number of individual and household characteristics
(see appendix table A2 for the national sample and appendix table A3 for the urban
sample). Among entrepreneurs who live in households with the same income, eligible
entrepreneurs are younger, have a higher education level, and are more likely to be
married, than those who are ineligible for the program.
The DD design controls for all systematic differences between eligible and ineligi-
ble entrepreneurs that do not change over time, including for example differences in
cultural expectations and motivations related to childcare obligations and labor force
participation between women with young children compared to those with relatively
older children. As a result, time-invariant factors are likely to represent an important
source of differences in entrepreneurship between eligible and ineligible entrepreneurs,
implying that the model control for an important share of unobservables. Additionally,
municipality fixed effects control for time-invariant heterogeneity across municipalities
such as differences in economic and market opportunities between rural and urban
municipalities, which could cause differential trends in business performance between
eligible and ineligible entrepreneurs if entrepreneurship among women with young chil-
dren under 4 years old was limited to urban areas. The time fixed effects control
for time-varying, but group invariant, factors such as cultural and economic changes
related to female entrepreneurship over time that are similar to all female business own-
ers. Finally, I control for differences in characteristics between treatment and control
groups by including a number of covariates in the regression model.
Given the DD design, unobservable and time-varying characteristics remain as a
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ity to estimate the difference in business performance between eligible and ineligible
entrepreneurs, before and after the introduction of the program (the DD estimate),
in municipalities with different levels of program intensity. The DD estimations from
high- and low-intensity municipalities can be combined in a tripe-difference model.
I estimate the following DDD specifications:
Yimt = β0+β1Ai+β2EImt+β3post+β4(Ai·postt)+β5(Ai·αm)+β6(EImt·Ai)+Xiγ+δt+αm+εimt
(2)
where again i indicates an individual observation; m, municipality; and t, years.
Similar to equatinon (1), equation (2) also includes a variable EImt that measures
program intensity in municipality m and time t. I use both a binary and a continuous
measure of treatment intensity. The continuous measure takes a value between zero
and 1 that was constructed by dividing the number of children enrolled in the program
by the total number of eligible children in each municipality. The binary treatment
indicator takes the value 1 if the municipality reached a treatment intensity above the
sample mean at ant time during the study period. EImt is a continuous variable that
takes a value between zero and 1, or a treatment indicator that equals 1 if program
intensity exceeds the median treatment intensity at any time during the study period.
Zero otherwise. The median maximum treatment intensity was 5.5% and 6.7% in the
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national and urban samples, respectively. β4, is the DD estimate, whereas β6 is the
DDD estimate that measures the effect of Estancias Infantiles on business performance.
Again, I estimate equation (2) using a linear probability model with municipality fixed
effects.
4.1 Threats to identification
According to the program rules, Estancias Infantiles targeted children 1 to 3 years
old, whose mothers were working in jobs that were not covered by the national social
security system, were actively looking for a job, or studying. For entrepreneurs whose
youngest child was born just before or after the age cutoff, the eligibility rules were likely
to have resulted in a treatment assignment that was as good as random. As discussed
earlier, baseline summary statistics reveal that eligible and ineligible entrepreneurs
differ significantly in relation to a number of individual and household characteristics
(see appendix table A2 for the national sample and appendix table A3 for the urban
sample). Among entrepreneurs who live in households with the same income, eligible
entrepreneurs are younger, have a higher education level, and are more likely to be
married, than those who are ineligible for the program.
The DD design controls for all systematic differences between eligible and ineligi-
ble entrepreneurs that do not change over time, including for example differences in
cultural expectations and motivations related to childcare obligations and labor force
participation between women with young children compared to those with relatively
older children. As a result, time-invariant factors are likely to represent an important
source of differences in entrepreneurship between eligible and ineligible entrepreneurs,
implying that the model control for an important share of unobservables. Additionally,
municipality fixed effects control for time-invariant heterogeneity across municipalities
such as differences in economic and market opportunities between rural and urban
municipalities, which could cause differential trends in business performance between
eligible and ineligible entrepreneurs if entrepreneurship among women with young chil-
dren under 4 years old was limited to urban areas. The time fixed effects control
for time-varying, but group invariant, factors such as cultural and economic changes
related to female entrepreneurship over time that are similar to all female business own-
ers. Finally, I control for differences in characteristics between treatment and control
groups by including a number of covariates in the regression model.
Given the DD design, unobservable and time-varying characteristics remain as a
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source of omitted variable bias. To produce unbiased estimates, the DD model as-
sumes that in the absence of Estancias Infantiles, differences in business performance
between eligible and ineligible entrepreneurs would have been constant over time. This
is referred to as the common trends assumption.
I study the pre-treatment trends in outcome levels between eligible and ineligible
entrepreneurs to determine whether it is plausible to make the assumption of common
trends. Appendix figures A3 and A4 show the trends for the average number of hours
worked during a week, as well as the likelihood of having an employee and operating
the business from home, in the national and urban samples, respectively. The trend
among ineligible entrepreneurs represents the common trend that would have occurred
in the absence of treatment—that is, if Estancias Infantiles were never introduced. As
mentioned earlier, in 2005 the labor survey was reconstructed. As a result, the survey
samples are not completely comparable over time. Despite the reconstruction of the
surveys in 2005, I provide pre-trend data between 1995 and 2007 with the understanding
that the data are less comparable before and after the changes in the surveys. The
restructuring is marked in each figure by a vertical line. The trends appear to be parallel
by visual inspection prior to the introduction of Estancias Infantiles, indicating that
the assumption of common trends is reasonable. As a result, the assumption that the
estimated treatment effect is unbiased becomes more credible.
While these figures provide evidence that supports the common trends assumption
in the pre-treatment period, there is no guarantee that the parallel trend would con-
tinue in the post-treatment period. A common concern with the DD analysis is that
factors unrelated to treatment might affect outcomes differently among eligible en-
trepreneurs than among ineligible entrepreneurs. If this occurred simultaneously with
the introduction of Estancias Infantiles, this could lead to a violation of the common
trends assumption by causing differences in the underlying post-treatment trends be-
tween the two groups. For example, any government program that aimed to increase
business opportunities for women with young children (under 4 years old), such as
increased access to microcredits or managerial education, could cause a positive trend
in business performance among eligible entrepreneurs even in the absence of Estancias
Infantiles. This would result in an upward bias of the DD estimates. Following the
same reasoning, any positive economic shock to the economy that coincided with the
introduction of Estancais Infantiles, and affected entrepreneurs whose youngest child
was under 4 years old more than compared to entrepreneurs whose youngest child was
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between 4 and 6 years old, would bias the results upward. Though possible, I consider
it unlikely that such shocks would have affected eligible and ineligible entrepreneurs
differently.
Given the above reasoning, the DD estimation design will produce unbiased es-
timates assuming that there were no confounding effects, but that it was only the
introduction of Estancias Infantiles that changed female business performance. One
way of addressing differential trends between eligible and ineligible groups, caused by
time-varying confounders, would be to compare the DD estimates in treated munic-
ipalities with the same estimate in municipalities where Estancias Infantiles was not
implemented, or that had a different level of treatment intensity. This is the DDD esti-
mate. The DDD model controls for potential bias caused by time-varying confounding
variables by comparing the difference in outcome variables between eligible and inelig-
ble entrepreneurs, before and after the program introduction, with the corresponding
differences in municipalities that offered a different level of program availability. This
strategy is based on the assumption that the estimated differences in the control mu-
nicipalities were exposed to the same confounding factors causing the potential bias
of the DD estimates but were not exposed to the treatment of the Estancias Infan-
tiles program to the same extent. This isolates the treatment effect. I provide DDD
estimates as a complement to the DD estimates in the next section.
Another potential source of bias arises if the implementation of Estancias Infantiles
was correlated with other time-varying determinants of business performance among
eligible women. For example, the introduction of Estancias Infantiles might cause
eligible, high-ability, and well-educated entrepreneurs from untreated municipalities to
move to a treatment municipality in order to access the program. This could contribute
to improving the performance of female enterprises and confound the effect of Estancias
Infantiles. This would result in an up-ward bias of the treatment effect.
I investigate the correlation between Estancias Infantiles and time-varying, observ-
able, characteristics by estimating the DD model using such characteristics as depen-
dent variables, including age, education level, and marital status. Appendix table
A4 provides the results of these covariate-balance regressions. Panel A presents the
estimates based on the national sample, whereas Panel B shows the estimates from
the urban sample. The results indicate that Estancias Infantiles was not significantly
nor materially associated with changes in entrepreneur characteristics in the national
sample. For example, the introduction of the program was associated with a decrease
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in average age among entrepreneurs by 0.026 years, compared with the pre-treatment
average age of approximately 32.6 years in the national sample. The association is
somewhat higher in the urban sample, although still insignificant both statistically
and materially.
Out of the 9 coefficients presented in panel B, 2 are statistically significant at
the 10% level. The results suggest that the introduction of Estancias Infantiles was
associated with a statistically significant decrease in the number of children in the
household (10% at the mean) and an increase in the share of entrepreneurs with a
primary education among urban entrepreneurs (4% at the mean). Importantly, the
program was not significantly associated with changes in any other education outcome,
suggesting that changes in the education level among eligible entrepreneurs is unlikely
to drive the result. The association between Estancias Infantiles and the total number
of children in the household suggest that the program could have affected fertility.
Given the lack absence of association between the program and other entrepreneur
characteristics, I consider it unlikely that differential demographic trends among eligible
entrepreneurs drive the results discussed in the analysis in this paper.
5 Results
In this section I present the results from the empirical analysis. First, I exploit the
variation in access to Estancias Infantiles caused by program eligibility in a difference-
in-difference (DD) estimation framework. Furthermore, I examine heterogeneity by
education level and business sector. Second, I include the variation in program intensity
between and within municipalities, caused by the stepwise rollout of the program, in
a triple-difference (DDD) framework. In addition, I demonstrate the robustness of
my results to potential bias caused by unobservable confounders by showing that the
results are not sensitive to the choice of control groups.
5.1 Difference-in-Difference estimations
Table 2 shows the estimated association between Estancias Infantiles and female en-
trepreneurship obtained by estimating equation (1). Panel A presents the standard
two-period DD estimates based on data from two time periods, the years just before
and after the introduction of the program (2006—7), and Panel B displays the results
from DD estimations including all time periods between 2005 and 2014. The reduced
20
study period estimates the direct effects of the implementation of the program, whereas
the complete study period includes a longer post-treatment period. All results are es-
timated using the national sample (ENOE).
Overall, I find little evidence that Estancias Infantiles affected female entrepreneur-
ship. The results in both panels A and B reveal a positive but statistically insignificant
association between the introduction of the program and the likelihood of operating a
business from home (column 2) and hiring a paid worker (column 3). Furthermore, the
results in panel A indicate that the number of working hours during a week is insignifi-
cant and negatively associated with the program, suggesting that eligible entrepreneurs
worked on average 1.4 hours less than ineligible women per week after the introduction
of the program (column 1, 5% at the mean). The negative and insignificant association
between the program and working hours remains when the effects are followed for a
longer time period, although smaller in magnitude.
The results suggest that the standard two-period DD estimates are consistently
larger than the multiple-period DD estimates. The two-period DD estimation strategy
is limited to measure the direct effects of the program on female business, indicating
that the average treatment effect decreases over time.
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Table 2: Difference-in-difference (DD) estimations, national sample
(1) (2) (3)
Variabes Hours worked Operated from home Had paid worker
Panel A: Two-period DD
Treatment effect -1.449 0.011 0.011
(1.487) (0.030) (0.018)
Observations 3,817 3,817 3,817
R-squared 0.019 0.026 0.106
Number of clusters 448 448 448
Mean 31.315 0.316 0.091
Panel B: Multiple-period DD
Treatment effect -0.432 0.001 0.005
(0.894) (0.016) (0.010)
Observations 16,437 16,437 16,437
R-squared 0.024 0.022 0.097
Number of clusters 546 546 546
Mean 30.514 0.313 0.087
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Notes: All results are based on estimations using the national sample (ENOE). Panel A presents
the standard two-period DD estimates, based on two time periods just before and after the
introduction of the program (2006–2007). Estimations in panel B extend the two-period DD
estimation strategy and include all time-periods between 2005 and 2014. All regressions control
for municipality and year fixed effects. Individual and household controls include age, household
income, household size, total number of children, and dummies for education level (primary
school, secondary school, or post-secondary education) and marital status. Estimations are
conditional on being self-employed. The treatment effect is the coefficient of the interaction
between an indicator for having a child 3 years or younger and an indicator that takes the value
1 in the post-treatment period, that is, β3 in the baseline equation (1). Standard errors are
clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 3 shows the results from estimating equation (1) using the urban sample.
Panel A presents the estimated treatment effect using one pre- and one post treatment
time period, textendash 2002 and 2008, whereas the estimations in panel B extends
the post-treatment time period, to also include survey years 2010 and 2012.
Similarly to the results of my analysis based on the national sample, I find little
evidence that Estancias Infantiles was associated with female business performance.
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Using both the reduced and complete sample periods, the results reveal insignificant
associations between the introduction of Estancias Infantiles and most measures of
business performance (column 2–5). The results in column 2 indicate that eligible
women were less likely than ineligible entrepreneurs to operate their businesses from
home after the introduction of Estancias Infantiles, although the results are insignificant
at conventional levels. Column 4 indicates that Estancias Infantiles was associated with
a decrease in the likelihood of applying for a credit by 5.7 percentage points (35% at
the mean) when estimated using the full number of sample years. The the estimated
association between Estancias Infantiles and physical capital of the business is small
and imprecisely estimated with large standard errors.
In contrast to the national sample, the urban estimates indicate a positive and sta-
tistically significant association between the program and the number of hours worked
per week using both the 2-period and multiple-period DD estimation strategies (col-
umn 1). In panel A, the introduction of the program was associated with an increase of
approximately 6.3 hours dedicated to the business during a week among eligible women,
an 18% increase in working hours at the mean. The positive association between Es-
tancias Infantiles and hours worked remains when including the full study period, at
a 5% significance level. One plausible explanation for the differences in the effect of
Estancias Infantiles on female working hours between the national and urban samples
could be that business profitability and performance in urban areas are less likely to
be constrained by limited demand. As a result, the financial reward from working ad-
ditional hours is likely to differ between urban areas and the national average, making
urban entrepreneurs more willing to invest additional hours in their business.
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Table 3: Difference-in-difference (DD) estimations, urban sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables Hours worked Operated from Had paid Applied ln(physical capital)
Panel B: two-period DD home worker for credit
Treatment effect 6.296** -0.093 0.020 -0.066 -0.230
(2.496) (0.065) (0.044) (0.041) (0.524)
Observations 1,244 1,244 1,244 1,244 1,244
R-squared 0.028 0.023 0.033 0.063 0.070
Number of mun2 80 80 80 80 80
Mean 34.607 0.328 0.078 0.119 6.619
Panel B: multiple-period DD
Treatment effect 4.244* -0.051 0.017 -0.057* 0.023
(2.197) (0.050) (0.027) (0.033) (0.422)
Observations 2,334 2,334 2,334 2,334 2,334
R-squared 0.034 0.015 0.017 0.043 0.124
Number of clusters 84 84 84 84 84
Mean 31.516 0.323 0.074 0.172 5.463
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: All results are based on estimations using the urban sample (ENAMIN). Panel A presents
estimates from a standard two-period DD design, including two time periods:—one pre-treatment and
one post-treatment (2002 and 2008). Estimations in panel B extend the two-period DD estimation
strategy and include all time-periods: 2002 and biannually between 2008 - 2012. All regressions control
for municipality and year fixed effects. Individual and household controls include age, household size,
total number of children, and dummies for education level (primary school, secondary school or post-
secondary education) and marital status. Estimations are conditional on being self-employed. The
treatment effect is the coefficient of the interaction between an indicator for having a child 3 years
or younger and an indicator that takes the value 1 in the post-treatment period—, that is–β3 in the
baseline equation (1). Standard errors are clustered at municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
5.2 Treatment intensity
In this section I expand the DD estimation strategy to also consider the variation
in the availability of Estancias Infantiles within and across municipalities, referred to
as treatment intensity. In table 4, I start by estimating equation (1) separately for
municipalities with low (column 2) and high (column 3) treatment intensity, using the
national sample. I define a municipality as high intensity if it reached a treatment
intensity that was above the sample median at any time during the study period.
Municipalities with a maximum intensity lower than the median are classified as low
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intensity. Columns 4 and 5 present the results from estimating equation (2), comparing
the DD estimates in high-and low-intensity municipalities in a DDD framework. I
provide estimates using both a binary (column 4) and continuous (column 5) treatment
intensity measure. The continuous intensity variable measures the share of eligible
children enrolled in the program at a specific point in time, and the binary measure
is defined according to the classification of high- and low-intensity municipalities in
columns 2 and 3. The DDD estimates provide a complement to the DD estimation
strategy by including the variation in access to the program in the estimation of the
treatment effect.
The results suggest that the estimated association between business performance
and Estancias Infantiles differs between municipalities with high and low treatment
intensity (columns 2–3). Albeit insignificant, the point estimates suggest that the in-
troduction of Estancias Infantiles was associated with a larger decrease in the number
of working hours in the low-intensity municipalities than in the high-intensity mu-
nicipalities. Additionally, I find a positive association between the program and the
likelihood of operating the business from home in low-intensity municipalities, which
corresponded to a negative association in the high-intensity municipalities. Impor-
tantly, most estimated effects are insignificant, with standard errors often nearly twice
as large as the estimated treatment effects in both high- and low-intensity municipali-
ties. As a result, size and magnitude of the coefficient should be analyzed interpreted
with caution.
The estimated DDD coefficients in column 4 and 5 provide a formal test of the dif-
ferences in treatment effects between municipalities with different treatment intensities.
Overall, the results show that the differences in treatment effects between municipali-
ties with high and low treatment intensity are insignificant. The binary DDD estimates
in column 4 suggest that there was negatively and statistically significant association
between Estancias Infantiles and the likelihood of running the business from home.
This is a direct result of the relation between the estimated treatment effect in mu-
nicipalities with high and low program intensity discussed earlier. Importantly, the
effect appears to be driven by the significant positive estimate in low-intensity munic-
ipalities, indicating that other factors but Estancias Infantiles might drive this result.
Albeit insignificant, the negative association remains with estimates using a continuous
treatment intensity measure.
Importantly, the DDD estimates in column 5 describe the effect of an increase in
25
Table 3: Difference-in-difference (DD) estimations, urban sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables Hours worked Operated from Had paid Applied ln(physical capital)
Panel B: two-period DD home worker for credit
Treatment effect 6.296** -0.093 0.020 -0.066 -0.230
(2.496) (0.065) (0.044) (0.041) (0.524)
Observations 1,244 1,244 1,244 1,244 1,244
R-squared 0.028 0.023 0.033 0.063 0.070
Number of mun2 80 80 80 80 80
Mean 34.607 0.328 0.078 0.119 6.619
Panel B: multiple-period DD
Treatment effect 4.244* -0.051 0.017 -0.057* 0.023
(2.197) (0.050) (0.027) (0.033) (0.422)
Observations 2,334 2,334 2,334 2,334 2,334
R-squared 0.034 0.015 0.017 0.043 0.124
Number of clusters 84 84 84 84 84
Mean 31.516 0.323 0.074 0.172 5.463
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Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: All results are based on estimations using the urban sample (ENAMIN). Panel A presents
estimates from a standard two-period DD design, including two time periods:—one pre-treatment and
one post-treatment (2002 and 2008). Estimations in panel B extend the two-period DD estimation
strategy and include all time-periods: 2002 and biannually between 2008 - 2012. All regressions control
for municipality and year fixed effects. Individual and household controls include age, household size,
total number of children, and dummies for education level (primary school, secondary school or post-
secondary education) and marital status. Estimations are conditional on being self-employed. The
treatment effect is the coefficient of the interaction between an indicator for having a child 3 years
or younger and an indicator that takes the value 1 in the post-treatment period—, that is–β3 in the
baseline equation (1). Standard errors are clustered at municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
5.2 Treatment intensity
In this section I expand the DD estimation strategy to also consider the variation
in the availability of Estancias Infantiles within and across municipalities, referred to
as treatment intensity. In table 4, I start by estimating equation (1) separately for
municipalities with low (column 2) and high (column 3) treatment intensity, using the
national sample. I define a municipality as high intensity if it reached a treatment
intensity that was above the sample median at any time during the study period.
Municipalities with a maximum intensity lower than the median are classified as low
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intensity. Columns 4 and 5 present the results from estimating equation (2), comparing
the DD estimates in high-and low-intensity municipalities in a DDD framework. I
provide estimates using both a binary (column 4) and continuous (column 5) treatment
intensity measure. The continuous intensity variable measures the share of eligible
children enrolled in the program at a specific point in time, and the binary measure
is defined according to the classification of high- and low-intensity municipalities in
columns 2 and 3. The DDD estimates provide a complement to the DD estimation
strategy by including the variation in access to the program in the estimation of the
treatment effect.
The results suggest that the estimated association between business performance
and Estancias Infantiles differs between municipalities with high and low treatment
intensity (columns 2–3). Albeit insignificant, the point estimates suggest that the in-
troduction of Estancias Infantiles was associated with a larger decrease in the number
of working hours in the low-intensity municipalities than in the high-intensity mu-
nicipalities. Additionally, I find a positive association between the program and the
likelihood of operating the business from home in low-intensity municipalities, which
corresponded to a negative association in the high-intensity municipalities. Impor-
tantly, most estimated effects are insignificant, with standard errors often nearly twice
as large as the estimated treatment effects in both high- and low-intensity municipali-
ties. As a result, size and magnitude of the coefficient should be analyzed interpreted
with caution.
The estimated DDD coefficients in column 4 and 5 provide a formal test of the dif-
ferences in treatment effects between municipalities with different treatment intensities.
Overall, the results show that the differences in treatment effects between municipali-
ties with high and low treatment intensity are insignificant. The binary DDD estimates
in column 4 suggest that there was negatively and statistically significant association
between Estancias Infantiles and the likelihood of running the business from home.
This is a direct result of the relation between the estimated treatment effect in mu-
nicipalities with high and low program intensity discussed earlier. Importantly, the
effect appears to be driven by the significant positive estimate in low-intensity munic-
ipalities, indicating that other factors but Estancias Infantiles might drive this result.
Albeit insignificant, the negative association remains with estimates using a continuous
treatment intensity measure.
Importantly, the DDD estimates in column 5 describe the effect of an increase in
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program intensity by 100%—that is, the effect of enrolling all eligible children in a
municipality in Estancias Infantiles. The average treatment effect, however, reached
6.5% during the period. I adjust the coefficients in column 5 to measure the effects of
an increase in treatment intensity by the average intensity. The results are presented
for each outcome in brackets in column 5. In relation to the likelihood of having a
home-based business, the DDD coefficient suggests that treated entrepreneurs are 1.8
percentage points less likely than ineligible entrepreneurs to run the business from
home after the introduction of Estancias Infantiles.
The results presented in table 4 indicate that the introduction of Estancias Infan-
tiles was not associated with changes in female entrepreneurship, consistent with the
general conclusions of the DD analysis. The continuous DDD estimates are imprecisely
estimated with large standard errors. Again, this suggests that the size of the coef-
ficients should be interpreted with caution. Taken together, the different estimation
strategies provide strong evidence of a weak association between Estancias Infantiles
and female entrepreneurship.
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Table 4: DD and DDD estimations including treatment intensity,—national
sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES DD DD low DD high DDD binary DDD continuous
baseline EI treatment EI treatment EI treatment EI treatment
Hours worked
Child1–3*post -0.432 -0.968 -0.221
(0.894) (1.512) (1.086)




Adjusted DDD coefficient [0.869]
Observations 16,437 4,755 11,682 16,437 16,437
R-squared 0.024 0.030 0.023 0.026 0.061
Number of clusters 546 273 273 546 546
Operatexd from home
Child1–3*post 0.001 0.057** -0.020
(0.016) (0.028) (0.020)




Adjusted DDD coefficient [-0.018]
Observations 16,437 4,755 11,682 16,437 16,437
R-squared 0.022 0.021 0.025 0.024 0.054
Number of clusters 546 273 273 546 546
Had paid worker






Adjusted DDD coefficient [-0.003]
Observations 16,437 4,755 11,682 16,437 16,437
R-squared 0.097 0.092 0.100 0.098 0.124
Number of clusters 546 273 273 546 546
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The results from estimating equation (1) (column 1–3) and equation (2) (column 4–5) using the
national sample. Columns 1 and 2 present the estimated effect of Estancias Infantiles (EI) on firm per-
formance among municipalities with a low and high treatment intensity. The DDD estimates in column 4
use a binary treatment indicator and in column 5 a continuous treatment intensity. All regressions control
for municipality and year fixed effects, age, household income, household size, total number of children,
and dummies for education level and marital status. The coefficients in column 5 describe the effect of an
increase in program intensity from zero to 100%, whereas the coefficients in brackets measure the effect of
an increase in treatment intensity represented by the sample mean. Estimations are conditional on being
self-employed. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5 replicates the estimations in table 4 using the urban sample. Similarly to
the results estimated using the national sample, the results from the urban sample
show differences in the estimated treatment effects of Estancias Infantiles between
municipalities with high and low program intensity. Overall, the estimated associations
between the program and female entrepreneurship are statistically insignificant and
support the conclusion that Estancias Infantiles has little or no effect on female business
performance. This reasoning is supported by the DD as well as the DDD estimates.
In panel B, the results indicate significant associations between Estancias Infantiles
and the number of hours worked, as well as the likelihood of applying for credit. The
results suggest that factors other than Estancias Infantiles affected business perfor-
mance among entrepreneurs with young children, which drove the average treatment
effects of the program presented earlier. Again, the estimated DDD coefficients have
large standard errors and should be interpreted with caution.
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Table 5: DD estimations including treatment intensity - urban sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables Hours Operated Paid Applied ln(physical
worked from home workers for credit capital)
Panel A: DD Baseline
Child1–3*post 4.244* -0.051 0.017 -0.057* 0.023
(2.197) (0.050) (0.027) (0.033) (0.422)
Observations 2,334 2,334 2,334 2,334 2,334
R-squared 0.034 0.015 0.017 0.043 0.124
Number of clusters 84 84 84 84 84
Panel B: DD low intensity
Child1–3*post 4.796 -0.056 -0.052 -0.034 -0.048
(3.245) (0.067) (0.049) (0.063) (0.613)
Observations 587 587 587 587 587
R-squared 0.035 0.049 0.044 0.073 0.106
Number of clusters 42 42 42 42 42
Panel C: DD high intensity
Child1–3*post 4.091 -0.039 0.039 -0.078** 0.014
(2.780) (0.067) (0.034) (0.038) (0.547)
Observations 1,747 1,747 1,747 1,747 1,747
R-squared 0.038 0.017 0.017 0.049 0.134
Number of clusters 42 42 42 42 42
Panel D: DDD binary treatment
Child1–3*high EI*post -0.705 0.017 0.091 -0.044 0.062
(4.238) (0.094) (0.060) (0.073) (0.815)
Observations 2,334 2,334 2,334 2,334 2,334
R-squared 0.037 0.024 0.023 0.054 0.128
Number of clusters 84 84 84 84 84
Panel E: DDD continuous treatment
Child1–3*EI intensity -63.825 1.732 0.138 -0.234 -6.419
(59.045) (1.486) (0.490) (0.662) (9.332)
Adjusted DDD coefficient [-5.170] [0.140] [0.011] [-0.019] [-0.520]
Observations 2,334 2,334 2,334 2,334 2,334
R-squared 0.078 0.067 0.059 0.081 0.186
Number of clusters 84 84 84 84 84
Municipality & year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean treatment intensity 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063
Notes: The results from estimating equation (1) (panel A–C) and equation (2) (panel D–E) using the urban
sample. Panel B and C present the estimated treatment effect among municipalities with low and high
treatment intensity, whereas panels D and E give the DDD estimates. The estimates in panel C use a
binary treatment indicator and panel E is based on a continuous treatment intensity. All regressions control
for municipality fixed effects, year fixed effects, age, household size, total number of children, and dummies
for education level and marital status. Additionally, the DDD estimations control for treatment intensity.
The coefficients in column 5 describe the effect of an increase in program intensity from zero to 100%,
whereas the coefficients in brackets measure the effect of an increase in treatment intensity represented by
the sample mean. Estimations are conditional on being self-employed. Clustered standard errors at the
municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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5.3 Local effects
It is possible that some groups could have benefited more than others from Estancias
Infantiles. One potential reason could be that childcare obligations constrain busi-
ness performance differently for women who operate in different business sectors. As
a result, the expected efficiency gains from enrolling children in Estancias Infantiles
might differ among sectors, causing the expected benefits from the program to vary
among entrepreneurs. For example, the expected benefits from formal childcare ser-
vices might be larger for domestic workers who offer services in clients’ homes, than for
entrepreneurs who operate small grocery shops in their own homes. Another poten-
tial reason for variations in the expected benefits from the program could be that the
ability to take advantage of the efficiency gains offered by formal daycare might also
vary among entrepreneurs. Recent literature has shown some evidence that manage-
rial education could have a positive effect on firm growth among female-run businesses
(Campos et al., 2017). This could imply that the effect of childcare services would po-
tentially be higher among entrepreneurs with a relatively higher education level, and
managerial training.
Appendix tables A8 and A9 present the effects of Estancias Infantiles on en-
trepreneurship for different subgroups in the national and urban samples, using the
multiple-period DD estimation strategy. The first and second panels estimate the ef-
fects of childcare among entrepreneurs in the service and sales sectors respectively,
whereas the last panel describe the estimated effects among women with at least a
secondary education. Overall, I find no evidence that Estancias Infantiles affected fe-
male entrepreneurship for any of the subgroups in either the national or urban sample.
The results suggest a positive and significant association between the program and the
number of worked hours among those with a relatively higher education level in the
national sample (5% level) and among entrepreneurs in the urban service sector (10%
level). The results indicate that the previously estimates positive association between
Estancias Infantiles and the number of hours worked in the urban sample was partly
driven by entrepreneurs in the service sector. In the national sample, the results suggest
that the Estancias Infantiles could have affected the labor supply among entrepreneurs
who were initially better off.
30
5.4 Selection into self-employment
Besides potentially affecting entrepreneurship among female business owners, increased
access to subsidized childcare is likely to affect the selection into and out of self-
employment. Previous literature suggests that self-employment represents a flexible
labor market opportunity that makes it possible for women to balance work and fam-
ily life (Marshall & Flaig, 2014; Hundley, 2000, 2001; Allen & Curington, 2014; World
Bank, 2012; Boden, 1996; Hamilton, 2000). Broad evidence from developing countries
indicates that childcare obligations represent one of the main reasons for not taking a
job in the formal sector (Cassirer & Addati, 2007). Furthermore, a number of studies
find that increased access to formal childcare services has a positive effect on female
labor force participation (Baker et al., 2008; Lefebvre & Merrigan, 2008; Hallman et
al., 2005; Attanasio & Vera-Hernández, 2004).9 By alleviating the trade-off between
childcare obligations and labor faced by women, formal childcare could affect not only
the decision to enter the labor market but also the type of jobs that women do.
The effect of subsidized childcare on female self-employment and wage employment
is an important consideration when interpreting the effect of Estancias Infantiles on
female entrepreneurship. On one hand, increased availability of childcare could mean
that women with relatively low business profitability, who face better conditions as
wage employees, would transition from self-employment into a wage job. As a result,
only relatively more profitable entrepreneurs would remain in the self-employment sec-
tor. On the other hand, increased availability of subsidized childcare could contribute
to an increased likelihood that low-productivity entrepreneurs, who previously did not
enter self-employment because of low expected profits in in the face of the cost of
childcare, would find it profitable to start a business. In both scenarios, any results, or
lack thereof, could be due to changes in willingness to start a business across different
groups, or changes in the composition of entrepreneurs in the sector and not primarily
due to changes in entrepreneurial behavior among existing firm owners.
In table 6, I test for selection into the self-employment sector, estimating equation
(1) using the complete sample of women whose youngest child was 1 to 6 years old. The
results indicate that Estancias Infantiles was not associated with the average likelihood
of being self-employed. The results are similar for estimations both conditional and
unconditional on working. In the last column, I use quarterly data from the ENOE
9 Other studies find small or insignificant effects (Manley & Vásquez Lav́ın, 2013; Berlinski &
Galiani, 2007; Havnes & Mogstad, 2011)
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survey to construct a panel based on the last quarter before the introduction of the
program, the fourth quarter of 2006, and the consecutive five quarters. The panel
makes it possible to follow individual entrepreneurs one year after the introduction of
Estancias Infantiles. Column 5 describes the results from estimating equation (1) with
individual fixed effects. The fixed effects estimates confirm the previous findings in
the table providing small and statistically insignificant association between Estancias
Infantiles and the likelihood of being self-employed, indicating that individuals did not
exit or enter self-employment as a result of Estancias Infantiles.
The results in table 6 suggest that Estancias Infantiles did not affect the likelihood
of being self-employed among women with young children. Furthermore, as discussed
earlier in this section, the program could potentially have resulted in movement of en-
trepreneurs with different individual characteristics and entrepreneurial opportunities
in and out of the self-employed sector. In table A4, I estimate the change in individ-
ual characteristics among self-employed women before and after the introduction of
Estancias Infantiles using both the national sample (palen A) and the urban sample
(panel B). The results suggest that Estancias Infantiles was not associated with any
significant changes in the composition of self-employed women in the national sample,
suggesting that the average treatment effects were not driven by differential demo-
graphic trends among eligible and ineligible entrepreneurs. However, in the urban
sample, the estimated association between self-employment and individual character-
istics shows a significant association between self-employment and the likelihood of
having at least primary education and the number of children in the household. In
relation to the lack of average treatment effects on female entrepreneurship, the results
suggest that an increase in the average education level among entrepreneurs did not
translate into changes in business performance.
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Table 6: The probability of being self-employed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables DD DD DD DD DD Panel
(2006–7) (2005–14) Low High (2006–7)
Panel A: Unconditional on working
Treatment effect -0.006 0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.004
(multiple period DD) (0.010) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Observations 24,919 110,157 34,081 76,076 51,019
R-squared 0.035 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.002
Number of clusters 516 533 264 269 20,977
Panel B: Conditional on working
Treatment effect -0.011 0.000 0.009 -0.002 0.016
(multiple period DD) (0.023) (0.012) (0.020) (0.015) (0.016)
Observations 8,488 38,485 11,006 27,479 17,935
R-squared 0.032 0.030 0.028 0.031 0.004
Number of clusters 496 533 264 269 9,507
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes —
Individual FE No No No No Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The results from estimating equation (1) using the complete sample of women whose youngest
child was 1 to 6 years old. Panel A presents the estimated likelihood of being self-employed among all
women in the sample, and panel B displays the estimated likelihood of self-employment conditional
on working. All regressions control for municipality and year fixed effects, as well as household and
individual characteristics such as education level, age, marital status, household size, and total number
of children. Column 5 gives the results from estimating equation (1), including individual fixed effects,
using a panel data that follows women one quarter before the introduction of the program and one
year post treatment. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
5.5 Robustness
To make sure that the estimated association between Estancias Infantiles and female
entrepreneurship is not sensitive to the definition of the control group, in this section
I estimate the baseline DD equation (1), using alternative definitions of the control
group. The results are presented in appendix tables A10 and A11.
Table A10 present the multiple-period DD estimates based on the national sample.
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ual characteristics among self-employed women before and after the introduction of
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significant changes in the composition of self-employed women in the national sample,
suggesting that the average treatment effects were not driven by differential demo-
graphic trends among eligible and ineligible entrepreneurs. However, in the urban
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having at least primary education and the number of children in the household. In
relation to the lack of average treatment effects on female entrepreneurship, the results
suggest that an increase in the average education level among entrepreneurs did not
translate into changes in business performance.
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Table 6: The probability of being self-employed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables DD DD DD DD DD Panel
(2006–7) (2005–14) Low High (2006–7)
Panel A: Unconditional on working
Treatment effect -0.006 0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.004
(multiple period DD) (0.010) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Observations 24,919 110,157 34,081 76,076 51,019
R-squared 0.035 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.002
Number of clusters 516 533 264 269 20,977
Panel B: Conditional on working
Treatment effect -0.011 0.000 0.009 -0.002 0.016
(multiple period DD) (0.023) (0.012) (0.020) (0.015) (0.016)
Observations 8,488 38,485 11,006 27,479 17,935
R-squared 0.032 0.030 0.028 0.031 0.004
Number of clusters 496 533 264 269 9,507
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes —
Individual FE No No No No Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The results from estimating equation (1) using the complete sample of women whose youngest
child was 1 to 6 years old. Panel A presents the estimated likelihood of being self-employed among all
women in the sample, and panel B displays the estimated likelihood of self-employment conditional
on working. All regressions control for municipality and year fixed effects, as well as household and
individual characteristics such as education level, age, marital status, household size, and total number
of children. Column 5 gives the results from estimating equation (1), including individual fixed effects,
using a panel data that follows women one quarter before the introduction of the program and one
year post treatment. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
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The baseline estimates (table 2, panel B, columns 1–3) are presented in column 1.
Column 2 gives the results from estimating the baseline DD equation using a control
group that excludes entrepreneurs whose youngest child was 4 years old. This definition
eliminates the possibility that children remained in the program for the transition
period after they turned 4 years old, which would result in lower-bound estimates. In
column 3, I exclude all entrepreneurs in the baseline treatment group who also had
children between 4 and 6 years old. As a result, mothers whose youngest children were
eligible for the Estancias Infantiles program, but whose older siblings were between
4 and 6 years old (similar to households in the control group), are likely to still face
childcare obligations related to their older siblings who were enrolled in preschool.
This would underestimate the effect of formal childcare on female entrepreneurship.
In column 4 I restrict the sample to entrepreneurs whose youngest child is between 3
and 4 years old, with the aim of increasing the comparability between women in the
treatment and control groups. Women in the treatment group with very young children
around 1 year old may face very different childcare obligations than a mother in the
control group whose youngest child is 6 years old. Finally, the last column presents the
results from estimating equation 1 including all municipalities in the national sample
in a staggered-roll out DD estimation. This estimation includes municipalities who
introduced Estancias Infantiles after 2007 or not at all. In addition to increasing
the variation in treatment intensity across municipalities, the inclusion of non-treated
municipalities results adds a control group of municipalities that were untreated during
the study period.
Overall, the results suggest that the estimated effects are robustly insignificant to
alternative definitions of the control group. Table A10 indicates that the estimated as-
sociations between increased access to affordable childcare services and business perfor-
mance remain statistically insignificant and for all the alternative specifications based
on the national sample.
Appendix table A11 replicates the estimations in appendix table A10 using the ur-
ban sample. Again, the findings are similar across columns, suggesting that the results
are not sensitive to the choice of control group. The estimated associations between
Estancias Infacties and the number of hours worked and the likelihood of applying
for a credit are no longer statistically significant when estimated using a sample of
entrepreneurs whose youngest child is between 3-4 years old (column 4). This could
potentially be explained by the small number of observations remaining in this sample.
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On the other hand, the results suggest a negative and precisely estimated association
between the program and the likelihood of operating the business from home for this
sample. Overall, the results suggest that few exceptions of marginally significant coef-
ficients, the estimated association between Estancias Infantiles and firm performance
remains insignificant. Again, the overall results indicate that the estimated treatment
effects are robust to different definitions of control groups.
The staggered roll-out DD estimates are not presented for the urban sample as all
municipalities introduced Estancias Infantiles directly in 2007.
5.5.1 Individual panel
I complement the robustness analysis by estimating the association between Estancias
Infantiles and female entrepreneurship using individual panel data. As mentioned
earlier, the ENOE survey is a rotating panel which provides the opportunity to follow
an individual for 5 quarters. I estimate the association between Estancias Infantiles
and firm performance by following individuals during a period starting one quarter
before the introduction of the program in 2007 and up to 1 year after the program was
introduced. The estimation strategy builds on Equation 1, but adds individual fixed
effects and quarter fixed effects.
The 2-period DD estimation strategy, table 2, produces unbiased estimates given
the assumption that all unobservable cofounders are time-invariant during the study
period. While the covariate-balance regressions, presented in table A4, provide con-
vincing evidence that the composition of entrepreneurs is stable over time with regards
to observable characteristics, variation in unobservable characteristics remains a po-
tential source of bias. For example, underlying preferences and abilities among eligible
entrepreneurs might change between the pre- and post-periods due to changes in the
group of eligible entrepreneurs, causing different trends in firm performance between
eligible and ineligible women that are unrelated to Estancias Infantiles. Individual
fixed effects control for all such unobservable time-invariant characteristics. As a re-
sult, unobservable and time-varying confounders remain the only potential source of
bias.
Table A12 presents the results from estimating equation (1), including individual
fixed effects. The results suggest that Estancias Infantiles was not significantly associ-
ated with entrepreneurship. The results support earlier analysis and suggest that the
DD analysis presented in tables 3 and 2 is robust to the inclusion of individual fixed
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effects. The results indicate that the DD estimates were not driven by time-invariant
confounders.
6 Conclusion
Microentrepreneurship represent an important source of income for many women in de-
veloping countries (Razavi, 2012). Earlier research indicates that female entrepreneurs
often underperform their male counterparts in relation to a number of indicators such
as business profits and sales. This gender gap is substantial and has been documented
in a large number of developing countries across the globe (Fiala, 2018; Hardy & Kagy,
2018).
In this paper, I have examined the importance of childcare obligations as a hin-
drance for female microentrepreneurship. Despite previous evidence that childcare
obligations could represent a key constraint for female microentrepreneurship (Bruhn,
2009; Fitzpatrick & Delecourt, forthcoming.), I find little evidence that increased ac-
cess to formal and subsidized childcare affects female entrepreneurship. Overall the
results suggest that Estancias Infantiles had no effect on business performance among
self-employed women in vulnerable households. The findings are consistent across both
the DD and DDD estimation strategies. I do find tentative evidence that the child-
care program was associated with an increase in hours worked among entrepreneurs
among urban entrepreneurs, but this association is not consistently significant across
specifications.
No previous study has estimated the effect of increased access to subsidized child-
care on female-run businesses. However, in earlier work,Calderon (2014) found that
increased availability of Estancias Infantiles was not significantly associated with hours
worked among eligible women who were working in the previous period. Importantly,
the study did not specifically focus on self-employed but rather on mothers of young
children in general. Furthermore, evidence from Chile suggested that the expansion of a
public daycare program was associated with a decrease in working hours among eligible
women Medrano (2009). On the other hand, another study in Chile showed that the
offer to participate in an after-school program was associated with an increase in hours
worked among mothers, albeit insignificant (Mart́ınez & Perticará, 2017). (Berlinski
et al., 2011) found that women worked 7.8 more hours per week as a consequence of
their youngest child attending pre-school in Argentina.
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One explanation for the lack of results could be a relatively weak identification of
treated households for the intention-to treat (ITT) estimates. Although the Estancias
Infantiles program quickly became the most important provider of childcare services
in Mexico for children 1 to 3 years old, the average intensity of the treatment reached
only about 6.5% on average in a municipality. The ITT estimate measures the average
treatment effect among all women who were eligible for Estancias Infantiles, implying
that the treatment intensity might have been too weak. Although the DDD design
adjust for the overall low treatment intensity in the DD estimations, the overall low
treatment intensity in all municipalities might still be too weak to capture any potential
treatment effects.
Another plausible explanation is that increased access to subsidized childcare ser-
vices made it possible for women to accept wage jobs in the formal or informal sector
that were less flexible and hard to combine with childcare obligations. A vast body
of literature suggests that increased access to subsidized childcare has a positive effect
on female labor market participation (Baker et al., 2008; Halim et al., 2019) and that
women who entered the labor market were likely to obtain more jobs in the formal sec-
tor (Calderon, 2014). I provide evidence that my estimated treatment effects are not
likely to have been driven by the entry and exit of eligible women to self-employment
as a result of the implementation of Estancias Infantiles. I find that the introduction
of the program was not associated with the average likelihood of being self-employed.
Furthermore, I show that the program was not significantly associated with changes in
the composition of self-employed individuals, suggesting that there are no confounding
effects.
Informal self-employment has often been described as a strategy to combine child-
care obligations and market employment. According to the analysis, entrepreneurs
worked on average more than 30 hours per week before the introduction of Estancias
Infantiles. This could suggest that self-employed mothers were bringing their children
to work prior to the introduction of Estancias Infantiles. Another plausible explanation
is that Estancias Infantiles substituted for already existing formal or informal child-
care arrangements. This study shows that while many women decided to start their
own businesses in order to enjoy time flexibility and be able to balance household and
business obligations, the main reason was to supplement household income.
In the light of worldwide social norms that place a large share of the responsibility
for childcare and housework on women, future policymakers should pay greater atten-
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effects. The results indicate that the DD estimates were not driven by time-invariant
confounders.
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tion to the necessity for many women to balance household and market work. This
is becoming more and more important as a result of shifts in women’s labor market
engagement, improvements in girls’ education, growth in migration and urbanization,
and changes to family structure, all of which have contributed to putting childcare
on the policy agenda (Samman et al., 2016). In this context, self-employment could
represent an important source of income for women in developing counties. Finding
the key to improving opportunities for female entrepreneurs is an important goal in
order to increase female income and empowerment.
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Table A1: Summary statistics for the national and urban samples
Panel A: National sample Panel B: Urban sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variable N Mean Min. Max. N Mean Min. Max.
Age 16 437 32.532 16 63 2 334 32.976 17 63
(6.202) (6.230)
No education 16 437 0.021 0 1 2 334 0.007 0 1
(0.146) (0.087)
Primary school 16 437 0.222 0 1 2 334 0.192 0 1
(0.416) (0.394)
Secondary school 16 437 0.348 0 1 2 334 0.293 0 1
(0.476) (0.455)
> secondary education 16 437 0.406 0 1 2 334 0.465 0 1
(0.491) (0.498)
Married 16 437 0.904 0 1 2 334 0.851 0 1
(0.293) (0.355)
Single 16 437 0.035 0 1 2 334 0.059 0 1
(0.186) (0.235)
Widow 16 437 0.008 0 1 2 334 0.015 0 1
(0.093) (0.124)
Divorced 16 437 0.050 0 1 2 334 0.073 0 1
(0.219) (0.261)
Adults in HH 16 437 2.260 1 11 2 334 2.211 1 7
(0.811) (0.800)
Tot. children 16 437 2.260 1 9 2 334 2.203 1 7
( 1.013) (0.977)
Income 16 437 3 118.677 100 129 000
(4 189.887)
Rural 16 437 0.246 0 1
(0.430)
Notes: Summary statistics for the national (columns 1–4) and urban (columns 5–8) samples. Standard
deviations appear in parenthesis. For each sample, the table presents means (columns 2 and 6), and
minimum and maximum values (columns 3–4 and 7–8). The sample includes female entrepreneurs
whose youngest child is 1 to 6 years old. Because of the structure of the questions in the 2002 urban
survey, it was not possible to calculate a monthly income for urban households.
44
Table A2: Pre-treatment summary statistics for the national sample (ENOE)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable All Treatment group Control group Difference
(child 1–3) (child 4–6)
Age 32.592 31.399 34.218 2.819***
(6.118) (5.956) (5.961)
No education 0.029 0.025 0.035 0.009*
(0.170) (0.158) (0.184)
Primary school 0.264 0.245 0.291 0.046***
(0.441) (0.430) (0.454)
Secondary school 0.314 0.315 0.313 0.002
(0.464) (0.464) (0.464)
> secondary education 0.390 0.413 0.359 -0.053***
(0.487) (0.492) (0.480)
Married 0.905 0.919 0.887 -0.031***
(0.292) (0.272) (0.315)
Single 0.033 0.028 0.039 0.011*
(0.178) (0.165) (0.195)
Widow 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.000
(0.103) (0.103) (0.104)
Divorced 0.050 0.041 0.061 0.020***
(0.218) (0.200) (0.240)
Adults in HH 2.265 2.229 2.314 0.085***
(0.841) (0.103) (0.871)
Tot. children 2.326 2.370 2.265 -0.105***
(1.060) (1.095) (1.007)
Income 2 899.714 2 867.153 2 944.614 77.461
(3 935.312) (3 647.93) (4 301.088)
Rural 0.230 0.223 0.240 0.017
(0.421) (0.416) (0.427)
Observations 3 684 2 125 1 559
Notes: Baseline summary statistics for the national sample in 2006, including the whole
sample (column 1) as well as the treatment (column 2) and control (column 3) groups. The
treatment group consists of female entrepreneurs whose youngest child is 1–3 years old and
the control group consists of entrepreneurs whose youngest child is 4–6 years old. Column
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(3 935.312) (3 647.93) (4 301.088)
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Notes: Baseline summary statistics for the national sample in 2006, including the whole
sample (column 1) as well as the treatment (column 2) and control (column 3) groups. The
treatment group consists of female entrepreneurs whose youngest child is 1–3 years old and
the control group consists of entrepreneurs whose youngest child is 4–6 years old. Column
4 presents differences in means between the treatment and control groups. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
45
Table A3: Pre-treatment summary statistics for the urban sample (ENAMIN)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable All Treatment group Control group Difference
(child 1–3) (child 4–6)
Age 33.309 32.253 34.650 2.396**
(5.968) (5.692) (6.049)
No education 0.014 0.008 0.023 0.015
(0.087) (0.089) (0.151)
Primary school 0.258 0.205 0.325 0.119***
(0.437) (0.404) (0.469)
Secondary school 0.204 0.229 0.172 -0.057**
(0.403) (0.421) (0.378)
> secondary education 0.421 0.452 0.380 -0.072**
(0.494) (0.498) (0.486)
Married 0.838 0.851 0.822 -0.028
(0.368) (0.356) (0.382)
Single 0.038 0.045 0.038 -0.007
(0.202) (0.209) (0.193)
Widow 0.026 0.035 0.016 -0.019
(0.161) (0.184) (0.128)
Divorced 0.091 0.067 0.122 0.054***
(0.288) (0.251) (0.327)
Adults in HH 2.173 2.087 2.283 0.196***
(0.753) (0.669) (0.836)
Tot. children 2.359 2.485 2.200 -0.285***
(1.040) (1.082) (0.963)
Observations 817 457 360
Notes: Baseline summary statistics for the urban sample (ENAMIN) in 2002, including
the whole sample (column1) as well as the treatment (column 2) and control (column
3) groups the treatment group (column 2) and the control (column 3) group. The
treatment group consists of female entrepreneurs whose youngest child is 1–3 years old
and the control group consists of entrepreneurs whose youngest child is 4–6 years old.
Column 4 presents differences in means between the treatment and control groups. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A7: Correlation between municipality characteristics and the rollout of
Estancias Infantiles
(1) (2)
Variables EI treatment Start date EI
Area 0.000** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Urban municipality -0.022 13.089***
(0.117) (4.076)
Semiurban municipality 0.181*** -2.268
(0.027) (1.637)
Mixed municipality 0.188*** -6.566***
(0.042) (1.292)
Illiteracy (>15 yrs) 0.478*** 10.837
(0.153) (13.970)
Avg. years schooling 0.093*** -1.150
(0.022) (1.022)
Occupation rate 0.000 -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
Primary sector -0.191** 0.811
(0.092) (7.171)
Tertiary sector 0.290 -21.052**
(0.240) (8.217)
Share self-employed -0.360* 19.768**
(0.182) (8.075)




State FE Yes Yes
Notes: Column 1 presents the estimated correlation between municipality
characteristics and the likelihood that it introduced Estancias Infantiles (EI)
based on all municipalities in Mexico. Column 2 presents the association be-
tween municipality characteristics and the timing of the introduction of EI,
conditional on municipalities being treated. The timing of the introduction
of the program is measured by an index that takes the value 1 in January
of 2007, 2 in February 2007, and so on. In urban municipalities, more than
50% of the population lives in localities with ≥100,000 individuals; in semi-
urban municipalities more than 50% of the population lives in localities with
15,000–100,000 inhabitants; and in rural municipalities more than 50% of the
population lives in localities with less than 2,500 inhabitants. Mixed munic-
ipalities do not have a clear urban or rural profile. All estimations include
state fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the state level. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A3: Pre-treatment summary statistics for the urban sample (ENAMIN)
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Table A7: Correlation between municipality characteristics and the rollout of
Estancias Infantiles
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Table A8: Local effects of Estancias Infantiles on firm performance, by firm
sector and education level, national sample (ENOE)
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Hours worked Operated from home Had paid worker
Panel A: Services
Treatment effect (multiple period DD) 1.541 -0.003 0.006
(1.732) (0.050) (0.032)
Observations 2,957 2,957 2,957
R-squared 0.039 0.050 0.139
Number of clusters 230 230 230
Panel B: Sales
Treatment effect (multiple period DD) -1.111 0.009 -0.003
(1.340) (0.019) (0.011)
Observations 9,244 9,244 9,244
R-squared 0.034 0.012 0.061
Number of clusters 457 457 457
Panel C: Secondary education
Treatment effect (multiple period DD) 2.610** 0.027 0.019
(1.261) (0.029) (0.023)
Observations 6,430 6,430 6,430
R-squared 0.023 0.012 0.103
Number of clusters 321 321 321
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The results from estimating equation (1) using a number of subgroups of the national sample
(2005–14). The results are estimated separately for entrepreneurs and businesses in the service sector
(panel A), those in the sales sector (panel B), and entrepreneurs with at least a secondary education
(panel C). All regressions control for municipality and year fixed effects. Individual and household
controls include age, household income, household size, total number of children, and dummies for
education level (primary school, secondary school, or post-secondary education) and marital status.
Estimations are conditional on being self-employed. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality
level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A9: Local effects of Estancias Infantiles on firm performance, by firm
sector and education level, urban sample (ENAMIN)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables Hours worked Operated from Had paid Applied for ln(physical capital)
Panel A: services home worker credit
Treatment effect 6.276* -0.011 -0.009 -0.099 0.548
(multiple period DD) (3.226) (0.089) (0.058) (0.066) (0.702)
Observations 731 731 731 731 731
R-squared 0.046 0.064 0.053 0.062 0.243
Number of clusters 54 54 54 54 54
Panel B: sales
Treatment effect 2.256 0.006 -0.001 -0.052 -0.768
(multiple period DD) (3.930) (0.071) (0.025) (0.061) (0.617)
Observations 1,174 1,174 1,174 1,174 1,174
R-squared 0.078 0.021 0.011 0.033 0.197
Number of clusters 64 64 64 64 64
Panel C: Secondary
education
Treatment effect 4.634 -0.075 0.037 0.013 -0.075
(multiple period DD) (3.178) (0.086) (0.048) (0.065) (0.608)
Observations 1,059 1,059 1,059 1,059 1,059
R-squared 0.051 0.021 0.010 0.044 0.108
Number of clusters 65 65 65 65 65
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The results from estimating equation (1) using a number of subgroups of the urban sample
(2002, 2008, 2010, 2012). The results are estimated separately for entrepreneurs and businesses
in the service sector (panel A), those in the sales sector (panel B), and entrepreneurs with at least
a secondary education (panel C). All regressions control for municipality and year fixed effects.
Individual and household controls include age, household income, household size, total number of
children, and dummies for education level (primary school, secondary school, or post-secondary
education) and marital status. Estimations are conditional on being self-employed. Standard
errors are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A8: Local effects of Estancias Infantiles on firm performance, by firm
sector and education level, national sample (ENOE)
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Hours worked Operated from home Had paid worker
Panel A: Services
Treatment effect (multiple period DD) 1.541 -0.003 0.006
(1.732) (0.050) (0.032)
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R-squared 0.039 0.050 0.139
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controls include age, household income, household size, total number of children, and dummies for
education level (primary school, secondary school, or post-secondary education) and marital status.
Estimations are conditional on being self-employed. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality
level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A10: Robustness: baseline DD estimations using different control groups,
national sample (ENOE)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables Baseline Control group Drop those with Youngest All
(mult.period DD) children 5–6 yrs. siblings 4–6 yrs. child 3–4 yrs. municipalities
Working hours
Treatment effect -0.432 0.235 -0.793 -1.627 -0.747
(0.894) (1.118) (0.923) (1.270) (0.874)
Observations 16,437 12,963 14,218 6,786 17,803
R-squared 0.024 0.024 0.025 0.026 724
Number of clusters 546 546 546 518 0.024
Operated from home
Treatment effect 0.001 -0.020 0.019 0.040 0.009
(0.016) (0.019) (0.017) (0.026) (0.016)
Observations 16,437 12,963 14,218 6,786 17,803
R-squared 0.022 0.023 0.024 0.024 0.022
Number of clusters 546 546 546 518 724
Had paid worker
Treatment effect 0.005 -0.000 0.005 0.002 0.005
(0.010) (0.013) (0.011) (0.017) (0.009)
Observations 16,437 12,963 14,218 6,786 17,803
R-squared 0.097 0.095 0.097 0.092 0.096
Number of clusters 546 546 546 518 724
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Municipality FE yes yes yes yes yes
Control yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: The results from estimating equation (1) using alternative definitions of the control group in the
national sample (2005–14). All regressions control for municipality and year fixed effects. Individual
and household controls include age, household income, household size, total number of children, and
dummies for education level (primary school, secondary school, or post-secondary education) and
marital status. Column 1 shows the preferred estimation in table 2 (panel B), column 2 restricts the
control group to include only entrepreneurs whose youngest child is 5–6 years old, and column 3 drops
entrepreneurs in the treatment group who also has a child 4–6 years old. The results in column 4 are
estimated using a restricted sample of entrepreneurs whose youngest child is 3–4 years old. Column 5
includes all municipalities in the sample, including those who never introduced Estancias Infantiles or
introduced it later than 2007, resulting in DD estimation with a staggered roll-out. All estimations are
conditional on self-employment. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A11: Robustness: baseline DD estimations using different control groups,
urban sample (ENAMIN)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Baseline Control group Drop those with Youngest child
(mult. period DD) children 5–6 yrs. siblings 4–6 yrs. 3–4 yrs.
Working hours
Treatment effect 4.244* 3.878 4.780** 2.464
(2.197) (3.189) (2.356) (3.072)
Observations Observations 2,334 1,829 2,061 995
R-squared 0.034 0.035 0.035 0.041
Number of clusters 84 84 84 80
Operated from home
Treatment effect -0.051 -0.052 -0.067 -0.198***
(0.050) (0.050) (0.055) (0.070)
Observations 2,334 1,829 2,061 995
R-squared 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.051
Number of clusters 84 84 84 80
Had paid worker
Treatment effect 0.017 0.005 0.030 0.009
(0.027) (0.032) (0.030) (0.049)
Observations 2,334 1,829 2,061 995
R-squared 0.017 0.023 0.019 0.021
Number of clusters 84 84 84 80
Applied for credit
Treatment effect -0.057* -0.078** -0.063* 0.013
(0.033) (0.038) (0.037) (0.058)
Observations 2,334 1,829 2,061 995
R-squared 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.051
Number of clusters 84 84 84 80
ln(physical capital
Treatment effect 0.023 0.036 0.036 -0.326
(0.422) (0.596) (0.476) (0.650)
Observations 2,334 1,829 2,061 995
R-squared 0.124 0.130 0.119 0.121
Number of clusters 84 84 84 80
Year FE yes yes yes yes
Municipality FE yes yes yes yes
Control yes yes yes yes
Notes: The results from estimating equation (1) using alternative definitions of the control group in the
urban sample (2002, 2008, 2010, 2012). All regressions control for municipality and year fixed effects.
Individual and household controls include age, household size, total number of children, and dummies for
education level (primary school, secondary school, or post-secondary education) and marital status. Column
1 shows the preferred estimation presented in table 2 (panel B), column 2 restricts the control group to
include only entrepreneurs whose youngest child is 5–6 years old, and column 3 drops entrepreneurs in the
treatment group who also has a child between 4–6 years old. The results in column 4 are estimated using a
restricted sample of entrepreneurs whose youngest child is 3–4 years old. All estimations are conditional on
self-employment. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A12: Difference-in-difference (DD) estimations with individual fixed
effects, national sample (ENOE)
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Hours worked Operated from home Had paid worker
Treatment effect -0.343 -0.028 -0.002
(1.101) (0.027) (0.020)
Observations 8064 8064 8064
R-squared 0.007 0.002 0.002
Number of id 4608 4686 4686
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The results from estimating Equation (1) using individual panel data
that includes 5 quarters between the 4th quarter 2006 and the 4th quarter 2007.
All regressions control for municipality and year fixed effects. Individual and
household controls include age, household income, household size, total number
of children, and dummies for education level (primary school, secondary school,
or post-secondary education) and marital status. Furthermore, the equation con-
trols for individual fixed effects and quarterly fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered at the individual level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figures
Figure A1: Total numbers of daycare centers enrolled in Estancias Infantiles,
2007-–15
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Figure A2: Geographic variation in availability of Estancias Infantiles in Mexico
at two points in time, 2008 and 2012
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Table A5: Summary statistics for microenterprises, national sample (ENOE)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Working hours per week 30.514 21.738 1 112
Employees
Workers 0.242 0.428 0 1
Paid workers 0.087 0.282 0 1
Location
Specific premises 0.299 0.458 0 1
Work from home 0.313 0.464 0 1
Walking vendor 0.127 0.333 0 1
Improvised stand 0.053 0.224 0 1
Stand 0.038 0.192 0 1
Client’s home 0.141 0.348 0 1
Vehicle 0.012 0.109 0 1
Sell directly to client 0.974 0.156 0 1
Type of business
Service 0.196 0.397 0 1
Sales 0.573 0.397 0 1
Manufacturing 0.186 0.389 0 1
Observations 16 437
Notes: The results present sample means (column 1), standard de-
viation (column 2) and sample minimum (column 3) and maximum
(column 4).
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Table A6: Summary statistics microenterprises, urban sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Working hours per week 31.516 20.644 1 112
Employees
Workers 0.189 0.391 0 1
Paid workers 0.074 0.262 0 1
Location
Specific premises 0.275 0.446 0 1
Work from home 0.323 0.467 0 1
Walking vendor 0.105 0.307 0 1
Client’s home 0.191 0.393 0 1
Vehicle 0.010 0.101 0 1
Type of business
Service 0.335 0.472
Sales 0.514 0.499 0 1
Manufacturing 0.109 0.312 0 1
Individual business 0.910 0.286 0 1
Family business 0.047 0.212 0 1
Business started by owner 0.806 0.395 0 1
Reason for starting business
Flexible working hours 0.060 0.239 0 1
Good opportunity 0.054 0.226 0 1
Supplement family income 0.519 0.499 0 1
Higher income 0.099 0.299 0 1
Credit
Applied for credit 0.172 0.377 0 1
Amount of credit 2 120.12 6 510.60 0 100,000
Capital
Start-up capital 0.862 0.344 0 1
Physical capital 9 684.42 1 9679.02 0 103 300
Observations 2 334
Note: The results present sample means (column 1), standard deviation
(column 2) and sample minimum (column 3) and maximum (column 4).
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Figure A3: Pre-trends for outcome variables, national sample
Working hours Working from home
Worker
Notes: The graphs show parallel trends in outcome variables between 1995 and 2007 for
the national sample. The treatment group refers to female entrepreneurs whose youngest
child was 1–3 years old and the control group include female entrepreneurs whose youngest
child was 4–6 years old. The vertical line indicates the restructure of the National Survey
of Occupation and Employment (ENOE) in 2005.
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Figure A4: Pre-trends for outcome variables, urban sample
Working hours Working from home
Worker
Notes: The graphs show parallel trends in outcome variables between 2000 and 2007 for the
urban sample. The treatment group refers to female entrepreneurs whose youngest child
was 1–3 years old, and the control group include female entrepreneurs whose youngest child
was between 4–6 years old. The vertical line indicates the restructure of the National Urban
Employment Survey (ENEU) in 2005.
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policy tool to eliminate within-country inequalities in access to quality health-
care.
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1 Introduction
United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 3, Good Health and Well-being, posi-
tions equity as a central issue of the global health agenda by aspiring to ensure healthy
lives and promote well-being for all people at all ages. Disparities in access to quality
healthcare within many low-income countries represent one of the major impediments
to reaching this goal. One source of disparity that many studies have documented is
that between rural and urban areas (Kruk et al., 2017; Gage et al., 2017; Das et al.,
2012; Scheil-Adlung, 2015). Rural areas often face substantial shortages in health in-
frastructure compared with urban areas, such as a lack of equipment, health workforce,
and physical infrastructure (Leslie, Sun, & Kruk, 2017; Scheil-Adlung, 2015). However,
while it has been widely accepted that structural inputs represent a necessary condi-
tion to deliver quality care (World Health Organization, 2018), less is known about
their importance in determining the quality of the actual health services that patients
receive when they visit a health facility.1
This study investigates the gap in healthcare quality between rural and urban public
health centers in Rwanda and how much of this gap can be attributed to differences
in structural inputs. I use data from the performance-based financing (PBF) national
monitoring system to assess the quality of healthcare. PBF is a health financing scheme
that provides funding for health services based on their quality. The PBF quality data
come from unannounced evaluations at public health centers across the country during
2013–18. District hospitals are responsible for the quality evaluations of all health
centers in their district and the evaluations are carried out by a team of specialists
from the hospital. The data were collected using direct observations during patient
visits, chart examinations, and facility checklists (Ministry of Health, 2018b).
I create two measures of quality—a general quality score and a patient-focused
quality score—based on 12 different PBF quality indicators. The general quality score
measures the overall quality of the health clinic, whereas the patient-focused score
includes only patient-focused activities. The quality scores summarize both structural
and process measures of quality, describing the context in which care is delivered as well
as all acts of healthcare delivery (Donabedian, 1988). The quality scores are matched
1Health facilities in many developing countries often face substantial gaps in their readiness to
provide basic healthcare services (Leslie, Spiegelman, et al., 2017; K. L. Leonard & Masatu, 2007).
The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that approximately 40% of health facilities in low-
and middle-income countries lack access to essential infrastructure such as improved water and nearly
20% lack sanitation (World Health Organization & UNICEF, 2015).
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with data on structural inputs and contextual factors from the Rwandan Integrated
Health Management Information System (HMIS). Structural inputs include measures
of clinic size, access to drugs, and access to health workers, proxied by the clinic’s total
number of beds, total number of yearly outpatient visits, average drug expenditure
per patient visit, and total wage costs. Additionally, I include a number of contextual
factors that estimate the importance of external market factors such as demand and
competition. These variables measure total population in clinic catchment area and
the distances to the closest neighboring clinic and the nearest district hospital. To test
how much of the inequalities in healthcare quality can be attributed to differences in
structural and contextual factors, I measure whether the quality gap between rural and
urban clinics decreases once I control for these factors in the estimations.
The results show that there is a small but significant difference between rural and
urban clinics in the quality of care provided. Rural clinics received approximately
1%, or 0.3 standard deviations, lower quality scores than urban clinics. The results
confirm previous empirical evidence from India (Das et al., 2008), Haiti (Gage et al.,
2017), and Indonesia (Barber et al., 2007), indicating that the quality of care in rural
areas is considerably lower than in urban areas. Furthermore, the results suggest that
the structural inputs and contextual factors explain only a small share of the existing
differences in quality. For example, differences in structural variables such as the total
number of beds, staff, and medicines represented approximately 9% of the difference
in quality scores. The results are in line with previous research that indicates that the
structural inputs are only weakly associated with the process of care (Leslie, Sun, &
Kruk, 2017).
This paper relates to the literature that studies variation in the quality of healthcare
within low-income countries. The literature has documented significant disparities in
the quality of healthcare by a number of stratifiers such as the type of healthcare
providers (Barber et al., 2007; Das et al., 2012), household wealth level (Barber et al.,
2007; Sharma et al., 2017), and rural and urban location (Barber et al., 2007; Das
et al., 2012; Gage et al., 2017). Empirical evidence suggests that medical expertise
is higher among urban than rural healthcare providers: in one study in India 52% of
the healthcare providers in urban areas reported having a medical degree, compared
with only 11% in rural areas (Das et al., 2012). Furthermore, other studies suggest
that rural care providers are less likely than urban health workers to give a correct
diagnosis and treatment (Das et al., 2012), and to adhere to clinical guidelines (Leslie,
2
Spiegelman, et al., 2017).
I add to this literature by providing evidence of disparities in health quality between
rural and urban areas in Rwanda. Given the country’s remarkable improvements in
public health outcomes in recent decades, Rwanda represents a compelling case study
of the quality of care in a developing country context. Over two decades ago, genocide
left almost 1 million dead and a legacy of poverty and human devastation. Rwanda’s
under-five mortality rate was the highest in the world, and life expectancy at birth
was the lowest (Binagwaho et al., 2014). Since then, Rwanda has achieved impressive
health gains, surpassing the performance of neighboring countries.2 However, despite
remarkable improvements in health outcomes, health inequalities within the country
remain and continue to represent a major challenge (Liu et al., 2019; Pose & Samuels,
2011).
Moreover, this paper contributes to the literature that investigates which factors
explain disparities in the quality of care within low-income countries. Previous re-
search that has studied the association between health infrastructure and the quality
of process care is inconclusive: while some studies find a positive correlation between
medical infrastructure and clinical quality (Kruk et al., 2017), many others suggest that
structural inputs do not predict the quality of care provided in consultations (Leslie,
Sun, & Kruk, 2017; Das et al., 2008, 2012; Das & Hammer, 2014; K. L. Leonard &
Masatu, 2007). Instead, these studies find that provider effort represents the primary
determinant of the quality of care received by patients. Empirical evidence suggests
that low practitioner effort is frequently found in health markets in many low-income
countries. For example, a study in India showed that public care providers spent on
average 2.4 minutes with the patient and completed 16% of checklist items (Das et al.,
2016). Another study of 7 Sub-Saharan countries showed that healthcare providers
on average performed 62% of the recommended antenatal care actions and approxi-
mately half of the suggested actions related to sick-child care (Kruk et al., 2017). In
this context, low provider effort is likely to constrain potentially important impacts of
structural inputs on the quality of care provided to patients.
2In Rwanda, between 1996 and 2018, life expectancy almost doubled, from 35 to 69 years, and the
under-five mortality rate dropped from 196 to 35 per 1000 births, and between 2000 and 2018, the
maternal mortality rate dropped from 1160 to 248 per 100,000 live births. In comparison, between
1996 and 2018, life expectancy increased from 49 to 65 years in Tanzania and from 45 to 61 years in
Burundi, and under-five mortality dropped from 154 to 53 in Tanzania and from 175 to 59 in Burundi.
Between 2000 and 2018, the maternal mortality rate dropped from 854 to 524 in Tanzania and from
1010 to 548 in Burundi (World Bank, 2020).
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I contribute to previous research by providing evidence on the importance of struc-
tural inputs in explaining healthcare quality from a health sector with strong monitor-
ing and accountability mechanisms. The PBF scheme represents a public mechanism
for accountability by introducing a financial payment structure that conditions funding
on health service quality and provider effort (Ministry of Health, 2018b). In addition
to the PBF scheme, the central government monitors service delivery through a unique
traditional system of performance contracts between local government agencies and the
president of Rwanda, called Imihigo. The contracts include health-related performance
targets such as reduction in morbidity and mortality, and access to care (Versailles,
2012).
The importance of provider effort as a determinant for the quality of care exceeds
the scope of this paper. The quality measures used in this analysis were collected
through direct observations. In the presence of an observing enumerator, caregivers
are likely to alter their behavior in order to comply with clinical guidelines (K. Leonard
& Masatu, 2006). Therefore, lack of provider effort is not likely to be fully captured by
these measures. However, the Rwandan health sector provides a setting for estimating
the importance of structural factors in a market where such effects are less likely to be
constrained by low levels of provider effort.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the study
setting and the PBF scheme. Section 3 provides the data and defines the quality
measures used in the analysis. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis, and Section
5 concludes.
2 The Rwandan Health Sector
Rwanda has a decentralized health system, in which the administrative responsibility
for health service delivery, facility management, and infrastructure investment is cen-
tered in 30 district health departments. The districts are responsible for the health
facilities and services provided therein, making them the organizational unit of primary
health services provided at health centers and district hospitals (Versailles, 2012).
This study focuses on the quality of primary health services. Health centers are
the gatekeepers of the health system and the focal point for primary care. Health
centers provide basic primary care including promotional activities, and preventive
and curative health services, such as normal deliveries, minor surgical interventions,
4
management of noncommunicable and communicable diseases, and laboratory testing
(Kalisa et al., 2015). For needs beyond these services, patients are referred to district
hospitals, provincial hospitals, or referral facilities as needed (African Strategies for
Health, 2015). In 2016 Rwanda counted with 499 health centers throughout the coun-
try, each serving a catchment area of several thousand people. Furthermore, the health
system consisted of 8 national referral hospitals, 4 provincial hospitals and 36 district
hospitals. Approximately 10% of all healthcare providers were private for-profit. Pri-
vate healthcare providers are located mainly in Kigali, while the rest of the country is
underserved by the private sector (African Strategies for Health, 2015).
One of the main objectives of the Rwandan health sector strategic plan is to ensure
universal access to the highest attainable quality of health services at all levels. To
expand the availability of healthcare to the Rwandan population, the government has
implemented a number of health policies that aim to increase both the demand and
the supply of healthcare. In 2006, the Rwandan government introduced a national
community-based health insurance (CBHI) scheme that offered financial protection
against healthcare expenditure for those who lacked access to health insurance. The
insurance covered all health services provided at public and private nonprofit health
facilities. The CBHI scheme contributed to increased geographic and financial acces-
sibility, as well as usage of health services, among Rwandans (Lu et al., 2012). As a
result, Rwanda has made impressive steps towards universal health coverage (World
Health Organization, 2017).
The introduction of the CBHI scheme was accompanied by an increase in total
healthcare expenditure in Rwanda, which grew from approximately 4% of GDP at the
beginning of 2000 to 8.5% by 2012. On average, between 2000 and 2017, healthcare
expenditure in Rwanda represented approximately 6.5% of GDP, higher than in several
Sub-Saharan countries, such as Ghana (3.8%), and Ethiopia (4.4%), but less than in
others, such as Uganda (8.8%). Healthcare expenditure represented approximately 5%
of GDP during the period among all countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank,
2020).
In addition to the policy efforts that aimed to increase the demand for healthcare,
the government has put an emphasis on increasing the supply of healthcare services
across the country. To ensure service delivery, the central government introduced a
number of public accountability systems (Pose & Samuels, 2011). The PBF scheme
represents one of the key accountability systems in the health sector. The program was
5
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introduced as a national health financing policy at all health facilities in Rwanda in
2006 (Ministry of Health, 2018b). The performance-based contracts attach payments
for specific health services, conditional on quality standards. The quality standards
are assessed using a number of indicators that are defined according to qualitative and
quantitative quality measures, outlined in the national PBF evaluation tool (Ministry
of Health, 2018b; Basinga et al., 2011). For example, the evaluation of deliveries consid-
ers the correct use of medicines and medical supplies such as anesthesia, sterile gloves,
and emergency kits; presence of qualified personnel; measures to prevent infection; and
accurate decisions regarding referral of patients to referral hospitals. The evaluation of
vaccines puts a large emphasis on storage and correct management of the vaccine stock.
Additionally, the quality index includes the direct observation of four vaccinations of
children, evaluating indicators such as the right dosage, appropriate injection sites,
correct use of garbage cans, systematic reporting of side effects, and correct registra-
tion of vaccination. The registration of tuberculosis, use of the technical manual, and
the stock of antituberculosis medication are other quality indicators included in the
tuberculosis section of the evaluation. Importantly, the care of any cases of diagnosed
tuberculosis are evaluated according to the guidelines of the national tuberculosis di-
vision (Ministry of Health, 2018b). For a detailed description of all quality indicators,
please consult Table A1 in Appendix.
Health center performance is regularly measured against quality indicators during
quarterly quality evaluations conducted by the district hospitals. At the end of each
evaluation session, the points awarded for every quality indicator are summed up and
used as an overall quality score for the health facility. Each facility’s total score is
used to determine the final PBF reimbursement it will receive. Every health facility
prepares an annual action plan integrating all expected income sources, including PBF
revenues and expenses. Each individual caregiver signs a contract with the health
center that states the performance requirements and the monetary contribution paid
for performance, measured by the caregiver’s adherence to the checklist of quality
indicators.
In conjunction with the introduction of the PBF, the Rwandan government intro-
duced another type of performance contract called Imihigo with the aim of improving
the efficiency of service delivery. Imihigo is an accountability system based on perfor-
mance contracts, detailing specific performance targets that the local governments set.
The contracts are signed between local and national governments. Local ministries,
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public agencies and districts are required to sign formal public service agreements to
deliver key specific outputs each year. Activities included in the contracts are derived
partly from the national economic development and poverty reduction strategy, and
partly from demands and priorities in local communities.
The district governments develop five-year and one-year plans and targets based
on these national and local demands and conversations. Each target is linked to a
specific performance indicator. At the end of the process, the local governments sign
the Imigiho contracts with the president in a public ceremony. The documents are
available to the general public (Byamukama & Makonnen, 2012). The Imihigo work
process is monitored closely and evaluated yearly by evaluation teams put together
by the national government, to hold local governments accountable for meeting their
targets. Annual evaluation is conducted by the national quality assurance team to
determine the extent to which districts have achieved their objectives and contributed
to improvements in the socioeconomic well-being of citizens. District mayors are held
to account for their Imihigo performance twice a year in public sessions in Kigali, which
are chaired by the president. As a result, Imihigo put pressure on public officials to
fulfill policy goals and to provide quality services (Versailles, 2012).
3 Data
The quality measures in this analysis are based on data from the PBF national moni-
toring system. These data contains information on 12 indicators that measure health
center adherence to quality checklists, developed by the Ministry of Health. The data
were collected quarterly through unannounced clinic visits by professional staff. Each
administrative district in Rwanda has a district hospital that is responsible for evalu-
ating health centers in its catchment area. The quality indicators cover a wide range of
administrative and clinical activities, including antenatal care, family planning, and de-
liveries; diagnosis and treatment of tuberculosis; providing vaccinations; financial, data
and general management; management of laboratory and pharmacies; and hygiene. To
ensure the accuracy of the quality evaluations, the Ministry of Health conducts bian-
nual counter verification of health facility data. A district steering committee may
sanction or even exclude a health center from the PBF strategy for reasons such as
collusion with or corruption of the evaluators (Ministry of Health, 2018b).
I categorize rural health centers based on their geographic distance from one of 10
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administrative and clinical activities, including antenatal care, family planning, and de-
liveries; diagnosis and treatment of tuberculosis; providing vaccinations; financial, data
and general management; management of laboratory and pharmacies; and hygiene. To
ensure the accuracy of the quality evaluations, the Ministry of Health conducts bian-
nual counter verification of health facility data. A district steering committee may
sanction or even exclude a health center from the PBF strategy for reasons such as
collusion with or corruption of the evaluators (Ministry of Health, 2018b).
I categorize rural health centers based on their geographic distance from one of 10
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major cities in Rwanda: Kigali, Huye, Muhanga, Musanze, Rubavu, Byumba, Risuzu,
Kibuye, Rwamagana, and Kibungo. I use the geographic coordinates of each health
facility to measure the distance between the health center and the closest city center.
The baseline definition of a rural health center uses a buffer zone of 15 kilometers (km)
around each of the 10 cities. All health clinics that are situated outside the buffer zones
are defined as rural. Kigali is the largest city in the country and accounts for more
than 50% of the total urban population. As of 2012, Kigali had approximately 845 000
inhabitants. The second-largest city, Rubavu, had around 150 000 inhabitants, while
4 of the 10 largest cities had less than 60 000 inhabitants. Consequently, the urban
system in the country is dominated by Kigali (Rajashekar et al., 2019). I study the
sensitivity of the results to the choice of rural-urban cutoff by using alternate radii of
the urban zones to 10 km, 20 km and 25 km. The results are presented in the next
Section.
I use data from the HMIS on facility characteristics and structural inputs. The
HMIS is a national data base containing monthly information for all health facilities in
the country on a number of in- and outpatient statistics, ante- and postnatal care, and
human resources, as well as financial information. The data are recorded electronically
at each individual health facility and coordinated by the Ministry of Health. By match-
ing data from the PBF national monitoring system and the HMIS, I was able to match
the quality score for each health center with information on medical infrastructure and
patient visits.
I construct a yearly quality score for each health center by taking the mean of all
quarterly indicators during each year. The data contains information on 499 health
centers, representing the complete population of clinics in 2018. I dropped 29 health
centers that did not have any information on quality scores in the PBF data, as well
as 74 clinics that lacked geographic coordinates, which prevented me from categorizing
them as rural or urban clinics, and information on structural inputs in the HMIS
data. The first year of data (2012) was of overall low quality, likely because electronic
reporting in the HMIS was introduced during that year. Therefore, I dropped the data
from 2012. The resulting sample consists of 396 health centers, covering the period
2013–18, with a total of 2113 observations.
Appendix table A2 provides a brief analysis of the missing values. Overall, the
results suggest that rural clinics are approximately 7 percentage points more likely
than urban to have missing values. Furthermore, the results suggest that the missing
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values are not random; compared with other clinics, clinics missing values are likely
to have a larger number of hospital beds, higher drug expenditure per patient visit,
and a different case mix. To evaluate whether the pattern of missing values is likely to
affect the results, I further analyze the correlation between clinic characteristics and
the likelihood of having a missing value separately for rural and urban health centers.
The results show a positive correlation between missing values and the number of clinic
beds among urban health centers, suggesting that larger urban clinics are more likely to
be missing values in the sample. Furthermore, there is a significant positive correlation
between the likelihood of missing values and total wage expenditure among urban
clinics, whereas this correlation is significantly negative among rural clinics. Taken
together, the results indicate that the missing values are likely to contribute to an
underestimation of disparities in health infrastructure between rural and urban clinics.
Under the assumption that increased access to health infrastructure is associated with
higher health services quality, this would result in an underestimation of the quality
gap between rural and urban health facilities.
3.1 Quality measures
Measures of quality of care have traditionally been divided into three domains: struc-
ture, process and outcome. Structural quality refers to the material and human re-
sources, as well as the physical and organizational factors of the healthcare provider,
and the process component describes the quality of health service delivery to patients
such as adherence to clinical guidelines. Outcome reflects the impact of care on pop-
ulation health status (Donabedian, 1988). For this analysis, I create two measures
of quality—a general quality score and a patient-focused score—based on 12 different
PBF quality indicators (listed in table 1). The general quality score measures the
overall quality of the health clinic, including activities such as data and financial man-
agement and hygiene and laboratory management, as well as the quality of the care
provided, focusing on antenatal care, family planning, deliveries, tuberculosis, vaccina-
tion and supervision of community health workers. The patient-focused quality score is
restricted to include only quality indicators related to patient-focused activities, such
as antenatal care, family planing, deliveries, tuberculosis, and vaccinations. The aim
of this measure is to provide a quality index that exclusively describes the direct care
provided to patients. The quality scores summarize 140 structure and process mea-
sures of quality (see appendix table A1 for more detailed description of the quality
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indicators).
Structural measures evaluate the context in which the health services are provided,
including facilities, personnel, and management related to the delivery of care, whereas
the process component assesses the accuracy of the clinical encounter—that is, whether
health services provided to patients are consistent with national guidelines (Donabe-
dian, 1988). The process-related indicators measure adherence of health workers to the
clinical guidelines for best practice of care defined by the Rwandan government in the
clinical practice guidelines. The quality of health is measured by the PBF checklists,
defined by the Rwandan government and applied during the quality evaluations at the
health centers. Approximately 80% of the patient-related quality measure consists of
process-related indicators, corresponding to about 60% of the general quality score.
Table 1 summarizes the 12 quality indicators used to construct the general and
patient-focused quality scores, as well as the aggregated total quality scores. Column
1 describes the average values for all health centers, and columns 2 and 3 describe the
values for rural and urban clinics. Columns 4 and 5 present sample maximum and
minimum scores, and column 6 indicates the maximum quality score a health clinic
could potentially receive according to the PBF financing rules (Ministry of Health,
2018b).
The results indicate that the average scores exceed 80% of the total score (column
6) for nearly all indicators. General organization, laboratory management, and the
oversight of community health workers reached approximately 75% of the total quality
score on average. The two rows under the individual quality indicators present the
aggregated total quality scores. The general quality measure was 404.05 on average
during the study period, and the patient-focused total score was 191.30. This corre-
sponds to 88% on the general quality score and 80% on the patient-focused quality
score, on average. The Ministry of Health categorizes health centers with a quality
score above 80% as high-quality health facilities, whereas those that receive a quality
score of less than 60% are described as low-quality providers. Health centers in this
study received a general quality score ranging from 73% to 95% (333.75 to 437.5 score
points) and a patient-focused score ranging from 57% to 85% (137 to 205 points). Less
than 5% received a quality score lower than 5%, both general and patient focused, that
is lower than 80%, either general of patient-focused.
Importantly, even small deviations from the maximum score could potentially mask
quality deficits that could have large implications on the quality and safety of the care
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provided at the health clinic. For example, according to administrative documentation
from the PBF, the gap between the sample average and maximum score in relation to
the hygiene indicator could imply that a clinic lacks access to a toilet or latrine with
soap and running water; that it has no contract with a cleaning service and no formal
record of cleaning products such as soap, bleach, and chlorine; or that it lacks access to
a water source such as running water, or a well or tank. Similarly, a difference between
average and maximum quality scores in relation to deliveries could imply that a health
center lacks routines for infection prevention, that it lacks local anesthesia and saline,
or that deliveries were not done by qualified personnel.
The results in columns 2 and 3 of table 1 indicate that urban clinics on average
had significantly higher quality scores for a number of quality indicators. Urban clinics
received significantly higher quality scores on all indicators related to clinical care, with
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics: quality indicators and quality scores
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Indicators and scores All Rural Urban Min Max Max
(sample) (sample) PBF score
General Data management 35.713 35.658 35.809 18.5 40 40
score (3.480) (3.511) (3.427) (46%) (100%)
Financial management 23.041 22.993 23.124 2 25 25
(2.024) (2.094) (2.005) (8%) (100%)
General organization 28.367 28.209 28.640** 11.5 37 37
(4.282) (4.345) (4.161) (46%) (100%)
Hygiene 25.092 24.973 25.298*** 14.25 30 30
(2.328) (2.350) (2.277) (47%) (100%)
Laboratory 17.933 17.866 18.050 11.5 25 25
(4.106) (4.079) (4.151) (46%) (100%)
Pharmacy 30.739 30.623 30.938*** 19.25 33 33
(1.941) (1.951) (1.908) (58%) (100%)
Community Health Workers 23.058 22.893 23.344** 10.25 30 30
(5.037) (5.021) (5.054) (34%) (100%)
Patient Antenatal Care (ANC) 60.579 60.358 60.960*** 42.75 63 63
score (2.437) (2.561) (2.155) (68%) (100%)
Deliveries 60.612 60.494 60.817* 38.75 65 65
(4.005) (3.939) (4.110) (60%) (100%)
Family Planing 52.690 52.323 53.323*** 6.25 57 57
(5.103) (5.034) (5.163) (10%) (100%)
Tuberculosis 17.418 17.241 17.722*** 6 20 20
(2.095) (2.282) (1.681) (30%) (100%)
Vaccination 28.801 28.689 28.996 14.25 35 35
(4.914) (4.933) (4.880) (40%) (100%)
Total General score 404.051 402.328 407.026 333.75 437.5 460
(17.051) (17.533) (15.759) (73%) (95%)
Patient-focused score 191.300 190.418 192.823 137 205 240
(8.869) (9.017) (8.398) (57%) (85%)
Observations 2113 1338 775
Notes: Summary statistics of two quality scores: the general score, which includes all quality indicators, and the patient-
focused score, which is restricted to include only quality indicators related to antenatal care, deliveries, family planning,
tuberculosis and vaccinations. Column 1 provides average values for all health centers in the sample, whereas columns
2 and 3 present values for rural and urban clinics separately. Columns 4 and 5 show sample maximum and minimum,
and column 6 gives the maximum quality score according to Ministry of Health guidelines. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
3.2 Explanatory variables
Table 2 shows summary statistics for a number of structural inputs and contextual
factors. The total number of beds measure health center bed capacity and is a proxy
for clinic size, total number of outpatient visits in a year measures the capacity of
the health clinics to produce output, demand for services, and also clinic size; and
total wage expenditure is used as a measure of access to health staff. Wage levels
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for health workers in public health facilities in Rwanda are centralized and defined
by the Ministry of Health (Ministry of Health, 2019), implying that variation in wage
expenditure among health centers measure differences in number of health workers or
variation in the composition of workers among centers rather than disparities in salary
across the country. Drug expenditure per outpatient visit is a proxy for access to
drugs and medical supplies or the structure of drug prescription at each clinic. The
population of the catchment area represent an estimation of the potential demand for
healthcare faced by each clinic.
Column 1 describes all health centers in the sample, whereas columns 2 and 3 give
values for rural and urban clinics separately. On average, health centers had 22 beds,
performed approximately 25 700 outpatient visits, spent on average RwF 554 (USD
0.6) per outpatient visit on drugs, and had a total wage expenditure of approximately
RwF 3.94e+07 per year (USD 40,300). Moreover, the results suggest that there is a
statistically significant difference between rural and urban health centers in relation
to both health infrastructural and contextual variables. Columns 2 and 3 suggest
that urban health centers had significantly higher wage expenditure and fewer beds.
Furthermore, urban health centers have significantly more populated catchment areas,
and the distances to the closes neighboring clinic and district hospital were significantly
shorter in urban areas. There is no significant difference between the groups in total
outpatient visits per year or the average drug expenditure per outpatient visit.
In addition to the structural inputs and contextual factors, table 2 includes health
clinic case mix. The case mix refers to the composition of patient diagnoses related to
a number of priority health problems that were determined at a clinic during one year
and describes the demand for healthcare at each health center and the complexity of
the service provided. Acute respiratory infection and pneumonia represented the most
common group of diagnoses at health centers, accounting for approximately 21% of all
outpatient visits. Maternal health services such as ante- and postnatal care represented
3.3% and 3.1% of all visits, respectively, and deliveries accounted for 2% of the visits
during one year. The results suggest a relatively similar case mix between urban and
rural regions. However, respiratory diseases, malaria, and diarrhea and parasites were
significantly less common in urban areas, whereas deliveries were more common in rural
areas. There are no significant differences between ante- and postnatal care.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics: urban and rural health centers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables All Rural Urban Min Max
Medical infrastructure
Beds 21.989 22.457 21.180*** 0.41 124
(0.352) (11.166) (9.817)
Total outpatient visits 25695.75 25369.72 26258.61 2236 102631
(13723.39) (14221.9) (12806.63)
Drugs per outpatient visit 553.673 558.033 546.146 44.49 2494.81
(219.152) (230.685) (197.580)
Total wage expenditure 3.94e+07 3.89e+07 4.03e+07** 5274461 9.90e+07
(1.56e+07) (1.52e+07) (1.62e+07)
External market factors
Population catchment area 22 868.34 21865.3 24600.05*** 3293 62847
(10375.43) (9370.286) (11718.82)
Nearest clinic (km) 4.692 5.093 4.000*** 0.001 17.252
(1.890) (2.001) (1.441)
Nearest district hospital (km) 10.696 11.113 9.977*** 0.001 30.421
(5.799) (0.159) (0.204)
Service-mix
Deliveries (%) 0.018 0.019 0.017*** 0.003 0.093
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
Antenatal care (%) 0.033 0.034 0.032 0.004 0.147
(0.017) (0.018) (0.016)
Prenatal care (%) 0.031 0.031 0.030 0.00 0.245
(0.026) .026(0) (0.024)
Malaria (%) 0.125 0.133 0.111*** 0 0.617
(0.119) (0.121) (0.113)
Respiratory (%) 0.214 0.217 0.211 0.015 0.724
(0.098) (0.103) (0.089)
Diarrhea and worms (%) 0.084 0.086 0.081** 0.007 0.409
(0.051) (0.055) (0.044)
Oral/eye/ear (%) 0.044 0.045 0.043 0.000 0.335
(0.039) (0.042) (0.034)
Integrated management of 0.099 0.098 0.100 0.00 0.846
childhood illness (IMCI) (%) (0.062) (0.062) (0.063)
HIV (%) 0.001 0.001 0.001* 0.00 0.058
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Observations 2 113 480 775 1338
Notes: Summary statistics of the structural inputs and contextual factors included in the analysis.
Column 1 provides average values for all health centers in the sample, whereas columns 2 and 3 present
values for rural and urban clinics separately. Columns 4 and 5 show sample maximum and minimum
values. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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4 Empirical Analysis
In this section, I study the differences in quality of care between rural and urban
households. I use a linear regression to estimate disparities in quality. Furthermore,
I investigate how much of the inequality can be attributed to differences in health
infrastructure and external contextual variables. To do this, I decompose the quality
gap by comparing estimations with and without controls for these factors. This strategy
has previously been used by Fafchamps et al. (2009) to investigate the importance of
job sorting in African labor markets.
I estimate the following regressions:
ln(Q)it = α2Rurali + δ2Wit + ζt + εit (1)
ln(Q)it = α3Rurali + δ3Wit + γ3Xit + ζt + εit (2)
ln(Q)it = α4Rurali + δ4Wit + γ4Zit + ζt + εit (3)
ln(Q)it = α5Rurali + δ5Wit + β5Xit + γ5Zit + ζt + εit (4)
where (Q)it denotes the quality score of health clinic i at time t. Rurali is a dummy
that takes the value 1 if a health center is situated outside the 15 km buffer zone
that surrounds one of the 10 major cities in Rwanda. Wit is a vector of covariates
controlling for health center case mix, thus controlling for the disease burden of each
clinic. This is important since patients with more complicated symptoms might choose
particular healthcare providers, putting additional pressure on clinic resources and
affecting quality, confounding the true difference in provider quality with differences
in patient characteristics. As a result, I control for case mix in all specifications. Xit
is a vector of structural inputs at time t, including total wage expenditure, number of
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics: urban and rural health centers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
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(1.56e+07) (1.52e+07) (1.62e+07)
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Column 1 provides average values for all health centers in the sample, whereas columns 2 and 3 present
values for rural and urban clinics separately. Columns 4 and 5 show sample maximum and minimum
values. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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4 Empirical Analysis
In this section, I study the differences in quality of care between rural and urban
households. I use a linear regression to estimate disparities in quality. Furthermore,
I investigate how much of the inequality can be attributed to differences in health
infrastructure and external contextual variables. To do this, I decompose the quality
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has previously been used by Fafchamps et al. (2009) to investigate the importance of
job sorting in African labor markets.
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ln(Q)it = α4Rurali + δ4Wit + γ4Zit + ζt + εit (3)
ln(Q)it = α5Rurali + δ5Wit + β5Xit + γ5Zit + ζt + εit (4)
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and the distances to the closest neighboring clinic and district hospital. The population
size of the catchment area is used as a proxy for the demand of health services faced
by the health centers. When controlling for demand, the distance to nearest clinic also
aims to measure market competition. Additionally, this vector controls for access to
provider knowledge proxied by the geographic distance to the closest district hospital.
The majority of health centers do not have medical doctors (Collins et al., 2011). Med-
ical doctors from the district hospitals periodically travel around their corresponding
districts to support the health center health staff. I control for potential changes in
the quality scores common to all health clinics by including year fixed effects, δt. All
standard errors are clustered at the health facility level.
By comparing α across the different models it is possible to decompose the urban-
rural quality gap into portions attributed to the different groups of factors. All estima-
tions control for variation in disease burden across rural and urban regions. Comparing
(α1–α2) allows us to evaluate how much of the gap is due to differences in the structural
inputs between rural and urban areas, and comparing (α1–α3) estimates how much can
be attributed to differences in external market factors. Comparing (α1–α4) provides
an estimate of how much of the disparity in quality between rural and urban clinics is
jointly explained by differences in both structural and external factors.
5 Results
Table 3 shows the estimated quality gap between rural and urban health centers, using
the estimated models presented in equations (1–4). Column 1 controls exclusively
for year fixed effects and disease burden. The results indicate a small but significant
difference in the quality of health services between rural and urban health clinics.
Rural health clinics have on average 4.2 points lower quality score than urban facilities,
representing approximately 0.3 standard deviations or 1% at the mean. Although the
data do not allow me to further investigate the implications of the difference in quality
scores in terms of actual health services, appendix table A1 can provide some guidance
on what this quality gap could mean. For example, the difference in quality scores
between rural and urban clinics could potentially correspond to any of the following:(i)
the absence of a water source; (ii) a lack of access to skilled health personnel during
deliveries or the availability of delivery emergency kits, (iii) incorrect management
of cases with complications during antenatal care visits, or (iv) incorrect storage of
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vaccines, or v) medications being out of stock, such as a lack of tracer drugs. Again,
this description suggests that even a relatively limited difference in actual quality scores
(4.2 out of the total score of 460) could potentially mask important differences in the
quality of health services.
In columns 2–4, I decompose the quality gap into parts that can be attributed
to differences in structural inputs and external market factors. Overall, the results
indicate that medical infrastructure and external market factors do not explain much
of the rural and urban quality gap. Differences in structural inputs explain just over
12% of the difference in quality between rural and urban health centers (column 2),
external factors explain approximately 11% of the gap (column 3), and internal and
external factors jointly explain about 8% of the quality gap (column 4). Comparing
the estimates in columns 2 and 4 suggests that the structural inputs explain a smaller
portion of the quality gap when the contextual factors are controlled for.
The results are in line with recent evidence of the potential of clinic readiness to
predict the quality of clinical process. This research suggests that the capacity of a
health clinic to produce quality says little about the quality of the actual care provided
(Leslie, Sun, & Kruk, 2017; Das & Hammer, 2014).
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Table 3: Total score: general quality score
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rural -4.610*** -4.051*** -4.111*** -4.230***
(1.280) (1.171) (1.273) (1.189)
Constant 418.3*** 196.0*** 378.6*** 212.5***
(3.256) (26.95) (16.27) (27.34)
Observations 2,113 2,113 2,113 2,113
R-squared 0.088 0.167 0.114 0.176
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Case mix Yes Yes Yes Yes
Structural inputs No Yes No Yes
External context No No Yes Yes
Notes The results from estimating equations (1–4) for the general qual-
ity score. Column 1 controls for time fixed effects and case mix; column
2 adds controls for health infrastructure by including number of beds,
population catchment area, total wage expenditure, and drugs per visit;
and column 3 controls for external factors such as catchment area pop-
ulation and distance to closest clinic and district hospital. Column 4
includes a complete set of all covariates. Standard errors are clustered
at household level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 4 repeats the analysis in Table 3 using the patient-centered quality score,
which almost exclusively contains quality indicators focusing on the clinical process.
The results indicate that the patient-centered quality score is significantly lower among
rural clinics than urban clinics. Rural health centers receive approximately 2.1 lower
quality scores than those in urban areas, corresponding to 1% of the mean and ap-
proximately 0.25 standard deviations. As with the general quality score, columns 2–4
suggest that structural inputs and external market factors explain only a reduced share
of the difference in quality scores between rural and urban health centers. Comparing
the estimates in columns 1 and 4, suggests that case mix, health infrastructural fac-
tors, and external market factors jointly explain approximately 11% of the quality gap
between rural and urban areas (α2–α5).
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Table 4: Total score: patient-focused quality score
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rural -2.378*** -2.098*** -2.101*** -2.113***
(0.637) (0.603) (0.653) (0.627)
Constant 197.9*** 110.2*** 172.4*** 111.6***
(1.542) (13.44) (8.714) (13.91)
Observations 2,113 2,113 2,113 2,113
R-squared 0.057 0.102 0.078 0.103
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Case mix Yes Yes Yes Yes
Structural inputs No Yes No Yes
External context No No Yes Yes
Notes: The results from estimating equations (1–4) for the patient-
focused quality score. Column 1 controls for time fixed effects and
case mix; column 2 adds controls for health infrastructure by including
number of beds, population catchment area, total wage expenditure,
and drugs per visit; and column 3 controls for external factors such as
catchment area population and distance to closest clinic and district
hospital. Column 4 includes a complete set of all covariates. Standard
errors are clustered at household level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
As described earlier, a number of health centers were not included in the analysis
due to missing data. Further analysis of the omitted health facilities indicates that
these health centers differed significantly from those included in the analysis. They
were on average smaller and more likely to be in rural areas than those included in
the study sample. The nonrandom exclusion of health centers is likely to contribute
to underestimating the quality gap between rural and urban areas.
5.1 Extensions and robustness
In this section I give additional estimations of the quality gap between rural and urban
clinics, using alternative strategies. The analysis in this section provides a deeper
understanding of the nature of the disparities in quality, as well as the association
between distance to cities and the quality of care, and evaluates the robustness of the
results.
Appendix table A3 reports results from estimating equation (4) with alternative
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definitions of rural households. Columns 1–3 show estimations using cutoff distances
of 10, 20, and 25 km. The results suggest that the estimated variation of quality
between rural and urban households changes as I vary the distance cutoffs but remains
negative for all definitions of rural households. The estimated quality gap decreases
as the distance of the cutoff from a city increases. The 10 largest urban cities and the
different cutoff distances are presented in the map in appendix figure A1. A comparison
of the estimated quality gaps in columns 1–3 of table A3 suggests that the quality of
care is relatively higher in the very center of a city. Furthermore, there is no significant
difference in quality between the semiurban clinics within the 10–25 km buffer zone
and those situated in remote rural areas farther than 25 km from the city. The results
indicate that the association between distance to urban centers and quality is not linear
and that the gap in quality of care is driven by a significantly higher quality at urban
health clinics.
In column 4, I further investigate the relation between distance from cities and the
quality of care, assuming a nonlinear effect of the distance between the city centers and
the health clinics. The results confirm that the quality of care is significantly higher at
health centers situated within 10 km of the center of a city an at clinics situated within
a zone 10–25 km from the city center. Column 5 measures the association between
the quality of care and the geographic distance from a health center to Kigali. The
city has a high density of healthcare providers and expertise. For example, half of
all eight referral hospitals in the country are situated in Kigali City. The estimates
in column 5 support previous results by showing a negative association between the
distance to Kigali and health center quality score, that is, distance from urban areas is
negatively associated with the quality score. A 1% increase in the distance between a
health center and Kigali is associated with a 2-point decrease in the quality score. The
estimates in column 6 show that the Kigali effect remains even when I control for rural
versus urban location. The results suggest that the distance from Kigali is negatively
associated with health quality among urban as well as rural clinics.
A large share of the health centers have received quality scores that exceed the 80%
ceiling used by the Rwandan government to define high-quality care. Appendix figure
A2 shows the sample distribution of all separate quality indicators that make up the
total quality scores. The graphs reveal that the majority of the indicators have a right-
censored distribution; that is, a number of health centers have received a full quality
score, suggesting that the quality measures are censored at the maximum score. The
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censored quality indicators imply that the true quality of each health clinic is not fully
observed, meaning that I do not observe the variation in quality among clinics beyond
the maximum score of the PBF indicators. As a result, the variation in quality scores
across health centers comes from the lower tail of the distribution. The distributions
reveal that despite high average quality scores, several clinics have low scores for one or
more individual indicators. Given the construction of the quality scores, a clinic with
important deficiencies in relation to a few specific quality indicators could receive the
same total score as a clinic that has a relatively high quality score across all indicators.
Although these two clinics could vary significantly in the overall levels of quality and
patient security, such difference would not be captured by the total quality score.
I adjust for the top coding of the quality indicators by constructing binary response
variables that take the value 1 if a quality indicator is below 80% of the total score,
and zero otherwise. Although the true quality score for each clinic is unobserved in
the data, the binary variable indicates whether the quality was above or below the
cutoff point of good quality care. I use a probit model to estimate the likelihood that
a clinic had at least one quality indicator with a score less than 80%. In appendix
table A3, column 8, I present the results from estimating equation 4 using a probit
model. The model estimates the difference between rural and urban clinics in having
at least one quality score that is less than 80%. The results suggest that rural clinics
are significantly more likely than urban clinics to have a low score in at least one area.
In column 9, I construct a count variable that indicates the number of total quality
indicators below 80% that a health clinic has received. I use a Poisson regression model
to estimate the difference in the number of low-quality indicators between rural and
urban clinics. The results indicate that a rural clinic has 0.11 additional low-score
indicators compared with urban clinics.
In column 7, I estimate the baseline equation 4 using data from 2012—18. The
data from 2012 were excluded from the main estimations due to low quality during
this first year of data reporting. The results suggest that the estimated quality gap is
stable when the additional year is included.
Appendix table A4 repeats the estimations presented in table A3, using the patient-
centered quality score. The results are in line with the estimations of the general quality
score, with the exception that the estimated quality gap is smaller for the patient-
centered score. Again, the quality gap is larger when I consider a more restrictive
definition of rural clinics (10 km cutoff, column 1) compared with longer distance
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cutoffs (columns 2 and 3). The results in column 4, support a nonlinear effect of
distance between the health center and the center of a larger city. Columns 5 and
6 suggest that there is a negative association between quality and the distance from
Kigali. As with the general quality score, this negative association remains when I
control for urban-rural location. Columns 8 and 9 indicate that rural clinics are more
likely to have reported at least one quality indicator below 80%.
Finally, appendix table A5 estimates potential development in the disparities in
quality over time. The results suggest that there has been no significant change in the
quality gap over time.
5.2 Interpreting the urban-rural quality gap
In this section I analyze the quality gap between rural and urban areas from a finan-
cial perspective, using the PBF reimbursement formula. The reimbursement formula
includes the quality score as a multiplayer that adjusts the funding according to the
quality level of the health services. This allows me to use the estimated gap in the
quality score between rural and urban clinics to estimate the financial implications
of such quality gaps. The financial implications of differences in quality provide addi-
tional information on how to interpret the meaning of the variation in quality measures
across urban and rural health clinics.
The PBF reimbursement formula defines the total financial funding for each health-
care provider by multiplier the number of performed healthcare services covered by the
scheme with a service-specific unit cost defined by the Ministry of Health. This amount
is then multiplied by the PBF quality score,3 providing a financial measure of differ-
ences in quality. I use the PBD reimbursement formula to estimate the average funding
related to six health services covered by the PBF scheme: the number of women who
received four antenatal care visits, newborns who received 4 postnatal care visits within
six weeks of their birth, deliveries at health centers, and preventive and curative consul-
tations. Importantly, the PBF includes a large number of reimbursable indicators that
3The following equation describes the PBF payment formula:




where i indexes health center, j a reimbursable service, and t time periods. Qualityit is the quality
score resulting from the quarterly independent evaluations at each health center, Pit is the unique
unit cost for each reimbursable health service in time t, and Nijt is the number of validated and
reimbursable health services delivered at a health center in time t (Ministry of Health, 2018b).
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generate PBF payments, and my calculations include only a portion of all reimbursable
treatments.
Table 5 presents the estimated PBF funding in relation to each separate health
service. Columns 1–4 show the estimated financial funding for an average clinic with an
average quality score that provides an average number of health services, and columns
5–6 describe the financial implications of the PBF funding. The total amount of
financial compensation is estimated by multiplying the service-specific unit cost by
the number of treatments executed. The amount is then conditioned on quality by
multiplying that amount by 0.88, the average quality score in the sample.
The results show that the total PBF payment corresponding to the six health
services sums to Rwf 1 955 101 (USD 2,000). The reimbursement represents approx-
imately one yearly salary of a nurse with the highest educational level (A1), about
2.5 million RwF. Furthermore, according to the national health center cost model, the
average total cost for preventive services at health centers was Rwf 41,106,580 (USD
42,000), and the average total cost of salaries for technical staff was Rwf 26,559,747
(USD 27,000). The average total cost of a health center was Rwf 120 million (Collins
et al., 2011). The results indicate that the PBF funding represents a relatively small
share of the overall health center budgets.
Columns 5–6 show the financial implications of the gap in quality between rural and
urban areas. I base my calculations on the estimated quality gap estimated in table 3.
Given the calculation formula of the performance-based financing, the estimated 1%
gap in the quality score resulted in a difference in PBF funding of the same magnitude.
In relation to the six covered health services, the PBF scheme results in a difference in
funding of approximately Rwf 19,500 due to the quality gap. The monetary difference
caused by the quality gap represents less than 1% of the yearly salary of an A1 nurse.
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quality gap over time.
5.2 Interpreting the urban-rural quality gap
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tations. Importantly, the PBF includes a large number of reimbursable indicators that
3The following equation describes the PBF payment formula:




where i indexes health center, j a reimbursable service, and t time periods. Qualityit is the quality
score resulting from the quarterly independent evaluations at each health center, Pit is the unique
unit cost for each reimbursable health service in time t, and Nijt is the number of validated and
reimbursable health services delivered at a health center in time t (Ministry of Health, 2018b).
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Table 5: Financial reimbursement within the PBF scheme
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Health service Unit costs Avg. Score Total Quality gap Diff. reimbursement
(Rwf) services (%) reimbursement (%) (Rwf)
4 antenatal visits 1139 233 88 233 541 1 2 335
4 postnatal visits within 6 weeks 1139 252 88 252 585 1 2 528
Deliveries HC 1773 390 88 608 493 1 6 084
Preventive and curative 30 30 079 88 794 086 1 7 940
consultations
Metal health consultations 296 225 88 58 608 1 586
Screening NCD and cancer 59 150 88 7 788 1 78
Total 1 955 101 19 551
Notes: Column 1 shows the unit costs for each treatment, fee for services; column 2 lists the yearly
average number of each service performed at a health center; column 3 displays the average quality
score among health centers; and column 4 presents the estimated amount of financial compenastion
from the PBF scheme according to the payment formula. The figures are from my own calculations
based on HMIS and PBF technical information (Ministry of Health, 2018b).
6 Conclusions
During the last decade, access to healthcare has improved greatly for people in many
low-income countries. However, there is a global recognition that potential health
achievements from increased access to healthcare have not been realized because of
low quality of health services. Moreover, numerous studies have documented large
disparities in the quality of health services both between and within countries (Kruk
et al., 2018). Such inequalities represent important barriers in the process of achieving
equity in health across population groups, one of the overall development goals defined
by the Sustainable Development Goals.
In this paper, I have examined the quality gap between rural and urban areas in
Rwanda. This study finds that there is a statistically significant difference in quality
between rural and urban health clinics and that rural clinics systematically underper-
form in comparison with urban clinics in all dimensions. Rural health centers have
lower quality scores than urban clinics, and the gap represents approximately 1% of
the mean score. The results suggest that the estimated quality gap could potentially
mask important differences that could have considerable effects on the quality and se-
curity of the health services provided to patients. Based on PBF quality check lists, the
average gap in the general quality score could, for example, mean that the rural clinic
lacked access to a water source, essential vaccines, routines for infection prevention, or
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local anesthesia and saline, or that deliveries were not done by qualified personnel.
Although earlier empirical evidence on the quality gap between rural and urban
areas is inconclusive, some studies have found important disparities in quality between
rural and urban health facilities in the low-income setting (Kruk et al., 2018; Gage et
al., 2017). While this paper supports these findings, it is important to consider the
context of the study when interpreting the results. Importantly, the present analysis is
based on quality measures designed for the Rwandan PBF scheme. The primary aim of
these indicators was to provide a quality measure that could be used to define the level
of reimbursement for health centers within this scheme. The Ministry of Health is likely
to have designed quality measures that, in addition to evaluating the level of quality
of health services, also considered the distribution of PBF funds across clinics. As a
result, the quality indicators are likely to measure the minimum standards for receiving
financial reimbursement rather than the actual quality of the care provided. The
right-censored distribution of the quality indicators described in the previous section,
suggests that this could be the case. This would result in an underestimation of the
variation in service quality across regions, implying that the results presented in this
analysis are likely to measure the gap in the supply of minimum-standard healthcare
between rural and urban areas.
Following this line of reasoning, the PBF scheme would provide monetary incentives
for health providers and facilities to reach an established minimum level of quality, but
would not incentivize caregivers to improve quality of care beyond these minimum
levels. Given that healthcare expertise and knowledge are often concentrated in urban
areas, this reasoning could explain the small gap in quality scores between rural and
urban health clinics. A restructure of the PBF performance indicators in order to
increase the system’s ability to identify and reward high-quality facilities, however,
could lead to the reinforcement of initial quality differences and create barriers to
improvement for health facilities with lower quality scores. As a result, the PBF
system could contribute to increased inequities in health quality among geographic
areas. Overall, the government’s 80% ceiling for the quality scores implies that PBF
contracts can contribute to improved healthcare services up to a certain point, but
otherwise represent an inefficient policy tool to improve quality.
In addition to estimating differences in the quality of care between rural and urban
clinics, I have examined how much of the quality gap can be attributed to differences in
structural inputs and contextual factors. The results suggest that variation in inputs
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explain only a small share of the differences in quality scores. The results are in line
with earlier work that has found no correlation between structural inputs and quality
(Das et al., 2008; Das & Hammer, 2014; K. L. Leonard & Masatu, 2007). Instead, these
studies suggest that provider effort represents the key determinant of care quality. Low
effort implies that even when providers have the knowledge of how to correctly treat a
patient, they often fail to do so. Low levels of provider effort are likely in the absence of
accountability of care providers (Das & Hammer, 2014). This is important, since low
levels of provider effort are likely to limit any potential effects of increased structural
inputs beyond a certain point. In fact, studying the importance of structural inputs in
markets with low provider effort potentially says little about the actual importance of
structural inputs in explaining disparities in care quality.
This analysis adds important evidence to this discussion by studying the impor-
tance of structural and contextual factors in explaining differences in the quality of
care in a health sector with a long experience of public accountability and monitor-
ing of quality. The PBF scheme introduced accountability of quality of care into the
health sector through both economic incentives and monitoring and evaluations. As a
result, the economic cost of low effort is relatively high for each healthcare provider in
the Rwandan healthcare sector compared with markets that lack formal accountabil-
ity mechanisms. Furthermore, the Imihigo system provides additional monitoring by
making local authorities accountable for service delivery.
While the results indicate that structural inputs account for a reduced share of
the variation in quality between rural and urban areas, the results also suggest that
the differences in structural inputs between rural and urban areas are small. This is
an interesting finding since previous research has suggested that differences in inputs
between rural and urban facilities are significant in many low-income countries (Leslie,
Spiegelman, et al., 2017). One potential explanation for the relatively uniform distri-
bution of structural inputs is the PBF system, which rewards investment in structural
inputs both directly and indirectly through the quality indicators. However, an earlier
evaluation of the PBF scheme in Rwanda found no evidence that the program had a
significant effect on the increase of structural health infrastructure. Another potential
explanation for the relatively uniform geographic distribution of health infrastructure
across the country has been the inclusion of health related targets in the performance-
based contracts signed between the president of Rwanda and local governments.
The results presented in this study suggest that statistically significant differences
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in quality between rural and urban areas remain after controlling for structural inputs.
One potential explanation for this could be differences in knowledge between rural and
urban healthcare providers. Unfortunately, lack of access to data on health worker
knowledge prevents me from further investigating its importance in explaining the
quality gap. However, if one is willing to consider the distance between Kigali and each
health clinic as proxy for access to knowledge, specialized knowledge in particular, the
estimations presented in column 5 in appendix table A3 provide supporting evidence
for this idea. The results indicate that a decrease in access to knowledge is associated
with lower quality of care. Although I cannot rule out that healthcare quality and
provider knowledge may be explained by factors other than the distance between a
health facility and Kigali, the results are in line with the expected relation between
knowledge and quality.
Another plausible explanation would of course be variation in provider effort be-
tween rural and urban areas. Low provider effort results in a gap between provider
knowledge and their performance during patient visits, referred to as the know-do gap
(Das et al., 2008; Das & Hammer, 2007). In a market with public accountability, I
expect the know-do gap to decrease. In fact, previous evidence has indicated that the
”know-do gap” decreases as a result of the introduction of performance pay (Gertler
& Vermeersch, 2012; Ngo et al., 2016), suggesting that the quality gap in Rwanda is
less likely to be less attributed to low effort among providers than in markets without
accountability. However, knowledge could remain a constraining factor for quality of
care in healthcare sectors with accountability and uniform access to structural inputs.
Despite increased interest in the quality of healthcare in low-income countries during
recent years, little is known about the exact factors that are correlated with disparities
across a number of dimensions within these countries. Knowledge of what factors are
associated with the quality of the care process is essential to design effective policy
interventions that contribute to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals. Future
investigations on how to increase quality and provide populations in low-income coun-
tries with equal access to high-quality care will continue to be a key issue on the global
policy agenda.
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Appendix





- Functional equipment and drugs available (including folic acid, iron,
and Mebendazole)
- Observation of 5 new patients on their first visit:
i) Examination (medical history, HIV testing, cervical and breast cancer
screening) and physical examination (height and weight, mid-upper arm
circumference, edema assessment, breast examination)
ii) Complementary examination (hemoglobin, syphilis, albumin, glyco-
suria, blood grouping)
iii) Immunization according to schedule
iv) Correct prescription of a) iron and folic acid, b) Mebendazole (from
the second quarter), c) insecticide-treated mosquito net
v) Management of cases with risk factors: a) risk factors identified, b)
decision made correctly according to the consultation sheet (CPN), c)
information communicated to the woman
- Observation of 5 cases on he second and third visits:
i) Obstetrical examination
ii) Administration of the tetanus vaccin according to directives
iii) Correct prescription of: a) iron for pregnant women, b) folic acid,
c) Mebendazole (from the second trimester)
iv) Management of cases with complications: a) complications identified
b) decision taken correctly according to the flowchart, c) information
communicated to the woman
v) Existence of a delivery plan: a) detection of signs of hazards: (ab-





- Contraceptive methods: a) Contraceptive availability with theoretical
stock corresponding to the physical stock, b) quantified alert thresholds
determined and respected
- Existence of a system of feedback and search of cases that stopped
using contraceptive
Analysis of 10 fact sheets:
- Reason for the methods chosen by the client, methods for which the
client is eligible, and the method offered in relation to one indicated by
the interview, medical history, physical examination.
- Monitoring and follow-up: check in the register and the card if the
part followed was correctly and completely filled.
Vaccination - Availability of vaccines and diluents (BCG, OPV / IPV, MR,
PNEUMO, Pentavalent, ROTA TEQ, VAT and diluents):
a) physical presence of unexpired antigens with label, b) nothing was of
out of stock during the last 3 months
- Cold chain: a) temperature of the fridge within the limits (between
+2C–+8C) b) no break in the cold chain during the last 3 months
Direct observation of 4 children in receiving vaccination
- Systematic BCG scar search
- Vaccine preparation: a) vaccine control pellet (VVM) in good condi-
tion, b) dilution technique respected, c) use of a self-locking syringe, d)
appropriate dose
- Injection and asepsis: a) cleaning the injection site with cotton soaked
with water b) use of appropriate routes and injection sites, c) correct
use of receptacles and garbage cans
- Systematically recalled side effects
- Correct and complete registration: a) vaccination record b) vaccina-
tion record c) scorecard
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Tuberculosis - The stock of antituberculosis medication is managed correctly
- The data collection tools used by the TB Division are available and
in use
- The updated TB Division data collection tools are correctly completed
according to standard operating procedures for monitoring and evalua-
tion: a) laboratory voucher, b) base register, c) treatment sheets
- Glutathione peroxidase result availability time at the requesting site
for all samples sent : results available at the requesting site within 4
days of date of dispatch
- HIV test for suspected TB cases
- Contact examination done at the beginning and at the end of TB
treatment for theory of planned behavior
Analysis of chosen cases on the sheets and register:
- Correct management for any case diagnosed TB according to the na-
tional directives of the TB division (choose at random 2 cases):
a) laboratory voucher (TPB +) or proof of diagnosis must be attached
to the patient’s file
b) treatment in accordance with the categorization of patients
c) control sputum if indicated done in accordance with the bacteriolog-
ical monitoring algorithm
d) HIV test carried out
e) for TB/HIV co-infected cases, if ARV has been initiated according
to the guidelines of the HIV and TB program
- FOSA entered its full-time quarterly report to R-HIMS before the fifth
day of the month following the quarter evaluated
34
Hygiene - Presence of latrines and showers that a) are usable, b) have door that
closes, c) have available water and soap, d) have toilet paper and water,
e) have covered pit
- Clean rooms, courtyard and grounds
- All beds with sheets, blanket, long lasting bed nets, beds with plastic
mattresses and not torn
- Absence of organic waste, syringes and dangerous products in the yard,
in the rooms, or any other easily accessible place of the CS enclosure
by the population
- Availability of a water source (running water or well or pump or castle
/ water tank)
- Cleanliness in the delivery room
Laboratory - Available and functional equipment and materials
- No shortage of reagents and consumables
- Separate waste management (sharps, non-infectious and infectious ob-
jects) with color identifying each type of bin
- Presence of the wastewater evacuation system guaranteeing environ-
mental protection
- Existence of the quality control register of rapid malaria tests carried
out by community health workers in the villages
- Existence of a separate and well ventilated room for collecting, spread-




- Tariffs for procedures, laboratory, medicines and consumables, ambu-
lance: a) displayed, b) legible, c) at reception and at the cash register
d) respected
- Receipts completely filled in with proof of daily payment
- Surprise control of the cash register
- Daily revenue journal: a) available and up to date b) concordant with
the receipts, c) writing is legible and has no correction fluid d) daily
payments correspond with the daily revenue journal
- Expenditure journal available an up to date
- Bank cash book: a) available b) consistent with the supporting docu-
ments for expenditure and bank statements and the revenue journal c)
up to date d) without too many entries or spaces
- Availability of monthly and annual financial reports sent to the com-
petent authorities
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Pharmacy - Pharmacy premises conforming to standards
- General or stock pharmacy including all drugs: essential drugs, ARV,
IMCI drugs, malaria, FP, availability of at least one psychotropic drug
per category (neuroleptic, antiepileptic, and antidepressant)
- Pharmacy cleanliness: no dust on shelves and products, no cobwebs,
no water, no expired products in the pharmacy, no other things (food,
juice etc.) in the fridge
- Storage in accordance with standards
- Availability of drugs and tracer consumables (take a sample of 10
products and also observe on the shelves)
- Compliance with the procedure for destroying expired products
- Observation of the dispensing pharmacy:
- Equipment and materials available and used: a) water filter, b) spat-
ulas, c) spoons, d) clean cups, e) cutting object, f) packaging
- Use of tools and up-to-date filling
- Hygiene rules observed when handling medicines: a) use of spatulas
and spoons, b) medicine packaging, c) disposable towel to clean spoons
- Administration of drugs to the outpatient: a) give the first dose of
drug, b) explain how to take the drugs correctly and systematically
reminded at the time of distribution, c) pack and label the drugs for




- Calendar of quarterly activities including supervision, monthly CHW
meeting, training & retraining, quarterly evaluation of CHWs
- Quarterly report on community health activities carried out, sent to
the sector/district hospital
- Presentation of supervisory feedback during the monthly CHW meet-
ing (see meeting report)
- Medication management and tools for community health activities: a)
drug stock sheet completely and correctly completed, b) absence of a
break in
the tools of the program, c) no out-of-stock drugs or consumables, d)
concordance between physical stock and theoretical stock
- Minutes of the 3 monthly meetings of the quarter evaluated on the
analysis of community data with available CHWs
- Referral to the community: a) existence of a register of cases referred
by the community, b) concordance between register of reference cases
(choose 3 coupons at random), c) feedback from the health center to
the CHW notified in the register36
General - Minutes of the 3 monthly meetings of the last three months of the
quality improvement team available. Each report must fulfill the criteria
listed in element 1 of the checklist
- Minutes of the 3 monthly meetings of the last three months of available
staff.
- A quarterly meeting report of costs with acknowledgment of receipt
of the sector.
- Evaluation of the implementation of the activities of the previous
quarter of the quarterly plan of the health center
- Existence of budget line on equipment maintenance in the annual
action plan
- Clean water stations with liquid soaps available in consultation rooms,
hospital rooms and laboratories
Deliveries - Conditions of confidentiality in the waiting room, during delivery and
postpartum
- Equipment, and material available and functional
- Prevention of infections
- Drugs and consumables available
- Analysis of 10 partographs chosen at random: a) partograph filled
according to the norms, b) decision made in case of exceeding the alert
line within one hour, c) delivery by qualified personnel
Source: (Ministry of Health, 2018a)
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Table A2: Analysis: missing values
(1) (2) (3)
Variables All Rural Urban
Rural (15km) 0.0720**
(0.0332)
ln(Beds) 0.0891*** 0.0551 0.157***
(0.0311) (0.0390) (0.0551)
ln(Population catchment area) 0.0297 0.0406 -0.0121
(0.0476) (0.0629) (0.0675)
ln(Total outpatient visits) -0.0848* -0.0737 -0.115
(0.0480) (0.0576) (0.0765)
ln(Medicine costs /outpatient visit) 0.0179 0.0300 0.0139
(0.0325) (0.0380) (0.0612)
ln(Wages) -0.0586 -0.147** 0.151**
(0.0441) (0.0583) (0.0595)
Deliveries (%) -3.250 -2.745 -1.943
(2.658) (3.127) (4.907)
Malaria (%) -0.333** -0.561*** 0.275
(0.161) (0.197) (0.249)
Respiratory (%) -0.309** -0.391** -0.0368
(0.143) (0.182) (0.215)
Diarrhea/parasites (%) -0.254 -0.215 -0.363
(0.286) (0.335) (0.493)
Integrated management of 0.450** 0.473* 0.170
childhood illness (%) (0.207) (0.283) (0.271)
Oral/ear/eye/PCT (%) 0.418 0.137 1.105*
(0.277) (0.296) (0.564)
HIV (%) -7.254* -8.134* -6.702
(4.224) (4.766) (6.739)
Prental care (%) 0.802 0.529 1.173
(0.697) (0.752) (1.212)
Antenatal care(%) -4.709*** -6.004*** -2.029
(1.381) (1.577) (3.162)
Constant 1.609** 3.121*** -1.745*
(0.687) (0.939) (0.966)
Observations 2,616 1,709 907
R-squared 0.083 0.113 0.106
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the health center
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Table A5: Changes over time in quality difference between rural and urban
facilities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Rural 15km -5.445*** -4.831*** -5.127*** -3.623** -4.552***
(1.649) (1.659) (1.583) (1.672) (1.621)
2014 * Rural 15km -0.875 -0.929 -0.363 -1.065 -0.553
(1.388) (1.457) (1.508) (1.503) (1.545)
2015 * Rural 15km 1.976 1.229 2.376 0.870 1.913
(1.895) (1.990) (2.013) (2.070) (2.118)
2016 * Rural 15km 1.102 0.829 2.124 0.287 1.258
(1.951) (2.046) (2.052) (2.068) (2.083)
2017 * Rural 15km 2.580 2.074 3.250 1.128 2.229
(2.171) (2.305) (2.317) (2.304) (2.355)
2018 * Rural 15km -0.351 -0.460 0.321 -1.880 -0.827
(1.979) (2.073) (2.051) (2.072) (2.076)
Constant 409.8*** 417.9*** 193.8*** 368.0*** 208.2***
(1.285) (3.799) (40.48) (22.69) (41.72)
Observations 2,113 2,113 2,113 2,113 2,113
R-squared 0.034 0.104 0.190 0.137 0.206
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Case mix No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Structural inputs No No Yes No Yes
External context No No No Yes Yes
Notes: The results from estimating equation (1–4) are presented in columns 2–5
including rural-by-year interactions to account for differences in the quality gap
between rural and urban clinics over time. Column 1 controls for time fixed
effects, column 2 adds controls for case mix, and column 3 adds controls for
health infrastructure by including number of beds, population catchment area,
total wage expenditure, and drugs per visit. Column 4 controls for external
factors, and casemix, and column 5 includes all previous covariates such as health
infrastructure, external market factors, and casemix. All standard errors are
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including rural-by-year interactions to account for differences in the quality gap
between rural and urban clinics over time. Column 1 controls for time fixed
effects, column 2 adds controls for case mix, and column 3 adds controls for
health infrastructure by including number of beds, population catchment area,
total wage expenditure, and drugs per visit. Column 4 controls for external
factors, and casemix, and column 5 includes all previous covariates such as health
infrastructure, external market factors, and casemix. All standard errors are
clustered at the household level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure A1: The 10 largest cities and buffer zones
Notes: The main specification uses a buffer zone with a radius of 15 km to classify
rural and urban areas. In the robustness analysis, I include different buffer zones
of 10, 20, and 25 km. The red stars indicate the location of the 10 major cities
in Rwanda, while the black stars indicate the locations of district hospitals
42
Figure A2: Distribution of all quality indicators
(a) Data (b) Finance (c) General management
(d) Hygiene (e) Laboratory (f) Pharmacy
(g) Vaccination (h) Family planing (i) ANC
(j) Deliveries (k) Tuberculosis (l) CHW
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